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SAMENVATTING 
Het zijn meestal de economen die zich afvragen wat eigenlijk precies van 
fysieke planning kan worden verwacht. Waarom wordt zo vaak voorgesteld 
om de instrumenten toe te passen van de ruimtelijke ordening - waarmee 
met name het grondgebruik kan worden beïnvloed - en niet die waarmee de 
economen beter bekend zijn, zoals heffingen, subsidies en prijsmaatrege-
len? 
Met deze vragen wordt onze aandacht gericht op de soort maatregelen 
die kenmerkend zijn voor de ruimtelijke ordening. Hieraan kan de term 
fysieke maatregelen worden verbonden en die kunnen worden omschreven als 
maatregelen die rechtstreeks van invloed zijn op de fysieke omgeving 
zoals de grond en de gebouwen alsmede de bestemming die daaraan kan 
worden gegeven. Eveneens kan een anderssoortige maatregel - de financiële 
- worden onderscheiden: een dergelijke maatregel is rechtstreeks van -
invloed op de financiële omstandigheden waaronder particuliere beslis-
singen worden genomen. De zojuist gestelde vragen worden nu: waarom 
worden zo vaak veeleer fysieke dan financiële maatregelen voorgesteld 
om bepaalde doeleinden te bereiken? Of, meer in het algemeen: op welke 
wijze komt een overheidsbeslissing aangaande het gebruik van fysieke dan 
wel financiële maatregelen tot stand? 
Deze vragen zijn voor ons de aanleiding geweest tot het verrichten van 
een onderzoek naar de instrumenten van het overheidsbeleid en tot het 
analyseren van de overwegingen (aangaande, onder meer, de doeleinden, de 
omstandigheden en de organisatorische context) die van invloed zijn op 
de keuze van het te gebruiken instrumentarium. 
Het onderhavige onderzoek is zowel theoretisch als praktisch gericht. 
In de op de praktijk gerichte case studies worden de fysieke en de fi-
nanciële maatregelen onderzocht die door zeven lokale overheden (waar-
van vier in Engeland en drie in Nederland) zijn genomen die ten doel 
hadden de binnen hun grenzen voorkomende werkloosheid te verminderen. 
De vraag dringt zich daarbij op waarom de ene categorie maatregelen wel 
en de andere niet is gekozen. Wat is daarbij het effect geweest van de 
genomen maatregelen op de plaatselijke werkgelegenheid? Zijn beslissin-
gen om bepaalde soorten maatregelen te nemen wellicht op organisatori-
sche moeilijkheden gestrand? 
In hoofdstuk 1 worden de probleemstelling alsmede de door ons gebruik-
te begrippen uiteengezet. Ten eerste, wat moet worden verstaan onder 
"het doel van het beleid"? Wij vatten de doeleinden, waar de maatregelen 
op zijn gericht op als problemen die moeten worden verminderd en waar 
persoonlijke gevolgen aan kunnen zijn verbonden. Derhalve richt het 
onderzoek zich op het proces: er wordt een maatregel uitgevoerd en dien-
tengevolge worden problematische, persoonsgebonden omstandigheden ver-
beterd. Ten tweede, wat wordt bedoeld met een lokaal instrument? Zowel 
de aard als de intensiteit van de problemen verschilt van de ene lokatie 
tot de andere. Daarom is het wenselijk dat er maatregelen worden geno-
men, die lokatne-gencht zijn, dat wil zeggen dat zij slechts gelden 
voor bepaalde plaatsen (steden, regio's, provincies). Een instrument dat 
ruimte biedt voor zulk een plaatselijke toepassing heet een lokaal in-
strument. 
Voorafgaand aan een analyse van de eigenschappen van de fysieke en de 
financiële maatregelen alsmede van de gevolgen van een keuze tussen 
beide voor de praktijk moet de vraag worden gesteld door welke overwe-
gingen die keuze wordt beïnvloed. Een daarvoor te hanteren theoretisch 
kader wordt in hoofdstuk 2 gegeven. De grondslag daarvoor vloeit voort 
uit het argument dat voor overheidsinstanties die rationeel proberen te 
handelen twee overwegingen gelden. De een is gericht op de "technische" 
gevolgen van een maatregel en de andere heeft betrekking op bepaalde 
aspecten van de context waarbinnen de instantie handelt. De eerste vat-
ten wij samen onder de technische mogelijkheden - waarvan wij er zes 
onderscheiden - die inherent zijn aan het gekozen soort instrument. De 
tweede door ons genoemde overweging heeft betrekking op het kader dat 
voor de toepassing van het instrument geldt (als dat er niet geschikt 
voor is dan stuiten pogingen om het instrument wel toe te passen op 
organisatorische moei 11jkheden). 
Aan de bovenstaand vermelde case studies dient een grondige voorbe-
reiding vooraf te gaan en dat is de taak van hoofdstuk 3 waarin drie 
onderwerpen worden behandeld, te weten een beredeneerde structuur voor 
de case studies, de context (juridisch, bestuurlijk en oolitiek) waar-
binnen de lokale overheden hebben gehandeld en een theoretisch kader 
voor het bestuderen van de werkloosheidspolιtiek. Aan deze onderwerpen, 
waarvan alleen de hoofdpunten worden behandeld in hoofdstuk 3, wordt 
in de bijlagen uitvoerig aandacht besteed. 
De hoofdstukken 4 en 5 bevatten een analyse van de door een aantal 
lokale overheden genomen fysieke en financiële maatregelen en de keuze 
daartussen, gericht op de bestrijding van de werkloosheid. Tot de 
fysieke maatregelen worden gerekend het aanleggen van industrieterreinen, 
het bouwen van (of het renoveren van of het verbouwen tot) bedrijfs-
ruimtes en de totstandbrenging van infrastructurele voorzieningen. De 
door ons aangetroffen voorbeelden van financiële maatregelen zijn 
geldelijke steunverlening aan bedrijven (bijvoorbeeld subsidies, lenin-
gen, kredietgaranties) en het ter beschikking stellen van grond en ge-
bouwen tegen prijzen onder de marktwaarde. 
De door ons onderzochte Engelse steden (hoofdstuk 4) bevinden zich in 
de West Midlands Region: Dudley Metropolitan District, Coventry 
Metropolitan District en het bestuurlijke samenwerkingsverband (genaamd 
Birmingham Inner City Partnership) tussen Birmingham Metropol i tan 
District en West Midlands County Council. De drie onderzochte Neder-
landse gemeenten (hoofdstuk 5) zijn 's-Gravenhage, Eindhoven en 
Groningen. In iedere afzonderlijke case study betrekken wij: de van 
gemeentezijde genomen maatregelen, de daaraan ten grondslag liggende 
overwegingen, de gevolgen voor de werkgelegenheid van de genomen maat-
regelen en eventuele organisatorische problemen in verband met de uit-
voering hiervan. 
In hoofdstuk 6 staan wij kort stil bij de bevindingen van de case 
studies alsmede bij het nut van het in hoofdstuk 2 uiteengezette kader 
waarbinnen deze "studies" zijn onderzocht. Vermeldenswaard zijn zowel 
de overeenkomsten binnen elk land als de verschillen tussen de landen. 
In de onderzochte Nederlandse gemeente werden, in tegenstelling tot de 
onderzochte Engelse, regelmatig bedrijfsterreinen door lokale overheden 
aangelegd. In Nederland zijn steeds nieuwe bedrijfshallen verstrekt, in 
Engeland zowel nieuwe als opgeknapte. De Engelse "local authorities" 
hebben voorts regelmatig - weliswaar bescheiden - financiële steun ver-
leend, terwijl de Nederlandse gemeenten dat veelal aarzelend en op ad 
hoc basis hebben gedaan. 
In de hoofdstukken 7 en 8 keren wij terug naar ons hoofdthema: het 
onderzoek naar de eigenschappen van de lokale fysieke en financiële in-
strumenten - welke eigenschappen worden toegespitst op hun technische 
mogelijkheden en op de kaders waarbinnen zij het beste tot hun recht 
komen? De antwoorden worden theoretisch afgeleid en tevens "bijgekleurd" 
met behulp van de bevindingen van de case studies. De lokale fysieke 
instrumenten behandelen wij in hoofdstuk 7. Wij beargumenteren dat 
deze instrumenten geschikt zijn om problemen aan te pakken die in nauw 
verband staan met een fysieke omgeving die voor consumptiedoeleinden 
ontoereikend is, die direct of indirect voortvloeien uit een fysieke 
omgeving die ongeschikt is voor de productie van alle of enkele goederen, 
diensten of voor het scheppen van arbeidsplaatsen en die voortvloeien 
uit de ongunstige voorwaarden verbonden aan de fysieke omgeving voor 
bepaalde soorten sociaal gedrag (bijvoorbeeld omgaan met buren). In aan-
sluiting daarop wordt het karakter van de lokale fysieke instrumenten 
onderzocht ten opzichte van de overige negen overwegingen die van in-
vloed zijn op de keuze van een toe te passen instrument. 
De lokale financiële instrumenten worden aan een soortgelijk onder-
zoek in hoofdstuk 8 onderworpen. Als uitgangspunt wordt een denkbeeld 
uit de leer der openbare financiën gebruikt en wel de opvatting dat 
budgettaire maatregelen om drie redenen worden genomen: ten behoeve van 
de allocatie, de distributie en de (conjuncturele) stabilisatie. Door 
ons wordt deze opvatting "vertaald" in vier verschillende manieren 
waarop financiële maatregelen hun invloed kunnen doen gelden, te weten 
op de prijs en de hoeveelheden van de te produceren consumptiegoederen, 
de productiemethoden, de inkomens- en vermogensverdeling en de schaal 
van de door consumenten en producenten genomen beslissingen. Zodoende 
kunnen vier soorten problemen worden onderscheiden waar de financiële 
maatregelen rechtstreeks van invloed op zijn. Vervolgens worden de 
eigenschappen van de lokale financiële instrumenten onderzocht ten op-
zichte van de overige negen overwegingen die van invloed zijn op de 
keuze van een toe te passen instrument. 
De resultaten worden in hoofdstuk 9 vermeld. Daar wordt uiteengezet 
dat er enige, voor de praktijk zeer belangrijke, verschillen tussen 
fysieke en financiële instrumenten bestaan, verschillen die voortvloeien 
uit de uiteenlopende manieren waarop de instrumenten, enerzijds op de 
fysieke omgeving en anderzijds op de financiële omstandigheden, recht-
streeks inwerken. De hier te signaleren verschillen leiden tot de con-
clusie dat financiële instrumenten vaak krachtiger zijn dan fysieke 
en derhalve geschikter zijn voor de oplossing van problemen onder een 
breder scala van omstandigheden. Hieraan zijn bovendien de volgende 
consequenties verbonden. Ten eerste: in vergelijking tot de fysieke 
instrumenten kunnen van de financiële, die in één lokatie worden toege-
past, relatief grote gevolgen buiten die lokatie worden verwacht. Mede 
op grond hiervan dient - ten tweede - te worden geconstateerd dat 
financiële instrumenten minder vaak aan de lokale overheden worden toe-
vertrouwd dan fysieke. Ten derde, de politici, die zo weinig mogelijk 
in het marktmechanisme willen ingrijpen, blijken beducht te zijn voor 
het gebruik van financiële instrumenten zodat zij zich veelal beperken 
tot het nemen van fysieke maatregelen - hetgeen dan als "neutraal" en 
"technisch noodzakelijk" wordt beschouwd. 
Ten slotte worden enkele implicaties van onze denkbeelden voor het 
praktische beleid uiteengezet Ten eerste: daar afzonderlijk genomen 
fysieke maatregelen meestal vrij zwak zijn, dient een probleem met een 
hoge politieke prioriteit primair met behulp van financíele instrumen-
ten te worden aangepakt Dit is van bijzonder belang ten tijde van een 
laag-conjunctuur. fysieke instrumenten zijn dan immers m e t bijster 
sterk aangezien hun effectiviteit afhankelijk is van een al bestaande 
vraag naar het gebruik van grond en gebouwen. Toch zijn fysieke maat-
regelen soms onmisbaar voor de totstandkoming van andere, wenselijk 
geachte veranderingen of ten behoeve van de uitwerking van andere be-
leidsmaatregelen. Ten tweede, indien de financiële instrumenten tot de 
bevoegdheden van de plaatselijke overheid behoren dan zal de landelijke 
overheid meestal op bepaalde controles aandringen. Dit is zo, omdat 
de financiële instrumenten relatief grote inter-lokale effecten kunnen 
veroorzaken en omdat de centrale overheid steeds zal willen voorkomen 
dat de ene lokale overheid de belangen van de andere schaadt. Ten derde: 
voordat vele politici bereid zijn krachtige financiële instrumenten te 
gebruiken, zullen zij extra voorzorgsmaatregelen eisen. Ten vierde 
daar de effectiviteit van de fysieke en de financiële instrumenten onder^ 
ling en ten opzichte van elkaar soms sterk verschilt, is het vaak wense-
lijk dat zij in hun samenhang en m e t afzonderlijk worden toegepast 
Tot slot worden in twee "epilogen" enkele persoonlijke meningen ge-
uit De eerste heeft betrekking op de staat van de theorie van de ruim-
telijke planning en met name op het ontbreken van stevig gefundeerde 
theorieën aangaande het verband tussen het nemen van fysieke maatregelen 
en de effecten daarvan. Met dit werk hopen wij een positieve bijdrage 
te hebben geleverd aan het verminderen van deze omissie. De tweede be-
treft de aard van het instrumentarium om de werkloosheid aan te pakken. 
Hier wordt gepleit voor meer financiële instrumenten die door lokale 
overheden kunnen worden toegepast 
CURRICULUM VITAE 
Barne Needham, geboren in 1942 te ßowdon, Cheshire (Engeland) bezocht 
van 1952 tot 1960 The Manchester Grammar School Aan de University of 
Cambridge (Pembroke College) heeft híj de natuurkunde twee jaar bestu-
deerd, daarna is hij tot de economische wetenschappen overgeschakeld 
in welke discipline hij afstudeerde 
Zijn eerste betrekking was bij het particuliere planbureau Shankland 
Cox Partnership, waar hij drie jaar full-time werkzaam was, gevolgd door 
een part-time adviseurschap gedurende negen jaar In die werkkring heeft 
hij contact onderhouden met verschillende opdrachtgevers (nationale en 
lokale overheid, het bedrijfsleven, de Verenigde Naties), daarbij wer-
den planmngsvraagstukken op nationaal (binnenstedel ι ]k, stedelijk, 
streek, provinciaal en nieuwe steden) en op internationaal niveau (Enge­
land, Wales, Jugoslavie, Jamaica) behandeld 
Als universitair docent is hij in 1967 begonnen bij de opleiding pla­
nologie aan The Central London Polytechnic In 1970 verhuisde hij naar 
Birmingham alwaar hij een positie aanvaardde aan The University of Aston 
in Birmingham als coordinator van een driejarige cursus "urban planning" 
Op grond van zijn publicatie Economic planning for cities' werd hem in 
1977 door de University of Aston de degree Master of Philosophy toege­
kend Tevens heeft hij gedurende drie jaar de voorzittersfunctie bekleed 
van de landelijke 'Education for Planning Association' Sinds het begin 
van 1978 is hij als wetenschappelijk hoofdmedewerker verbonden aan het 
Geografisch en Planologisch Instituut (vakgroep planologie) van de 
Katholieke Universiteit te Nijmegen 
Als een econoom die binnen de planologie actief is, heeft hij zich in 
het bijzonder met drie onderzoeksterreinen beziggehouden, te weten het 
verdiepen van het inzicht in de economische aspecten van het planolo­
gische en het ruimtelijke ordeningsbeleid, het werkgelegenheidsvraagstuk 
op lokaal niveau en het vraagstuk van de grondprijsvorming in samenhang 
met het grondbeleid Zijn eerste boek handelde over het eerste zojuist 
genoemde onderzoeksterrein ('How cities work', Pergamon, 1977) In 1979 
werd dit gevolgd door 'Guidelines for a local employment study' (Saxon 
House) dat betrekking heeft op het tweede onderzoeksveld en in 1980 is 
van de handen van dr В Kruyt en hem een boek gepubliceerd waarin het 
derde, hier genoemde, probleemgebied centraal staat ("Grondprijsvorming 
en grondprijspolitiek', Stenfert Kroese te Leiden) Met zijn proefschrift 
'Choosing the right policy instruments' is deels sprake van een terug­
koppeling naar een economische analyse van het ruimtelijke ordemngs- en 
het werkgelegenheidsbeleid 
Van zijn hand zijn voorts artikelen en recensies verschenen in The 
Journal of the Royal Town Planning Institute, Official Architecture and 
Planning, Urban Studies, Regional Studies, The Architects' Journal, 
International Journal of Environmental Studies, Plan, Stedebouw en Volks­
huisvesting en in het Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie 
CHOOSING THE RIGHT POLICY INSTRUMENTS 

Choosing the Right Policy 
Instruments 
An Investigation of Two Types of 
Instrument, Physical and Financial, 
and a Study of their Application to 
Local Problems of Unemployment 
BARRIENEEDHAM 
Institute of Geography 
and Planning, 
University of Nijmegen, 
The Netherlands 
Gower 
© D.B.Needham, 1982. 
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, 
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any 
means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, 
without the prior permission of Gower Publishing Company Limited. 
Published by 
Gower Publishing Company Limited, 
Gower House, Croft Road, Aldershot, Hampshire, England. 
ISBN 0-566-00608-1 
Printed and bound in Great Britain by 
Biddies Ltd Guildford and King s Lynn 
Contents 
Foreword 
PART I THE ISSUE AND A FRAMEWORK FOR STUDYING IT 
1 Local instruments, physical and financial 
2. A framework for choosing a type of instrument 
PART II THE ISSUE IN PRACTICE, LOCAL GOVERNMENTS CHOOSING 
MEASURES FOR TACKLING UNEMPLOYMENT 
3 Preparation for the case studies 
4. Four English local authorities 
5 Three Dutch gemeenten 
6. The theory and the practice, some interim conclusions 
PART III THE ISSUE INVESTIGATED FURTHER 
7 Local physical instruments 
8 Local financial instruments 
9 Results and practical implications 
APPENDICES 
I A method for estimating the employment effects of loca 
enployment measures 
II The background to the employment measures being taken 
by local governments in England and the Netherlands 
III A theoretical framework for local employment measures 
Bibl lography 
ν 
Foreword 
The ideas and theories set out in this work started to grow several 
years ago when I was a lecturer at the University of Aston in Birmingham, 
in the Department of Architectural, Planning and Urban Studies. Since 
moving to the Netherlands at the beginning of 1978 and joining the staff 
of the Department of Town Planning (vakgroep planologie) of the 
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facilities for working out the ideas into their present form. 
The ideas have been explored in very close combination with empirical 
research into measures being taken by local governments to tackle un-
employment in their areas, research which likewise began in England at 
the University of Aston and continued in the Netherlands under the 
auspices of the Economic Institute of the University of Nijmegen. Some 
of the results of those investigations are to be found in this work 
Because it was necessary, for this work, to update and supplement the 
results of the practical investigations I had done in England some 
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University of Nijmegen and one by the Netherlands Organisation for the 
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study trips by my former colleagues at Aston University 
Those studies of local governments involved very many discussions with 
the officials working there, and I never failed to be amazed by the 
courtesy and kindness with which those busy people received me It is 
always claimed, by researchers, that studies of public policy come about 
by a symbiotic relationship between the researcher and the public 
official: both need each other. In practice, the relationshio is all 
too often parasitic, with the researcher using the official and giving 
nothing back. It is my sincere hope that with this work I am giving 
something back, for I have written it in order to try to elucidate, and 
therefore make slightly less difficult, some of the very complex 
decisions with which public authorities are faced 
Elaine Kirby must be warmly thanked for she has been typing bits and 
pieces of this work for so many years, some sections of it more times 
than we care to count. The final version was typed by Henny Wigman, with 
astonishing rapidity. Jan Coenen of the Institute of Geography and 
Planning, University of Nijmegen, drew all the maps, graphs, and 
diagrams. 
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1 Local instruments, physical and 
financial 
THE ISSUE 
The economist working in town planning, as it has been the author's 
pleasure to do for many years now, experiences a state of mind to 
which we can apply the term "cognitive dissonance". This term is 
borrowed from Festinger (1957) who invented it to describe the state 
when a person knows and is troubled by various things that are not 
psychologically consistent with each other: we want to stretch it to 
describe the state when a person knows various things that are not 
intellectually consistent, in this case the disciplinary world of 
economic theory and the professional world of town planning practice. 
Festinger's theory is that people experiencing cognitive dissonance 
will be motivated to try to reduce it: and that idea also we can 
apply here. For a common reaction of economists is to allow themselves 
to be sucked into the social world of town planning, and the economist 
who successfully avoids that and who wants steadfastly to practise and 
develop the craft of economics tries to relate the two worlds to each 
other. So questions are posed such as: how can I analyse the activity 
of town planning in terms of the theory of economics7 and, how can I 
relate this activity of town planning to the theory and practice of 
national economic planning and/or macroeconomie policy9 
This present work originated in yet another attempt to resolve this 
cognitive discord. The starting point has been the type of measure 
that town planning typically proposes. "Attempts have been made to 
expand the compass of town planning means, but their recurring kernel 
interest does appear to lie with the management of land development by 
the public sector" say Pearce et al (1978, p.l). And no sooner has that 
been made explicit than economists begin to raise the question: why do 
town planners use such land-use controls in order to achieve whatever 
it is that they are trying to achieve, rather than other types of 
measures - such as subsidies and taxes - with which economists are more 
f am 1 lar ? 
Some economists confine themselves to the aim of trying to achieve 
a given pattern of land uses and consider physical and financial measures 
as alternative means. And so we find Netzer (1975, chap.5) discussing 
the advantages of replacing the yes/no control of land-use zoning with 
the variable control of taxes and subsidies on different land uses, 
Mills (1979) takes the discussion further by considering the conditions 
in which land-use zoning or a Pigovian tax/subsidy system would be 
better; Parry Lewis (1979, chap 11) considers briefly a tax on rents 
that varies from use to use and from place to place in order to implement 
1 
a preferred-use policy instead of a rigid land-use control policy, and 
Winger (1977, chap. 14) considers a system of financial transfers as an 
alternative to land-use zoning as applied in order to reduce "exter­
nality problems" (i.e when one land use affects adversely other land 
uses). 
Other economists have considered the use of physical measures to 
achieve other goals besides a desired land use and they have asked the 
question: would financial measures be better9 For example, Harrison 
(1977, chap.7) compares 'regulatory' (i.e. by land-use controls) and 
'fiscal' methods of "purposeful intervention in the urban economy", 
Wright (1969) suggests that some of the problems in the inner areas of 
big cities might be better tackled by financial stimuli to engender 
economic growth, than by a further round of town plans, the West 
Midlands County Council (1976) suggests using the rating system (i.e. 
a local property tax) to protect local shops and fιrns which are 
socially important but financially weak, instead of trying to achieve 
the same goal by an extension of development control (i.e land-use 
regulation) powers. 
That is, then, in general terms, the issue with which this work is 
concerned how do you decide when to apply physical (i.e. typically 
town planning) measures and when financial measures and not only in 
order to achieve a desired land use, but other goals also7 
The general issue has been posed several times but never fully 
investigated. (1) And when partial investigations have been made they 
have tended to concentrate on the question of efficiency: which type of 
measure would be economically most efficient7 Mills (1979) for example 
considers the case where there are interdependencies in the urban land 
market and deduces that where the sensitivity to such interdependencies 
is high then land-use zoning is economically more efficient, otherwise 
a Pigovian tax/subsidy scheme is better. And Willis (1980, ρ 260) 
considers that "standards, rule-making, zoning, development control and 
enforcement, the traditional policy instruments of town planning, are 
crude, improvident, inelegant and myopic in nature and astigmatic in 
effect. All too often such policy instruments give rise to serious 
inefficiency and inequity .... In the areas where private and social 
welfare differ, economics advocates that market methods, i.e pricing, 
be used to equate private with social welfare once more" 
In this study, however, we shall not try to compare the efficiency of 
physical and financial instruments The main reason is that there are 
considerations which logically must precede that of efficiency. One 
such is the consideration of effectiveness: will the measure, in any 
case, have the desired effect7 (2) Another is the consideration of 
what we call the contextual appropriateness of an instrument by that 
we mean that a proposal to take a particular measure will not be 
accepted or will not be effected if it is not appropriate to the con­
text of the decision-making. (3) 
The question which we shall be trying to answer here must therefore 
be qualified, how do you decide, apart from considerations of economic 
efficiency, when to apply physical and when financial measures7 Even 
with that qualification, however, that is a difficult question and to 
investigate it thoroughly requires carefully and appropriately defined 
concepts· it is the main aim of this chapter to introduce these 
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definitions. First, however, the structure of the work and the de­
velopment of the argument will be sketched. 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE WORK 
In the first two chapters we outline the theoretical context of this 
work. Chapter 1 describes the issue and introduces and defines the 
necessary concepts, Chapter 2 proposes a framework for studying 
decisions about the use of types of intrument and it describes the 
research method and its consequences for the structure of the work and 
for the significance which can be attached to the results 
We want to be able to investigate the working out in practice of 
the distinction between physical and financial instruments and to do 
that we have studied local governments taking physical and financial 
measures in order to try to reduce unemployment. In Chapter 3 infor­
mation is presented which is essential for a good understanding of the 
case studies. However, in order to interrupt the main argument as 
little as possible, much of that preparation has been put into append­
ices. appendix I gives a method for estimating the employment effects 
of local employment neasures, appendix II presents the background to 
the employment measures being taken in England and the Netherlands, 
and in appendix III a theoretical framework is offered for a better 
understanding of local employment measures Chapter 4 contains four case 
studies of English local authorities choosing and using physical and 
financial instruments, and Chapter 5 does the same for three "gemeenten" 
in the Netherlands. These case studies are described within the frame­
work proposed in chapter 2, and Chapter 6 makes some comments on that 
framework in the light of the case studies and then applies it to 
explaining some of the significant findings of the studies. 
There follows a theoretical analysis of two types of local instrument 
(physical in Chapter 7 and financial in Chapter Θ) within that frame­
work The procedure is to start from the definition of the type of 
instrument and from there to deduce its inherent technical possibilities 
and the context approoriate to it, using the variables as proposed in 
chapter 2. Although most of that investigation is theoretical, it is 
supported and illustrated by the practical findings from the case 
studies. Finally, the most important results are presented in Chapter 9, 
the first part of which contains the conclusions of the theoretical 
investigations about the difference between physical and financial 
instruments, and the second part translates those conclusions into the 
implications for practice. 
INSTRUMENTS AND MEASURES 
We are investigating two types of instruments/measures, and we start 
by defining these Policy instruments are "the possibilities which are 
legally available to pubiic bodies for the steering of certain processes 
in order to achieve certain desired effects" (Bringmann 1973, p.7) or 
'quantities with which processes can be influenced in order to achieve 
a desired situation' (Gemeente Groningen, undated, p. 3/10). Each 
application of an instrument is a measure: "a measure is the use of a 
particular instrument at a particular time in order to promote one or 
more objectives" (Kirschen et al, 1964, p. 17). (4) 
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Hazelhoff (1976) makes the distinction between direct and indirect 
instruments. As examples of indirect instruments he gives policy plans 
and statements, and they are indirect in that they cannot be apolied 
directly to "consumers or interested parties", such instruments are 
designed for the long-term (more than 10 years) or middle-term (between 
5 and 10 years). Indirect instruments create the framework or conditions 
within which direct instruments can be applied, as part of the daily 
execution of policy. 
In order to keep the investigation as concrete as possible we restrict 
ourselves to direct instruments and to the measures which they make 
possible. And as a consequence, when considering public agencies 
deciding what type of measure to use we shall be considering what Paludi 
(1979) calls "operational decisions". These are "decisions as to the 
use of regulatory and initiatory powers", they are taken "as and when 
an irretrievable degree of committment is reached and action is taken 
on the environment", and they are distinguished from decisions about the 
making of guidelines or plans which "should be seen as guiding frame-
works for the exercise of control powers and for the use of resources 
for promoting desired ends" (5) And our reason for thus focussing 
on direct instruments/operational decisions is the same as Faludi's. 
because that's where the money/action ÍS'. 
PHYSICAL AND FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS 
The starting point for this investigation has been the tyoe of measure 
that town planners typically use. How can we define and delimit a 
type of measure in such a way that it can both be subjected to theo-
retical analysis and related to the practice of town planning7 We 
introduce the idea of a physical instrument as follows 
If a measure acts directly upon the physical environment - land and 
buildings and the general uses to which they may be put - we call that 
a physical measure, and the instrument which was used in order to 
implement that measure is, correspondingly, a physical instrument 
Consulting the legislation that supports town and country planning in 
England and Wales and "ruimtelijke ordening" (ι e "spatial planning") 
in the Netherlands (mainly, the 1971 Town and Country Planning Act and 
the 1965 "Wet op de Ruimtelijke Ordening", respectively) we see that 
the legislation gives powers for controlling the use that may be made 
of the physical environment. That is, the legislation confers certain 
physical instruments on public agencies. To that extent, town and 
country planning in England and Wales and ruimtelijke ordening" in 
the Netherlands are both types of planning effected largely by the use 
of physical measures. (6) 
The economist might want to compare such physical instruments with 
those with which he is more familiar So out of the latter we want to 
choose a category which can be defined, analysed, and compared with 
physical instruments. We call a financial measure one which acts 
directly upon the financial circumstances within which people make 
decisions, and financial instruments are defined accordingly Included 
within financial measures are, therefore, grants and subsidies, loans 
and allowances, taxes and levies, price controls, management of the 
size of demand and supply by national monetary and fiscal measures, etc. 
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Consulting the instruments that are used for implementing national 
macro-economic policy in a range of countries (see, e.g., the list in 
Kirschen et al, 1964), we see that almost all of them are financial in 
the sense just defined (7) That is, national macro-economic policy 
is implemented mainly by the use of financial measures (8) Moreover, 
the suggestions made by some economists for alternatives to town 
planning instruments (see above) also fall within our definition of 
financial instruments. 
Two types of instrument have now been defined but we do not want to 
imply that there are not more than those two. Hazelhoff (1976) for 
example distinguishes three types (of direct instruments) which may be 
used to influence the form of the physical environment - physical, 
financial, and juridicial. Physical instruments he defines as are those 
interventions by public agencies in the physical environnent ("de ruim­
te") by which the public agencies themselves (by commissioning building 
or civil engineering contractors) create the conditions for further 
social activities (he instances the provision of infrastructure). As 
examples of financial instruments he names oremiums and subsidies, 
contributing risk-bearing capital to firms, and levies. Juridicial 
instruments are those regulations which impose limts on activities by 
requiring that private individuals and firms apply for permission before 
starting certain activities - Hazelhoff names the building regulations, 
environmental health laws, pollution control, etc 
We divide Hazelhoff's juridicial instruments into two - those which 
try to control the form and general type of buildings and other land 
use, and those which try to control activities within the given 
buildings or land uses. The former are called negative physical 
instruments, because by them public agencies try to control the form 
of the physical environment by regulations about what private firms 
and individuals will not be allowed to do to the physical environment 
Hazelhoff's physical instruments (see above) are then instruments of 
positive physical planning, because by them public agencies themselves 
change the physical environment and together - ι e both negative and 
positive - they make the category of physical instruments. 
There remain over certain of Hazelhoff's direct instruments which are 
neither physical nor financial but "juridicial (e g environmenta1 
health laws and pollution control) and in addition there is a whole 
range of indirect instruments The existence of other types of 
instrument besides the physical and the financial becomes clear in 
appendix II where are listed the instruments available to local 
governments in England and the Netherlands for tackling local em­
ployment problems. There we come across numerous instruments which are 
neither physical nor financial - e g . training schemes, promotion and 
the giving of advice. It is convenient to call all these other in­
struments "organisational' (rather than "juridicial"). This classifi­
cation of instruments and measures is illustrated in figure 1 1 
INSTRUMENTS «ΙΤH A LOCAL APPLICATION 
We now want to identify a further property of instruments by 
distinguishing between those instruments which must be applied to the 
whole country (nationally) and those which can be applied "locally", 
that is, so that they act upon or are valid for certain areas of a 
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DIRECT INSTRUMENTS 
physical 
negative 
eg development 
control 
positive 
eg public 
works 
financial 
inhibiting 
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stimulating 
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eg power to 
refuse 
planning 
permission 
eg power to 
build roads 
eg power to 
levy property 
taxes 
eg grants to 
industrial 
development in 
certain areas 
Figure 1.1 Classification of 
instruments and measures 
country and not for other areas. Examples of national instruments are 
powers to control the money supply and to fix personal income tax rates 
(the rate does not depend on where the person lives or works), examples 
of local instruments are powers to build a bridge in A (but not in B) 
or to give a greater investment allowance to a firm expanding in A than 
to a firm expanding in B. (9) 
The distinction national/local can be applied to instruments in two 
ways - either an administrative distinction (which level of government 
applies the instrument, national or local7) or a distinction according 
to the area to which the instrument is applied (nationally - i.e. 
uniformly over the whole country, or locally - ι e to some parts of 
the country and not to others). In this work, we use the idea of local 
in the latter sense - an instrument which allows a local application 
(irrespective of whichever level of government applies it). The two 
ways of distinguishing between local and national are, however, 
interrelated as follows: a local government may apply instruments only 
in local areas, whereas a central government may apply instruments both 
locally and nationally 
instrument applied instrument applied 
by local government by national government 
instrument applied to 
local area 
instrument applied 
throughout country 
e.g powers to 
build a road 
e.g subsidies under 
industrial location 
pol ι су 
(not possible) e.g. macro-economic 
policy 
The case studies in chapters 4 and 5 are of the use made of physical 
and financial instruments by local governments, we can see therefore 
that those case studies are necessarily of the use made of local 
instruments in the "area of application" sense, and that the area of 
application is the size of one or a grouping of local government areas 
In this work we consider only those instruments which allow a local 
application, and we pay particular attention to the different locational 
effects of local applications of physical and financial instruments. 
One reason is that the starting point is the type of measure typically 
proposed by town planning, and such measures are principally local. 
positive physical planning involves the public agency changing the 
physical environment in certain locations, and negative physical 
planning consists of regulating private physical development in specific 
geographical areas (10): because we are conducting a parallel 
investigation of physical instruments and financial instruments we shall 
restrict ourselves to financial instruments which can be applied locally. 
A second reason is that we are concerned with problems which have 
specific local manifestations and, as is argued later, such local proble 
problems can often best be tackled with local measures. A further reason 
is that local financial instruments are currently not widely apolied (11) 
so it is the national financial instruments (the effects of tax measures 
or of import controls, for example) which are much better understood: yet 
if financial instruments which can be applied locally might be important 
they ought to be investigated further. That is one of the main aims of 
this work, but before we can carry it out we need to introduce some more 
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ideas, terms, and definitions. 
THE APPROACH TO PROBLEMS 
One of the fundamental ideas in th 
take measures in order to achieve 
in chapter 2). Further, we find it 
which a measure is taken by a pubi 
be alleviated (12) and useful also 
personal terms by asking, who is s 
developed in Needham 1977(b), app. 
people experience as problematic a 
such: there is a political select! 
remains, analyse the measures take1 
personal circumstances which they 
Before a problem so defined can 
how have those personal circumstan 
regarded as unacceptable, arisen'7 
of the causes of the problem, and 
lous to talk of the real causes of 
understand problems by investigati 
set of technical conditions which 
to explain the existence of the st 
doing we are not rejecting the ide 
we are making the point that, when 
effect relationships which give π 
there can be many ways of interven 
is work is that public agencies 
specific goals (the idea is expanded 
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ic agency in terms of a problem to 
to formulate such problems in 
uffering what 7 (the argument is 
l.A) Not all circumstances which 
re accepted by public agencies as 
on. Nevertheless, the guideline 
η by public agencies in terms of the 
are supposed to alleviate (13) 
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:a of causality - far from it Rather, 
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Figure 1.2 Problems and their explanatory conditions 
other than trying to trace the cause-and-effect chains back to one or 
a few "underlying causes" (14) 
LOCAL PROBLEMS AND LOCAL MEASURES 
The severity of a problem often differs between geographical areas 
For example, one part of a city might have bad housing, another part 
not, or one town might suffer air pollution and another not, or one 
region might have 8% male unemployment whereas another region has only 
2%. Thus we can talk about local problens. 
This is not inconsistent with the approach of nethodological 
individualism which we have chosen to follow. "People have problems, 
not cities" is the well known dictum of Herbert Gans. A "local problem" 
can arise when the number or proportion of people in a local area who 
experience a particular problem exceeds that level below which it was 
not regarded as a political issue (e.g. 0.5% unemployment is not a 
political problem, 10% unemployment is) or when the intensity of the 
problem experienced by a given number of people penetrates the political 
consciousness (e.g. in area A 1000 people are sharing dwellings but 
not bathrooms, in area В 1000 people are sharing dwellings including 
bathrooms, and the conditions in В are regarded as problematic but those 
in A not) 
If there are local problems in that sense, then it follows that some 
of the explanatory conditions must be different locally than nationally 
And if measures are going to be taken to change those conditions which 
are present locally but not nationally or which are more intense 
locally than nationally, then it is usually more efficient to apply 
those measures only to the localities where they are required, not 
nationally. That is, local problems can often best be tackled with 
local measures (perhaps in conjunction with national measures) (15) 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PROBLEMS AND MEASURES 
A measure is an action which changes conditions outside the public 
agency taking it, in what Friend and Jessop (1969, p.88) call the 
"external planning environment". Now, in order to alleviate a problem, 
a measure must change one or more of the "explanatory conditions" which 
have caused the problem- but the connection between the measure and the 
problem can be very indirect. 
In order to investigate the cause-and-effect chain between the means 
and the end we use an analytical framework from Lipsey (1972, ρ 690) 
which, although it comes from the theory of economic policy, can be 
applied just as well here That diagram can now be superimposed upon 
the earlier problems/explanatory conditions diagram, and the resulting 
figure (1 3) then illustrates the general relationship between the 
taking of a measure and the alleviating of a problem 
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Upsey's terms our terms 
powers instruments 
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the "external 
planning 
environment" 
which is 
imnediately 
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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS GENEPAL ISSUE 
"How do you decide when to apply physical measures and when financial 
measures in order to tackle local problems7" is the question we have 
set ourselves. That a number of other economists have already posed 
similar questions is an indication that others find the issue important. 
We now outline why we consider the issue to be theoretically significant 
and in the rest of this work we shall develop the theoretical 
investigation and in addition attempt to show that the issue is 
practically important too. 
The significance of the definitions of instruments, measures, and 
problems (and our main reason for formulating them thus) is that they 
focus attention on the process. 
implementing change in the 
a measure ^ conditions experienced 
by people 
This process can be given the name of "the process by which measures 
work". A public body implements a measure and sooner or later, 
directly or indirectly, to a greater or lesser extent, and probably 
accompanied by side-effects, the problem situation changes for the 
better and the unacceotable conditions which some people were suffering 
are ameliorated. (That, at least, is what the public body hopes, the 
measure might not work.) 
instrumental variables 
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power 
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Figure 1 3 How policy instruments work 
We would expect physical measures to work fundamentally differently 
from financial measures. A physical measure either changes the physical 
environment directly (a road is built or a house expanded) or controls 
directly the use which others may make of the physical environment 
(e.g. a street is pedestrianised, a olot of land may not be built upon). 
then people respond to those changes in one way or the other, possibly 
setting off a whole chain of events (i.e "any number of intermediate 
variables"), and the problematic personal circumstances are thereby 
changed. A financial measure changes directly the financial circumstances 
within which people (consumers and producers) make their decisions 
people respond to those changes and make different decisions, and the 
problematic personal circumstances are thereby changed. The difference, 
then, between physical and financial measures is that they present 
different kinds of stimuli to private actors and we would e 
therefore, those actors to react to them in different ways 
therefore, an essential 
the question "How do you 
when financial measures9 
Moreover, we shall show 
is of practical importan 
or a financial measure с 
significantly different: 
difference betwee 
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to make that choice better. 
NOTES 
(1) Parry Lewis (1979, p.187) for example says "Some form of interven­
tion in the free-market determnation of land-use is necessary. 
Unfortunately a blend of control by land-use consequences with 
zone or plot-specific taxes has not yet emerged, despite its 
apoarent advantages'. 
(2) The size of that effect, compared with the size of the measure 
needed to bring it about, constitutes the consideration of 
efficiency 
(3) A second reason is that the theoretical framework necessary for 
such a comparison must rely heavily on welfare economics and that 
is so abstract, because of the number of simplifying assumptions 
that it must make that few of the conclusions are applicable in 
practice 
(4) A similar distinction but in slightly different words is expressed 
by In 't Veld (1978, ρ 38) "Instruments are those things with 
which people attempt to influence processes in order to reach a 
desired situation (the objectives). Activi ties are the actions 
which result from handling the instruments" (DBN's emphasis). What 
In 't Veld calls "activities" we have called "measures". 
(5) It will be seen that this distinction between "regulatory and 
initiatory Dowers" and "guideline or plans" is the sane as Hazel-
hoff's distinction between direct and indirect instruments 
(6) However, ohysical planning (Britain) or "ruimtelijke ordening" 
(Netherlands) cannot be defined as planning effected by physical 
methods. They are types of planning better defined not by the means 
(measures used) but by the ends (or intermediate ends) viz. a 
better physical environment. For example, the plan "Binnen de Ruit" 
(Gemeente Rotterdam, 1978) is a plan for the physical structure 
of the gemeente, and it contains a full list of the instruments 
available to a Dutch gemeente for realising a physical plan 
(pp.141-152) That list contains much more than "physical instru­
ments", as defined here. 
(7) And that can cause confusions with our definitions If economic 
policy is implemented largely by the use of a certain type of 
measure, why not call those measures "economic"7 The reason is 
that al 1 policy measures (physical included) are economic, in the 
sense that they all involve the use of scarce economic resources 
see the discussion about economic policy at the start of chapter 8. 
(8) However, macro-economic policy can be effected by other types of 
measures also, such as physical measures, ohysical direction of 
resources, exhortation. 
(9) There is another type of instrument which falls between the 
national and local types as defined This type is aoplied to 
individual cases, and the size of the application per case is 
the same throughout the country: however, the number of cases to 
which the instrument may be applied is locationally restricted so 
that more cases are affected in some areas than in others An 
example would be a grant to people undergoing training, the grant 
is nationally umform, but in region A only 1000 persons per year 
may receive it (however many might be eligible) whereas in region 
В 5000 persons oer year may receive it region В is favoured 
because the need there for training is greater In some 
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circumstances this type of instrument falls within our definition 
of national, at other tines it is local. For example, at the 
beginning of the financial year people in every region will be able 
to get a training grant: the application is national Later on 
in the year, some regions have allocated all their quota and the 
grant is available in the other regions only: the application is 
now local. 
(10) Such regulation is sometimes by planning norms which are aoplied 
uniformly throughout the country. Nevertheless, an instrument 
by which measures can be taken in some specific locations and 
not in others is still, by our definition, a local instrument. 
(11) Applications can however be found if we look to industrial location 
policy in Britain and to "regionaal sociaal-economisch beleid" 
in the Netherlands, where financial incentives are applied in order 
to stimulate industrial growth in certain parts of the country. 
(12) The arguments are to be found in Needham 1971 and in Needham and 
Paludi 1973 The arguments have been strengthened by later empirical 
work done by de Klerk 1978, and In 't Veld (1978) nakes an ex-
haustive list of the disadvantages of working with "goals" rather 
than with oroblens. 
(13) Popper (1960, pp.323-4) distinguishes between "methodological 
individualism" and "methodological collectivism". The first 
approach analyses in terms of individuals interacting in certain 
social situations, the second in terms of social classes or 
organisations or even societies actina as wholes or entities 
It will be seen that our approach is simlar to that of methodolo-
gical individualism 
(14) Pooper's analysis of explanations is useful here "We have . 
two different kinds of statements which together yield a complete 
causal explanation: (1) Universal statements of the character of 
natural laws, and (2) Specific statements pertaining to the 
special case in question, called the initial conditions" (Popper, 
1961, p.123). 1,'hat we have called the "cause-and-effect relation-
ships" are the result of the "laws" working on the "initial 
conditions" and the laws and the initial conditions together 
constitute our "exolanatory conditions" Changing the working of 
the laws or changing the initial conditions will change the 
outcome: either or both can be used to tackle oroblems. 
(15) This argument is expanded in appendix II with reference to local 
employment measures in England and in appendix III with reference 
to local employment measures in general. 
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2 A framework for choosing a type of 
instrument 
In order to be able to investigate the nature of ohysical and financial 
instruments and to be able to deduce the practical imo!ications of the 
choice between those two we need to face the general question: what 
considerations should influence the choice of a type of instrument7 
That is, we need to know within what framework a type of instrument 
is (or should be) chosen: then we can try to fit local physical and 
local financial instruments within that framework. It is the aim of 
this chapter to propose such a framework, the fitting into it of the 
two types of instrument takes place in chapters 7 and 8 
RATIONAL CHOICE BY PUBLIC AGENCIES7 
We begin to construct a framework, within which the choosing of a type 
of instrument can be studied, by making two assumptions: 
- that it is valid to talk of a public agency making a choice 
- that it is valid to talk of a public agency making a rational choice 
Both are important assumptions about which much has been written with­
out reaching any generally accepted conclusions (1) Yet they do not 
assume as much as is sometimes thought, nor need they as assumptions 
remain untested. 
About the first assumption, Jenkins (1978, ρ 34) says "This is a point 
many critics cannot accept easily. It would be disputed that organ­
isations can act .." Yet Paludi (1973, p.33) bases his planning theory 
explicitly on the assumption that an analogy can legitimately be made 
between a planning agency and an (individual) human mind engaged in 
operational (purposive) thinking 
About the second assumption, we first of all limit ourselves to the 
idea of ends-means rationality, whereby "rationality . . means to choose 
the best from amongst the available alternatives" (Paludi, undated) 
which means in our context choosing the best (type of) instrument to 
tackle a given problem Now, to explore policy "involves an under­
standing of the behaviour of individuals both within and outside the 
political system ... and here, as an initial approxination, a rational 
model may be no bad thing .. For the explanation of behaviour, rational 
models do appear to have analytical force" (Jenkins, 1978, p.29) Yet 
when Paludi (undated) says "It is indeed my contention that the model 
of rational choice is solidly based on the way in which ordinary people 
make their choices in everyday life" is he not glossing over some of 
the difficulties in transferring the model of individual behaviour to 
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organisations7 The point surely is not that organisations (public 
agencies) should not try to behave like rational individuals (for if 
they could, decisions might become better according to some previously 
established criteria (2)). rather the point is that organisations 
(especially large public organisations) might have inherent properties 
which make them unable to follow the model of rational choice, in which 
case another more approoriate nodel should be applied (3) 
Both assumptions seem to imply, therefore, that a public agency has 
as much cohesion and unity as a person. For examole, Scharpf (1978, 
p.346) says "the instrumental logic of goals and means . is the 
logic of individual rationality. It presupposes the existence of a 
unitary mind .." Etzioni (1968) might have no difficulty in accepting 
that for he says (o.2) "A social collectivity has a self as a 
carrier of an active orientation Collectivities can set goals, commit 
themselves to their realisation, and pursue them". Others, including 
the present author, would not go that far. And it is, in our opinion, 
not necessary: the assumptions do not require it 
What the assumptions do require is that a public agency has institut-
ional rules which the persons working in it are suoposed to follow. 
These are rules about decision-making which, if they are good rules 
(i.e if followed they bring about the desired effect) result in the 
decision-making proceeding in a certain way (in this case, according to 
the model of a rational individual) (4) What the agency requires is 
what Scharpf (1978, p.347) calls "instruments for authoritative goal 
integration". 
The assumptions do not even require that those institutional rules 
are always successfully followed. The same agency might follow them in 
some cases and not in others, as Paludi et al (1981, app.C) point out: 
whenever they are followed then it is indeed valid to talk about a 
public agency making a rational choice, otherwise it is not. 
That, then, is what the assumptions imply And it will be seen that 
the implication is not immune to empirical testing (though not with 
the aim of being able to test the statement "all public agencies, or 
a particular public agency, always make rational choices", rather in 
order to investigate the statement, "in this oarticular case, this 
particular public agency made a rational choice"). Moreover, in our 
case studies (chapters 4 and 5) the implication of the assumptions is 
subjected (admittedly not very rigorously) to such a testing So until 
then we retain our two initial assumotions and proceed to build upon 
then by asking: how should a public agency which tries to be rational 
choose a type of direct instrument7 
THE EVALUATION OF PLANNING MEASURES 
We can approach this question as though it were an example of a typical 
evaluation of the type, which plan (set of measures) out of a given 
set of alternatives should be chosen? And what all evaluation techniques 
have in common is a weighing uo (in one way or the other) of the 
consequences of implementing the plans. Thus the questions are asked. 
what are the expected effects on the problem situation7 what are the 
expected side-effects'1 how quickly will the measures work7 what is the 
probability of the measures not working7 how easily can the plans be 
15 
adapted if it is necessary to react to unforeseen changes7 etc. Such 
questions we shall call questions about the technical effects of the 
plans, in the words of Friend and Jessop (1969, p.88) they concern the 
effects of the plans on the "external environment" of the agency. 
The prediction of these technical effects is properly the concern of 
"substantive" theories or of "theories in planning", theories from 
geography, economics, sociology, etc. which agencies use in a technical 
way. 
It is expected of a rational planning process that the proposed 
plan will have been subjected to that sort of technical evaluation. 
"rational choice implies the exploration and evaluation of alternatives 
open to the decision-maker" (Faludi, undated). But such a technical 
evaluation on its own is not sufficient. "To amplify this point, let 
me introduce an example which many planners are familiar with It is 
the story of the death of a beautifully rational plan prepared with 
great professionalism by department x. Then the horsetrading begins, 
and the plan is sacnfied for the sake of keeping a coalition intact." 
(Paludi, undated) 
So the technical oreparation of a plan (including the technical 
evaluation of alternatives) by rational methods is not enough to ensure 
its acceptance. Is everything else then "irrational"7 Faludi (undated) 
answers, "This is where we enter into an argument about the context 
of rational choice. The future of a coalition may be more important 
than the plan, and the outcome could thus be justified on perfectly 
rational grounds. Such an argument is possible, but it requires 
agreement about its context in turn ...". 
That is, a public agency which tries to паке a rational choice between 
alternative plans should take the context of the planning into account 
But which aspects of this context7 We take a hint from Friend and 
Jessop (1969, pp.88-9) who identify three types of uncertainty which 
make the formulation and comparison of possible actions difficult-
- "uncertainties in knowledge of the external planning environment 
including all uncertainties relating to the structure of the world 
external to the decision-making system" 
- "uncertainties as to future intentions in related fields of choice" 
- 'uncertainties as to appropriate value judgements" 
That division can be applied to the context of the planning: we 
re-phrase slightly to distinguish the following three aspects: 
- the knowledge held by the agency about the external environnent 
- the organisational context within which the agency is operating 
- the political/normative context within which the agency is operating 
And these together we shall call the context within which the measures 
are proposed and will be implemented. (5) 
Summarising, we say that a public agency which tries to be rational 
should evaluate alternative plans by considering the technical effects 
of implementing the plans and the context within which the plans are 
to be proposed, accepted and implemented "Good" policy, says Scharpf 
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(1978, p.349), is policy which satisfies two general tests: "good, in 
the sense that (it) would be feasible within given constraints of the 
policy system and that (it) would be effective in solving, or at least 
reducing, the underlying problem". (6) 
THE CHOICE BETWEEN TYPES OF INSTRUMENT 
That conclusion applies to the evaluation of alternative plans. Our 
interest is somewhat different: it concerns the method by which a 
public agency should rationally choose a type of instrument, when the 
different types available (in this case, physical and financial) can 
be expected to work in fundamentally different ways. Yet there is no 
reason to assume that the considerations affecting this choice cannot 
similarly be divided into two - considerations of the technical effects 
caused by applying the instruments and considerations of the context 
within which the instruments are applied. More positively, it is almost 
a matter of definition to say that different types of instrument which 
work in fundamentally different ways have different possibilities 
inherent within them for bringing about technical effects; and it seems 
reasonable to assume that the context appropriate to one tyoe of 
instrument might not be appropriate to another We shall, therefore, 
accept the concepts "technical effects" and "context" and explore 
aspects of them which can be expected to be significant for the choice 
of a type of instrument, and in that way we shall build up a framework 
within which that choice can be investigated. 
THE TECHNICAL POSSIBILITIES INHERENT IN A TYPE OF INSTRUMENT 
We distinguish the following categories of technical possibilities which 
might be inherent in a particular type of instrument, where the type is 
defined by reference to the thing (in our case, the physical environment 
or the financial circumstances) on which the instrument acts directly. 
The types of problem situation that can be changed. 
Practically, this issue can be illustrated by questions such as can 
unemployment be reduced by land-use planning7 or, less crudely in 
what conditions can unemployment be reduced by land-use planning7 In 
order to approach this issue theoretically we refer to the discussion 
in chapter 1 where two aspects of the problem situation were 
distinguished: the nature and extent of the problem experienced and as 
recognised by the public agency (the "problematic personal 
circumstances"), and the particular technical "explanatory conditions" 
which have given rise to those personal circumstances. 
A measure attempts to change one or more of the explanatory conditions 
(see figure 1.3) Questions about the types of problem situation that 
can be changed by the use of a type of instrument are, therefore, 
questions about the causal links between a given type of instrumental 
variable and the explanatory conditions which are giving rise to a 
problem in a particular type of situation. They are questions, therefore, 
about the way in which a type of instrument might be expected to work 
and it is precisely that, it will be remembered from chapter 1, that 
distinguishes physical instruments from financial instruments 
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To make this point more concrete, suppose that the problematic personal 
circumstances are that certain people have to travel too far to do 
their shopping. Now suppose that the explanatory conditions are that 
there are no shop buildings near by: what kind of instrument can affect 
that9 Suppose on the other hand that the explanatory conditions are 
that no shopkeeper wants to occupy the shop buildings that are standing 
vacant near by: is a different kind of instrument needed to affect that7 
The possibility of directing the help towards specified persons. 
This consideration is important because of our approach to problems. 
In chapter 1 we said that it was desirable to include the question: 
who is suffering the problem7 It follows that the problem has not been 
alleviated unless the measure changes the personal circumstances of 
those people whose circumstances were problematic. (7) An important 
technical aspect of a type of instrument is, therefore to what extent 
can it be used so as to direct the help towards specified oersons7 
Speed. 
By this, we mean the time between applying the instrument and achiev-
ing the desired effect. Do some types of instrument work more quickly 
than others7 If the public agency is in no hurry, this question is 
irrelevant, otherwise this consideration might well influence the 
choice of a type of instrument. 
Flexibility 
We distinguish two meanings of flexibility, as follows. 
- flexibility I: the ease with which the effects of applying an 
instrument can be negated or reversed. This can be important 
because certainty can never be assumed, so an instrument might be 
applied and achieve the desired effects, then a few years later it 
might be desired to wipe out or reverse those effects. How easily 
can that be done7 
- flexibility II: this refers to the ease with which the application 
of the instrument can be adapted to a range of situations. Is the 
instrument blunt, so that although there is only one small nut to be 
cracked, nevertheless a sledgehammer must be used7 Or is the 
instrument capable of being finely tuned to the circumstances7 
The inter-local effects of applying a local instrument. 
We are considering local instruments applied to tackle local problems, 
so the relationship between the location of a measure and the 
location(s) of its effects is an important technical asoect of the 
instrument used. In order to discuss this, we introduce the term, the 
"inter-local effects" of applying a local instrument (8), and we 
include not only the effects outside the area within which the 
instrument is applied (i.e. "spillover" effects) but also the fact that 
the effects inside the area might be weakened by some of the effects 
'leaking" over the boundary to areas outside. 
It is not necessary for our purposes to investigate all the inter-
local effects of applying a local instrument: we are comparing local 
physical instruments and local financial instruments so we can 
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concentrate on the differences to be expected between the inter-local 
effects of those two types. It will be renembered that the instruments 
have been defined by reference to the direct change they bring about. 
people then respond directly to those changes and that can cause a 
series of yet more changes. However, after that first response, the 
subsequent changes need bear no mark of the type of instrument which 
had been applied. Take, for example, an attempt to inprove the 
facilities in a shopoing centre either by physical measures (the local 
government carries out the building works) or by financial measures 
(the local government reduces the property taxes on those shoos): once 
the facilities have been improved shoppers not only inside but also 
outside the area will react to the changes (there will be spillover 
effects) but those effects will be the same irrespective of the type 
of instrument used to affect the change. 
We can conclude that, in a comparison of the inter-local effects of 
physical and financial instruments, we can limit ourselves to the 
spillovers and leakages in that first stage - the direct response to 
the direct change in the local circumstances brought about by the 
measure. The inter-local effects of the subsequent stages will deoend 
more on the activity which is being affected than on the type of 
instrument applied (9) 
THE CONTEXT APPROPRIATE TO AN INSTRUMENT 
Friedman (1966) uses the idea of a "decision environnent" for precisely 
the same reason as we have found it necessary to introduce the 
consideration of the context, namely "the fact that thought and 
consequent action intended to be rational are contingent upon environ-
mental conditions .. which represent the medium in and through which 
planning decisions are made The most that planners can hope for 
is the most rational decisions under the circumstances' (Friedmann, 
1967, his emphasis). 
Friedmann (1967) uses the idea of a decision environment further by 
suggesting that different planning styles arise in resoonse to differ-
ent decision environments. We, however, want to use the idea by 
suggesting that different contexts are appropriate to different types 
of instrument and for this we suggest (using an idea from Friend and 
Jessop, 1969, see earlier) that the significant properties of the 
context are as follows. 
The knowledge of the external environnent 
It is useful to distinguish two aspects of this - the "technology 
image" and the firmness of the knowledge. "Technology image" is a term 
used by Faludi (1973, p.63) to refer to "a system for the purposive use 
of knowledge": it relates the agency's understanding of the problem to 
its ideas as to how the problem might be tackled. For our purooses, it 
describes the agency's perception of the relationshio between types of 
instrument and types of problem if the relationship is perceived 
to be absent or weak, then the agency will not choose that type of 
instrument 
Knowledge of the relationship between the instrument and the oroblem 
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can be divided into the relevant "theories in planning" and the size 
of the relevant variables. We assume that public agencies accept as 
given the theories as developed by others but have the possibility them-
selves of improving the relevant data (by local surveys etc.)· A public 
agency wishing to make firm predictions will therefore assess the state 
of the theories, what data are already available and the costs of 
obtaining better data When there are different types of instrument 
which work in different ways, the "knowledge of the external environment' 
that is required for making firm predictions will be different for the 
different types of instrument The state of that knowledge night allow 
firmer predictions to be made of the effects of applying one type of 
instrument than another, or the costs of improving the knowledge up to 
the required level might be higher for one type than another. Of course, 
if it is not important to the agency that its predictions be firm (e g 
if small-scale measures are being taken experimentally) then this aspect 
of the context is not so important 
The capability of the agency. 
We divide 'the organisational context' (see above) into two, and con-
sider first the capability of the agency. By this we mean the legal 
competence, the financial ability, and the working arrangements -
everything that affects the ability of the agency to implement a 
measure, that determines whether or not a measure will be administrat-
ively feasible. 
A public agency has to have a legal authority for all its actions (in 
a society based on law and order, in any case) Part of the context 
appropriate to the applying of an instrument, therefore, is the legal 
competence to do that. If we now concentrate on subnational agencies 
(in order to be able to apply any conclusions to our case studies of 
local governments) we find that competence is restricted to within a 
certain jurisdictional area. 
The legal powers are sometimes complicated and divided. For example, 
we can divide the important decisions about taking a local measure into 
three according to the stage in which they are made - designing and 
proposing the measure, approving the measure, implementing the proposal. 
And the competence of the agency can vary between those stages with, 
for example, a local agency being free to design and propose a measure, 
but having to obtain central government approval to take it, and having 
to implement it in co-operation with other (e.g geograohically 
adjacent) agencies. Or it might be that a local public agency has to 
share its legal oowers with other agencies, or that there are other 
agencies which have overlapping powers over some or all of the 
geographical area (e.g. the counties and districts of English local 
governments). 
Sometimes legal powers alone are sufficient to allow an agency to 
take a measure, often however that measure costs the agency money, so 
the financial ability and autonomy to pay for it can be important 
asoects of the agency's capability. Further, internal working 
arrangements, agreements with other agencies, and so on can influence 
this capability 
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This aspect of the context has itself been designed (to a greater 
or lesser extent - "the design of planning agencies"), usually by 
central government Further, the legal competence of a public agency 
with respect to a particular instrument has usually been designed to 
take account of the properties of that instrument' in particular, a 
local public agency will not usually be granted the powers (or if so, 
only under close control) to apoly an instrument with a 'spatial 
range' (10) wider than the agency's boundaries. However, it is not 
always so cut-and-dned. sometimes the organisational context set for 
a local agency does not give a clear answer to the question - has the 
agency the ability to apply that instrument, or not9 For example, an 
agency can try to change the context by obtaining new powers or less 
central supervision. Or it can push against and stretch the organis-
ational boundaries set for it, but only by accepting such burdens as 
extra inter-departmental working parties or a Cold War with its 
neighbours. That is, an organisational context might be so in-
appropriate to the use of a particular instrument as to exclude that 
use altogether, or it might allow the use without difficulty, or it 
might allow the use but only with great costs and difficulties. A public 
agency in deciding whether its capability allows it to apply a particular 
instrument will bear those considerations in mind 
Other measures already being taken. 
This is the second aspect of the organisational context that we shall 
consider. A measure is an attempt to change the explanatory conditions 
which have given rise to a problem, but the agency might not be the 
only body trying to change those conditions, or the agency itself might 
already be taking other measures which are influencing those conditions 
So in deciding on the use of an instrument the agency will consider the 
relationship (where important) between the effects likely to be caused 
by the instrument and the effects already being caused, or hoped for, 
as a result of other existing and/or committed measures. (11) These 
can be measures taken in order to tackle the same problem, when the 
interaction of the measures within the same problem situation could 
be important, or unrelated measures when there could be interaction 
between the side-effects. 
This consideration could be very important when deciding on the type 
of instrument to use, for some tyoes work in fundamentally different 
ways and hence produce different technical effects It could be, for 
example, that one type of instrument is technically unable to achieve 
the desired results and needs to be complemented by a different type, 
which produces the conditions necessary for the first type of instrument 
to work successfully. Or it could be that one type of instrument 
supplements a different type by re-inforcing its effects 
The reigning political attitudes. 
This is the final aspect of the context that we distinguish, and it 
refers to the fact that the decision to take a measure is made, in 
principle although not always for routine applications, by politicians 
who bring to bear on the decision their own attitudes and what they 
consider to be the attitudes of their voters 
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Such considerations could be relevant to the decision about a type of 
instrunent to use, because different types require different uses of 
public Dowers, and political opinion might allow certain types of 
public powers to be used and not others. (12) For example. Popper 
(I960, pp.131-2) makes the distinction between institutional/indirect 
intervention and personal/direct intervention: "the first is that of 
designing a 'legal framework' of protective institutions, .. The 
second is that of empowering organs of the state to act - within 
certain limits - as they consider necessary for achieving the end laid 
down by the rulers for the time being ... Of course, intermediate 
cases exist". And he makes that distinction in order to be able to 
argue the general political advantages of the former and the political 
dangers of the latter. 
That sort of consideration is obviously imoortant at the level of pol-
itical principles, but the less abstract and formalised attitudes of 
politicians might also be influential. Suppose, for example, that 
politicians were averse to taking risks or to experimenting or that 
they did not like having to co-operate with other public agencies, that 
could influence the choice of instrument. Or suppose that the "power-
orientation of the local policy-makers" gives them a certain "propensity 
to intervene" (the terms are from Young et al, 1980). then the 
"managerialists" would not shy away from instruments which gave the 
possibility of close intervention in private processes whereas the 
"neo-conservatives" (again the terms are from Young, op. cit) would 
prefer more indirect measures. 
SUMMARY. A FRAMEWORK FOR CHOOSING A TYPE OF INSTRUMENT 
We can summarise the discussion so far by saying that a public agency 
which tries to be rational will/should choose a type of instrument for 
local application according to some or all of the following ten 
considerations: 
- the inherent technical possibilities 
. the types of problem situation that can be changed 
. the possibility of directing the help towards specified persons 
: the speed with which the desired effects can be achieved 
• the flexibility with which the effects of applying the instrument 
can be negated or reversed 
: the flexibility with which the application of the instrument can 
be adapted to a range of situations 
: the inter-local effects of apolying a local instrument 
- the context appropriate to the instrument 
: the knowledge of the external environment 
. the capability of the agency 
. other measures already being taken 
: the reigning political attitudes. 
THE RESEARCH METHOD 
The obvious next step would be a theoretical investigation of physical 
and financial instruments structured according to the above framework-
what would we expect to be the inherent technical possibilities of and 
the context appropriate to those two types of instrument7 The conclusions 
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could be cast in the form of empirically testable hypotheses, which 
could then (if the time allowed) be followed by the actual empirical 
testing 
That procedure we have not adopted here, however, the main reason 
being that there were insufficient good theories available for deducing 
statements about the two types of instrument. We decided, therefore, 
to make a careful study of public agencies actually choosing and applying 
local physical and local financial instruments what considerations 
were important for the choice, what were the technical effects of taking 
the measures, and were the measures appropriate to the context7 Seven 
public agencies (four in England and three in the Netherlands) were 
studied, and the results were enormously influential in the development 
of the ideas here there was a continuous interaction and mutual 
influence between the study of the agencies and the working out of the 
theories As a result, what we called above 'the obvious next step" 
- i.e deducing statements about the two types of instrument - has been 
delayed until the case studies have been presented That sequence was 
chosen to avoid giving the impression that the case studies constitute 
an empirical testing of theoretical ideas And it must also be 
emohasised that the conclusions presented in the last chapter of this 
work nust be regarded as theoretical deductions not yet tested 
rigorously in practice (13) 
That research method has been called by de Groot (1961) "exploratory 
research' or "empirical exploration" Its characteristic is, he says, 
that "it is explicitly designed for the formulating or working out of 
a theory or separate hypothesis" (p 323). It is appropriate in those 
cases when one is researching 'a relatively broad area about which 
little usable theory exists and when there is an abundance of observat-
ions or variables, about the relative importance of which little is 
known" (p.324). It will be seen that that fits our situation exactly 
And the limitations also must be applied this study this method 
can be used for no more than orientation research and cannot be used 
for the scientific testing of theories or hypotheses (14) 
THE CHOICE OF CASE STUDIES 
The practical implications of the choice of local physical and financial 
instruments should be observable in most social problem areas which are 
the focus of public action - housing problems, urban renewal, 
environmental pollution, traffic, etc , - for in any of those, either 
type of instrument could be applied, singly or in combination 
The social problem area chosen for our case studies is local 
manifestations of unemployment, and we shall be investigating the choice 
and application of measures to reduce unemployment taken by local 
governments in England and the Netherlands The reasons for choosing 
this problem area are. that local oroblems of unemoloyment are currently 
severe and are, therefore, an important object of study in their own 
right, that the measures are being chosen and applied in conditions 
which include many of those contained in the general analytical frame-
work (including the necessary condition that both local physical and 
local financial instruments are available), that the subject area is 
well known to the author, and that surveys had been carried out in 
England and the Netherlands which provided the necessary background 
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information from which to select and develop the case studies. 
The case studies are taken from two countries: but that does not mean 
that we are attenpting cross-national comparative research. However, 
by taking case studies from two countries, the working out in practice 
of some of the ten considerations becomes clearer. There has to be, 
however, one general framework for the case studies (15) and that is 
provided by the framework developed above about how a public agency 
which tries to be rational will choose a type of instrument - the ten 
"considerations" divided into the inherent technical possibilities 
and the context appropriate to the instrument. 
NOTES 
(1) It is important, moreover, to realise that the assumptions are not 
independent of each other. Parry Lewis (1979,chap.2) shows that the 
concept of rationality cannot be applied to a group of people: it 
can therefore be applied to a public agency only if the latter can 
be shown to behave as if it were an individual. Therefore, the 
assumption that a public agency can make a choice (which implies 
that it is a coherent unit) is necessary for the assumption that 
it can act rationally. 
(2) That is, in fact, how Faludi uses his model of rational choice, as 
a methodological rule. 
(3) This point is explored further in Needham (1977a, chap.11), Needham 
(1979b) and In 't Veld (1978). 
(4) Moreover, it could even be so that the rules could ensure rational 
decision-making by the agency even if none of the persons involved 
acting on their own could have been able to act rationally in those 
same circumstances. 
(5) It will be apparent that the political decision to recognise cer-
tain personal circumstances as problematic is not included in our 
definition of the context. In other words, the problem(s) to 
alleviate which the measures are being taken are regarded as given. 
This is legitimate in a framework set up for evaluating alternative 
plans and (see later) for choosing between types of instrument. 
(6) Scharpf (1978) uses a different nomenclature, whereas we extend 
evaluation from the "technical effects" to include the "context", 
he extends the "objective oroblen situation". Yet another 
terminology is used by Friend and Jessop (1969, chap.5): they say 
that the "choice of a response" must be shaped by the "context of 
operations" which includes "the current view of how situations 
should be classified, the current operational policies, and the 
current objectives and appreciation of constraints". 
(7) This might seem to be an obvious point, yet it is often overlooked. 
For example, the house improvement grants available under the 1969 
Housing Act were being used in some parts of London to improve 
dwellings to a standard which the previous tenants could no longer 
afford. Yet even when faced with this evidence, the then Minister 
of Housing in a television interview refused to be perturbed by it, 
maintaining that "Improvement is the name of the game". That is, 
the physical improvement was important, irrespective of who 
benefitted from it. 
(8) The analogy is with the term "international effects" used in 
economics. 
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(9) For example, Kurstjens (1974) talks about the "geographical range" 
of the significance of industrial land. Similarly we could 
investigate the geographical range of changes in shopping centres, 
recreation areas, etc. 
(10) The term is from Klaassen and Paelinck (1974, p.47) and they use 
it to refer to the territory over which the application of an 
instrument exerts a significant influence. Clearly it is related 
to our "inter-local effects" of an instrument. 
(11) As Young et al (1980, p.44) say "All urban governments are engaged 
in the simultaneous management of a local socio-political environ­
ment and an inter-organisational (their emphasis) environment". 
This they call the reticulist approach, the active management of 
networks. 
(12) See, e д., the discussion of varieties of national economic planning 
by Oulès (1966), who equates "indicative" planning with the 
Western democracies and "imperative" planning with the "command" 
economies of the Soviet bloc 
(13) Nevertheless, we would claim that the close interaction and mutual 
influence between the theory and the practice have been a kind 
of continuous empirical testing of half-developed theoretical 
ideas. Therefore we can expect that those theoretical ideas will 
be robust enough not to fall to the first empirical testing that 
others might carry out. "A serious empirical test always consists 
in the attempt to find a refutation, a counter examole. In the 
search for a counter example we have to use our background 
knowledge: for we always try to refute first the most risky 
predictions, the most unlikely consequences ... which means that 
we always look in the most probable kinds of counter examples -
most probable in the sense that we should expect to find them in 
the light of our background knowledge" (Pooper K.R., 1969, ρ 240, 
his emphasis). In this sense, we would claim that the statements 
in the last chapter have already stood up to testing against the 
most risky predictions 
(14) A similar research method was used, and for similar reasons, in 
the "Leiden-Oxford comparative study of local planning in the 
Netherlands and England" (undated): in that research there was no 
preconceived framework to be imposed on the phenomena to be studied 
so the deductive method could not be used, and induction as a 
method was rejected. "A solution was found in the process known 
as "abduction" It was decided to conduct a number of case 
studies ... based on an extremely simple original framework . . The 
case studies would provide the raw data from which the themes for 
comparison would be derived" (Leiden-Oxford, undated, p.11). 
(15) As Webb (1971) says, in his essay on the use of case studies in the 
analysis of policy-making, "The heuristic value of the material 
(from a case study) is only evident in the context provided by a 
contextual framework. The case method has a role, quite apart from 
the pedagogic one - but only if employed in a disciplined way". 
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3 Preparation for the case studies 
In chapters 4 and 5 we investigate the choosing and taking of certain 
measures by local governments in order to tackle a certain problem. 
The problem is of unemployment in the local government area and the 
measures are those made possible by instruments which are direct, 
local, and physical or financial (all those terms are defined in 
chapter 1). The puroose of those case studies is to develop, by practical 
investigations, the ideas presented in chapter 2 about the ways in 
which a public agency chooses a type of instrument, and to obtain 
information about the working of physical and financial instruments in 
preparation for chapters 7 and 8. 
The processes to be described and understood are not straightforward, 
so we need to prepare ourselves carefully: that is the purpose of this 
chapter. However, in order not to interrupt the general argument more 
than is necessary, much of the preparation has been put into appendices 
at the end of this work. The three items on which preparation is needed 
are: how shall we structure the study of the cases7 within what context 
were the employment measures being taken9 and within what theoretical 
framework can the ermloynent measures best be studied? 
A STRUCTURE FOR THE CASE STUDIES 
In chapter 2 we said that a public agency which tries to be rational 
will/should choose a type of local instrument after taking ten 
considerations into account Those considerations were important, we 
said, because they determined the effectiveness of the instrument and 
whether the instrument was appropriate to the context. A practical 
study of the choosing and taking of measures must, therefore, include 
four main points: what measures were being taken7 why were those 
measures chosen0 what were the effects of taking those measures7 and 
were the measures appropriate to the context7 The reports of the case 
studies are, accordingly, divided into those four parts. 
What measures 
That a detailed description should be given of the measures being taken 
needs no justification. 
Why those measures 
It is equally clear that a full description is needed why those measures 
had been chosen. Here we have not, however, analysed those reasons into 
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the ten "considerations" of chapter 2 because not all of those 
considerations were familiar, in the form in which we have expressed 
them, to the public agencies we studied: the considerations could not 
easily be applied to the reports we read nor to our conversations with 
the local government officials. Instead, we used a modified list of 9 
reasons, as follows: 
- the relationship assumed between the measure and reducing unemployment 
in general (consideration, the types of problem situation that can be 
changed) 
- the relationship assumed between the measure and reducing the 
unemployment of particular social groupings (consideration: the 
possibility of directing the help towards specified persons) 
- the relationship between where the measure was applied and where 
within the local government area the unemployed lived whom it was 
desired to help (consideration, the inter-local effects of applying 
a local instrument, and consideration: the possibility of directing 
the help towards specified persons) 
- the expected effects of the measure outside the local government area, 
and the consequences for the unemployed within the local government 
area (consideration: the inter-local effects of applying a local 
instrument) 
- the relationship between this measure and other measures being taken 
by the local government or other agencies (consideration, other 
measures already being taken) 
- the importance of speed and flexibility to the public agency, and the 
expected speed and flexibility of the measure (consideration the 
speed with which the desired effect van be achieved, and consideration: 
the flexibility with which the effects of aoplying the instrument can 
be negated or reversed, and consideration: the flexibility with which 
the application of the instrument can be adaoted to a range of 
si tuations) 
- the importance of being able to predict accurately the effects of 
taking the measure, and any steps taken to improve the relevant 
knowledge available to the agency (consideration the knowledge of 
the external environment) 
- the other public bodies which had been able to control or influence 
the taking of the measure, and the actions of those bodies (consider-
ation: the capability of the agency) 
- the relationship between the measure and the attitudes of the local 
politicians (consideration the reigning political attitudes) 
The effects of the measures 
The third main question which must be asked in the case studies is: 
what were the effects of taking those measures7 By "effects' we mean 
the effects on the problem, on the "policy variable' - in this case, 
the effects on unemployment in the local area Such effects are, 
however, exceedingly difficult to investigate, so the discussion of 
how this might be done has been put into appendix 1. here we shall just 
report the two main conclusions The first is that in certain 
circumstances it is possible to estimate the direct employment effects 
within a local area of physical measures taken within that area (i.e. 
the number of extra workplaces locally attributable to the measure) 
by a method which we have applied (albeit not exhaustively) to the 
English case studies. And second, although some of those employment 
gains locally might be at the exoense of other areas, in certain 
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circumstances there will also be a net employment gain nationally: 
estimating the size of the national effects of local measures is, 
however, extremely difficult and has not been attempted here 
The appropriateness of the measures 
Finally, the fourth main question which must be asked in the case 
studies is. were the measures appropriate to the context7 The difficulty 
with this question is in making it operational, for if the neasure was 
appropriate, there should be nothing to observe, everything would 
procede smoothly. We therefore ask the question, what would happen if 
the measure was contextually inappropriate7 In that case, we would 
expect to observe what we shall call "organisational difficulties", 
which would manifest themselves in the following ways There would be 
unexpected technical difficulties and delays experienced within the 
agency in connection with designing and implementing the measure, there 
would be tensions and arguments with other public agencies, there 
would be political arguments within the agency between the politicians 
themselves and also between politicians and officials over the desir-
ability of taking the measure, oroposed measures would be abandonned 
before they had been applied, and so on The application of this concept 
will be clear in the case studies. 
Those, then, are the four main points around which are structured the 
case studies of local governments choosing and taking physical and 
financial measures to reduce unemployment. 
THE CONTEXT WITHIN WHICH THE EMPLOYMENT MEASURES WERE BEING TAKEN 
Some of the considerations which public agencies take into account 
when choosing a type of instrument cannot be adequately understood 
without a knowledge of the general background to the agencies' actions. 
For example, one of the considerations was the capability of the agency 
which, we pointed out, is to a large extent determined nationally. A 
further consideration was the reigning political attitudes, which again 
cannot be understood without good background knowledge. 
That information must therefore be presented and, because the 
situation in England is so different from that in the Netherlands, it 
must be presented at a fairly basic level: otherwise the non-Dutchman 
might not understand the Dutch case studies nor the non-Englishman the 
English cases. That has led to the information being presented at such 
length that it has been put at the end of this work, as appendix II Only 
the most important conclusions relating to the differences between the 
two countries are given here. 
The description of the English situation centres around a list of 
powers (Acts of Parliament) which an English local authority can use 
to try to regulate employment in its area, and that was chosen because 
of the all-pervading influence of the spirit of ultra vires which 
presides over, and often dominates, decision-making in local authorities. 
(1) The constitutional principle is that a local authority may only 
pursue those objectives and take those actions that are specified by 
Act of Parliament and clarified by the subsequent subsidiary legislation. 
For example, a local authority may construct speculatively a factory 
building only if it is clearly stated in some statute that such an action 
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is permissible. If a local authority acts "outside the powers" (ultra 
vires) then its elected menbers are liable to punishment at law (2), 
which is why a list of the precise powers under which a local government 
may act is so important for understanding the English situation. If 
a local authority wants to be allowed to take a different kind of 
measure, then it must first persuade central government to grant it the 
powers, either by a new Act aoplicable to all local authorities or a 
new Act applicable to just that one local authority (a Local Act) or 
to just a few local authorities (a Special Act). 
In the Netherlands, the most local level of government is called the 
"gemeente", (3) and its tasks can be divided into two - those which 
have been expressly allocated to it by a higher authority and which it 
is obliged to carry out (medebewind), and otherwise any tasks from which 
the gemeente has not been precluded because higher authorities (central 
or provincial government) or separate authorities at the same level 
(e.g. waterboards) have the express responsibility for those tasks. 
It will be seen, from that second category of tasks, that a gemeente 
has a constitutionally guaranteed autonomy, albeit heavily constrained. 
In particular, the doctrine of ultra vires is unknown in the Netherlands. 
The constitutional positions of an English local authority and a 
Dutch gemeente can therefore be compared, very crudely, in the follow-
ing way. an English local authority may do only those things which are 
expressly allowed to it, a Dutch gemeente may do anything except what 
is expressly disallowed. It follows that a list of powers under which 
a local government may pursue an employment oolicy, such as the list 
given for English local authorities in appendix II cannot be given 
for Dutch gemeenten. (The most nearly comparable list would be of things 
which a Dutch gemeente may not do. and such a list would be of so little 
use that we shall not attempt to draw it uo) It must not be concluded 
from that basic difference in constitutional positions that English 
local authorities have less freedom than Dutch gemeenten, for the real 
freedom of action is affected also by the following considerations. 
A gemeente may perform any tasks from which it has not been precluded 
because higher authorities or separate authorities at the same level 
have the responsibility for those tasks, we said. Important, therefore, 
is the question: how strictly is that exclusion imposed on gemeenten7 
Our conclusion is that, in the field of emoloyment policy, central 
government restricts gemeenten very tightly: in particular, Dutch local 
governments are allowed much less freedom to take labour supply measures 
than are their English counterparts. 
Secondly there is the question of the means by which the central 
controls the local government In the Netherlands, the control is 
operated from closer by (via the orovinces) and more continuously (a 
steady supervision and checking of the gemeente's actions) than in 
England. 
Thirdly, how certain and predictable is the freedom of action allowed 
to the local governnenf In both countries, active local governments 
take measures right up to the limits of their powers. In England those 
limits are fairly definite; in the Netherlands they are often indefinite, 
which can dissuade a cautious gemeente from exoloring its capabilities 
to the full. 
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And fourthly, how much financial freedom does a local government have7 
English local authorities raise a much higher proportion of their 
income from local taxes than do Dutch gemeenten and receive a much lower 
proportion in the form of specific grants, both of which give English 
local governments more independence (both over income and expenditure) 
than their Dutch counterparts have. 
It is not our aim to reach a conclusion about in which country local 
government has more freedom to take employment measures: the above 
summary of parts of aopendix II shows that the reality is too com­
plicated for such simple comparisons. Rather we have tried to prepare 
for the case studies, in particular so that Dutch exoectations are not 
applied to the English cases, nor vice versa. 
A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR STUDYING EMPLOYMENT MEASURES 
Public agencies, we have said, choose measures with respect to two 
sets of considerations - contextual and technical In order to be able 
to analyse critically the way in which local governments pursuing an 
emoloyment policy take technical considerations into account we need a 
theoretical framework for understanding local unemployment, how it 
arises and how it might be reduced: such a framework allows us also to 
comment critically on the theories of unemployment which the local 
governments themselves use (implicitly or explicitly) in choosing the 
measures. A framework is set out, exclained and justified in appendix 
III: here we just give the classification of employment measures to 
which the conclusions lead. 
We classify measures taken to reduce unemployment as follows. 
- A: to increase the general demand for labour 
- B: to decrease the general supply of labour 
- С to change the occupations supplied so as to fit the demand better 
- D. to change the occupations demanded so as to fit the supply better 
- E. supply-side measures to reduce frictional unemployment 
- F· demand-side measures to reduce frictional unemployment 
- G: better brokerage between supply and demand 
Moreover, the undoubted presence of unemoloyment-prone social groupings 
and the probable existence of segmentation in labour markets (by which 
mobility between labour sub-markets is hindered by barriers of an 
unknown height) make it advisable to direct some or all of those seven 
general measures (Α-G) at specific social groupings (e.g. to increase 
the demand for the labour of school-leavers). That might be more 
effective than general measures as a way of helping those who have the 
greatest difficulties in finding work 
Further, the existence of geographical barriers to the nobility of 
labour can reduce the effectiveness of national measures in tackling 
the unemployment of those living and/or working in a particular 
location. In those cases, if it is desired to reduce the unemployment 
of those in particular area (e.g a local government wants to help its 
residents), some or all of the general measures Α-G should be applied 
to specific locations (i.e not to all locations) 
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It is that classification of employment measures, together with its 
theoretical basis, which has been used in the case studies which now 
fol low. 
NOTES 
(1) For example, it belongs to the culture of a local governnent officer 
to ask, before taking any action, "under what statutory authority -
i.e Act of Parliament - am I going to act7". The doctrine of ultra 
vires is explained in Cross, 1974. 
(2) The example of Clay Cross - see e.g., Minns 1974 - where several 
Councillors were bankrupted by the proceedings taken against them 
in the High Court, shows this to be no idle threat. 
(3) In this work we do not try to translate the Dutch word "gemeente" 
for the reason that there is no good English equivalent. It is often 
translated as "municipality" but as that refers to the government 
of a type of area (urban) and not to the level of government (the 
most local) we stay with the Dutch word. 
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4 Four English local authorities 
THE ENGLISH CASES 
In 1977, when the author was working in Birmngham, he and some 
colleagues were commissioned by the Department of Environment (West 
Midlands Region) to carry out research into the extent of the employment 
initiatives being undertaken by local authorities, the powers and 
resources used, and the relative effectiveness of those initiatives. 
As part of that research, 22 local authorities in the West Midlands 
region were questioned about the employment problems (widely defined) 
which they experienced and about the measures which they were taking 
to reduce them. The final report was published in 1979 (JURUE 1979). 
That study was of the use of all types of local measure (physical, 
financial, and organisational, direct and indirect) taken to reduce 
all types of local employment problems, the present case studies are 
of the use of two types of local measure (direct physical and direct 
financial) taken to reduce one type of local enoloyment oroblem (un-
employment): it is clear therefore that examples for the case studies 
could be drawn from the 1977 survey, using in particular the unpublished 
information contained in the files from that survey. (1) 
The 1977 survey identified 21 different types of "local authority 
employment measures" a reworked list of which is given in aopendix II. 
We want to study only those which were unequivocally either direct 
physical or direct financial, so we concentrated on: 
- supplying land for employment purposes (direct ohysical) 
- supplying buildings for employment purposes (direct physical) 
- providing financial assistance to private firms (direct financial ).(2 ) 
Of the 22 local authorities surveyed, only 5 were taking all of those 
types of measure in 1977, and we selected the following 3 case studies 
for the reasons stated: 
- Dudley Metrooolitan District. This has the instruments available to 
any local authority, but was unusual in that it was actually using 
the financial instrument, given in section 3 of the Local Authorities 
(Land) Act 1963, which enables a local authority to give loans to 
private firms under certain conditions. 
- Coventry Metropolitan District. This has, in addition to the 
instruments generally available, extra financial powers which it 
acquired by a Local Act - the Coventry Corporation Act 1972 
- The Birmingham Inner City Partnership. T m s partnership (the BICP) 
covers a part of the Birmingham Metropolitan District within which are 
available not only the instruments which all local authorities can 
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apply but also extra financial powers created by the Inner Urban Areas 
Act 1978 and available only within certain areas designated by central 
government Within the Birmingham area there were two separate local 
government agencies taking emoloyment measures - the Birmingham 
District Council and the West Midlands County Council. They were 
supposed to co-ordinate their measures through a Partnership Committee, 
and whenever they were using powers provided by the Inner Urban Areas 
Act 1978, prior approval was necessary, given by that Partnership 
Committee, on which sat the District, the County, and central 
government. 
The areas mentioned here are shown on figure 4.1 and the course 
of unemployment in those areas over the last few years is shown in 
figure 4.2. (3) The information that we wanted about those three cases 
(four local authorities), was collected as follows. After reading the 
information about the authorities collected during the 1977 survey, we 
had conversations with one or more of the officers responsible for 
advising the councillors about policy and for imolementing the chosen 
measures. (4) The information from the interviews was then checked 
and supplemented by reading all the relevant reports, in<-luding the 
minutes of the meetings of the Council and its relevant Committees All 
that information gathering took place in 1980. We then wrote in draft 
a report about the local authority and sent it to one or two officials 
in each authority with the request that they inform us of inaccuracies. 
In order to avoid too stilted a description, in the reports that 
follow we have not identified and referenced the source of every item 
of information that we used, instead we have listed, at the end of the 
chapter, all the sources used. 
DUDLEY METROPOLITAN DISTRICT 
Problems of unemployment are not new to Dudley. A University of Liverpool 
study describes the old County Borough as having been one of the black 
spots of unemployment in the Black Country between the two wars and as 
long having had a widely fluctuating unemployment rate (5) The 
situation in the last 10 years has, however, been rather different 
Unemployment in Dudley followed the national trend but the unemployment 
rate remained below that of the UK and of the West Midlands County 
Nevertheless, there were disturbing trends in the composition of the 
unemployment, in particular a rise in the number of young persons un-
employed, and a very steep rise in female unemployment In 1981, the 
unemployment rate moved above that of the U.K. Looking to likely future 
changes in labour supoly and demand, the Council foresaw - and in this 
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it was later supported by a study it commissioned in 1980 - a growing 
deficit of workplaces, which meant that either the rate of un-
employment would rise, or that even more people would have to leave 
Dudley every day to go to work (Dudley was a net exporter of labour 
with in 1971 a net outflow of 25% of the economically active residents). 
And the main impact of this deficit would probably be felt amongst the 
female working population, the unskilled and semi-skilled, those 
approaching retirement, and the young - social grouoings which, moreover, 
often have low geographical and occupational mobility. Further, a study 
suggested that the unemployment in the Dudley area was becoming more 
"structural", meaning that any increase that could be expected in the 
demand for labour would be for types of labour very different from 
those now unemployed, and that simple training schemes would not be 
sufficient to transform the unemployed into demanded labour. 
The measures 
Since the beginning of the 1970's, Dudley had been supplying land both 
to private industrial firms for their own use and to private developers 
who built industrial premises and then supplied them to private firms. 
This land came from two sources - already in council ownership (e.g. 
stocks acquired in the past for industrial uses, acquired for housing 
but no longer thought suitable for that use, the site of a school now 
redundant), and purchased especially in order to bring industrial land 
on to the market. Since 1976 however the Council had had the policy 
of acquiring no more land for industry unless it could be clearly 
demonstrated that a particular site was needed and that something was 
preventing it from being brought on to the market privately: the Council 
was therefore now supplying mainly from its own land stocks. 
The land was supplied either serviced (to industrial firms which build 
for their own use) or unserviced (to developers). Until 1976 it was 
policy to supply the land leasehold only, since then the Council would 
sell freehold (6) if the buyer so wished (which most of the firms buying 
for their own use did). Moreover, in 1979 the Council resolved to allow 
firms leasing industrial sites from the local authority to buy the 
freehold of their sites. 
In 1975, the Council decided to commission the building of "industrial 
nursery units" on a site it owned, and thus to start supplying build-
ings as well as land. However, after a change of financial circumstances 
and more than a year of debate, it was decided to stimulate the provision 
of industrial buildings in another way: the Council entered into a 
partnership agreement with an industrial developer, whereby the developer 
leased the land for a peppercorn (i.e. nominal) rent in exchange for 
paying the Council an agreed share of the rental income. 
Almost the only financial help that all local authorities may give to 
a private firm is a loan secured by a mortgage towards the cost of a 
firm developing its own buildings on land leased or bought from the 
local authority. Dudley decided in 1977 to offer such loans to firms 
employing less than 20 people, subject to a satisfactory report from 
the Council's Director of Finance: since then 5 applications had been 
made, of which one had been withdrawn, three (for £30,000, £35,000 and 
£50,000) had been granted and one was pending. In order to overcome the 
statutory limitations on such loans, Dudley resolved to enter into lease 
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and leaseback arrangements with firms wanting to raise capital: the 
Council would buy a long lease on the premises from the firm (in that 
way paying a capital sum to the firm) and would then lease the premises 
back to the same firm (when repaying the lease would be a sort of 
repayment of the capital sum). 
The reasons for the measures 
Unemployment in general. The reason for supplying industrial land was 
that investigations showed a definite lack of such land: on the 
Development Plan sufficient industrial land was zoned to last until the 
end of the century but many of the sites were very difficult to service 
or develop because of poor ground conditions (e.g. abandoned mineral-
extraction sites) (7) or environmental problems (e.g. too near to 
housing). It was decided therefore that the Council itself should use 
its resources and powers to bring land on to the market. (8) 
The reason for deciding to develop small unit factories was that 
numerous national investigations had revealed a gap in the market: 
neither public nor private developers were providing small units 
speculatively. Dudley decided to try to fill that gap. In the meantime, 
however, the publicity over this deficiency and over the need of small 
firms for such premises has alerted other develooers, both public and 
private, to the possibilities. 
The reason for giving loans was the wish to be able to help small 
firms held back by the lack or high cost of finance. The Council 
considered promoting a Local Act to try to obtain wider powers to aid 
firms financially, but noticing the discouraging reception given by 
central government to other local authorities with the same aim (see 
appendix II), Dudley decided to work within the existing powers and 
apply the only financial instrument available to it. 
With respect to all three measures it was assumed that by giving firms 
the opportunity to grow (in area or in turnover) the Council was giving 
them the opportunity to employ more oeople. Since then, however, a 
report commissioned by the District estimated that the demand for 
industrial land would continue to grow but that that did not imply an 
increase in the demand for labour: more land would be demanded within 
the District without the demand for labour increasing. 
Unemployment of certain groupings. The measures constituted, therefore, 
an attempt to stimulate the demand for labour in general. It was, in 
fact, a particular aim of the Council to improve the employment of 
young people: it was hoped that the measures might achieve that in-
directly, for increasing the general demand for labour should increase 
also the demand for young people. The comments made about the 
"structural" nature of the unemployment - see above - cast some doubt 
upon this hope. 
The location of the unemployed. The choice of location within Dudley MD 
was largely arbitrary: land was supplied where it was available, 
buildings were to be erected on that land, loans were given where they 
were requested. It was Council policy to try to prevent the need for 
long work-journeys by retaining the traditional Black Country pattern 
of dispersed workplaces, but at the same time it was assumed that 
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the District could function as one geographical labour market, as a 
result of which location within Dudley was not so important. 
The inter-local effects. The locational effects of measures applied 
within the District had not been consistently considered. The aim of 
the measures was to provide emoloyment for peoole living in Dudley, 
but any new workolaces created in Dudley could be occupied by people 
living elsewhere. This possibility had, however, been largely ignored. 
On the other hand, a firm threatening to leave Dudley to settle 
elsewhere would receive immediate attention and offers of help to keep 
it within the area. 
Other measures being taken. Administratively, the three measures were 
related to each other in that the Council had intended to build 
factories, and it gave loans for building factories, only on its own 
land. Moreover, the measures were related in the way in which they 
were supposed to work, in that the loans were regarded as an aid to 
allow firms to take advantage of the land provided by the Council. 
Speed and flexibility. It would seem that speed and flexibility were 
not required of those measures. When unemployment was growing rapidly 
in 1974 and 1975 (see figure 4.2) the oroblem was seen as requiring 
an urgent solution, but when it reached a plateau in 1976-77, the 
attitude changed to: here we have a long-term problem which requires 
the steady long-term application of measures. 
The relevant knowledge. Nor did it appear that it was desired to be 
able to predict with any accuracy the effects of applying the measures: 
the evidence on which was based the decision to take the measures was 
far from exhaustive, and the opportunity which the measures gave of 
learning by experience had not been used (see later). The Council 
officers, however, found that they were being hindered by an out-of-date 
knowledge of the local employment and industrial situation, and a 
study was commissioned in 1980 to supply some of that information and 
suggest appropriate measures. 
Outside controls on the agency. In taking these measures, Dudley had 
had to work with other public bodies as follows. Over some, but not all, 
of the proposals by Dudley to suoply industrial land, the West Midlands 
CC had the power of veto by virtue of its planning powers. Then, before 
being allowed to build the factories, Dudley would have had to apply 
to the Department of Industry for Industrial Development Certificates. 
(9) There were no such outside controls, however, on the giving of 
mortgages on factory buildings, for Dudley obtained the money from its 
annual loan allocation from the Public Works Loans Board. 
Local political attitudes. Dudley shared with the rest of the Black 
Country the tradition of small-scale manufacturing industry, and the 
desire that the Council should help small manufacturing firms was 
strong. A related attitude, which found its way on to the Council 
minutes, is that "District Councils should not compete directly with 
private enterprise but fill in gaps in private enterprise provision". 
That was adopted as a Council resolution in 1975 when Labour was the 
ruling party in the Council: when the Conservatives came to power in 
1976 they followed the same principle but applied it more strictly. 
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The effects of the measures 
The measures were being taken in order to increase the employment of 
people, especially young oeople, living within Dudley, and at least a 
partial evaluation of some of the measures would not have been 
difficult With respect to the supplying of sites it was known that 
there was a very great demand for those sites, indicating that the 
Council was indeed supplementing the private provision of land: it was 
known further that many firms which had taken those sites had moved 
from elsewhere in the District, (but it was suggested that one of the 
motives for the relocation was that the firms had oreviously been 
renting or leasing and wanted - after the change in Council policy in 
1976 - a site the freehold of which they owned) and it was estimated 
that over the next 10 years many snail local firms would be wanting to 
move to better premises in the area However, the employment consequences 
of the sites already supplied had not been systematically evaluated. 
To the extent that the Council was indeed filling market gaos and that 
the assumptions made in appendix I are valid for Dudley, then the method 
described there for estimating the employment effects of providing 
industrial land can be applied. The present author was allowed access 
to the local authority's planning application files, and they were used 
to estimate the increase in employment in those firms which, up to mid 
1980, have moved on to Counci1-provided industrial land (10) Four 
industrial estates were studied, containing 28 occupied olots. 
Employment data were available about 21 of these plots, and the extra 
workplaces in the firms moving to those plots was estimated to be 
between 103 and 125. 
The appropriateness of the measures 
It can be seen that in general the measures were consistent with 
Councillors' attitudes The only difficulty within the local authority 
arose with the change of political power in 1976, when the incoming 
Conservative majority wanted to drop the plan to build speculative 
factories, wanted to dispose of land freehold as well as leasehold, and 
wanted to acquire land for industrial uses much more selectively The 
first change in policy proved difficult, for the new Party took over a 
scheme which was already far advanced, the scheme was allowed to 
proceed but only by engaging a private developer to build and dispose 
of the factories, and that delayed progress by more than a year. In 
all other respects, the measures chosen were a fulfillment of the 
Council's political attitude that local government should try to fill 
"market gaps". Moreover, the measures taken to reduce unemployment were 
at the same time a fulfillment of the local political wish to help small 
manufacturing firms. In fact, the direct effect of the measures was to 
helo small firms, and it was assumed that thereby employment would be 
stimulated, in that way there could be no confi iet between measures to 
tackle unemployment and a "pro-smal1-firm" attitude. (11). 
There were two ways by which bodies outside the local authority could 
have obstructed or delayed the three measures: the West Midlands CC 
could have vetoed the industrial land schemes, and the Department of 
Industry could have refused IDC's for the factories. The fact that 
neither of those happened is probably attributable to the Council trying 
to avoid such confrontations: "Dudley resents outside interference" 
was a strong feeling. It was the same feeling (among other reasons) 
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which had led the Council to decide not to fight central government in 
an attempt to obtain wider Local Act powers (see above). 
This study of Dudley has included the situation uo to the middle of 
1980. On 30 October 1980 it was announced by central government that an 
"Enterprise Zone" would be sited within the Metropolitan District of 
Dudley, in which zone financial concessions and freedom from certain 
physical regulations would be available to firms. The scheme was given 
a high priority by the Council members and officers who saw it as the 
greatest industrial development opportunity for Dudley for a number 
of years. 
COVENTRY METROPOLITAN DISTRICT 
Coventry has, in the last few years, suffered a grievous fall in 
prosoenty, relatively if not absolutely. In the mid 1950's its 
unemployment rate was unbelievably low at 0.5%, which was about one-
third of the national rate, in the mid ІЭбОЧ it had climbed to 1% 
but still only about one-half of the British rate, but by February 1979 
unemployment was 6% when the British rate was 5.9%. (12) At that time, 
the demand for labour in the local economy was not expected to grow 
further (13) and the number of people seeking work was expected to 
continue to increase, all of which could lead, according to the 
Council, to a shortfall of 25,000 workplaces in the City in 1986. 
The Council did not share the view of central government that the 
cause of that high unemployment was a temporary recession, instead, the 
Council considered that the local economy had serious long-term 
weaknesses and would not return to former levels of prosperity even if 
the world economy picked up In that situation, the local authority 
identified three strategies which it could follow: 
- acknowledge that most important economic decisions are taken elsewhere, 
by the government and large firms, and accordingly adopt the 
traditional passive role for local authorities in the economy, 
- adopt a role as a pressure group to influence the decisions of central 
government and large firms, 
- take an active role itself, seeking to encourage new firms to move 
into the area, and to foster and encourage development and expansion 
within the area 
In 1976, the City Council adopted the latter two strategies (14) 
Moreover, as it had little success in the following three years in 
influencing central government and as employment in large firms 
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continued to decline, it concentrated less on the second and more on 
the third strategy, with a special emphasis on helping small local firms. 
In 1979 the Council launched its "Small Firms' Package". 
The measures 
Coventry had been supplying industrial land since the 1950's, when it 
wanted to be able to offer alternative sites to firms relocated as 
part of its widespread urban redevelopment schemes. Although urban 
redevelopment had almost come to a standstill, the same measure was 
still being taken, but for rather different reasons: much more emphasis 
was being laid on providing land for new firms and to allow existing 
firms to grow and take on more labour. 
Supply was mostly from existing land stocks acquired many years ago 
and from land bought more recently under a Community Land Act programme. 
Hardly any more land was being acquired for this purpose, partly because 
finance was scarce, partly because there was very little land left 
within the boundaries (irrespective of ownership) ripe for develooment 
and zoned for industry. The latter scarcity had recently led the City 
to buy land just outside its boundaries, in Warwickshire, for disposal 
to firms. The land was supplied either with just the major infra-
structural services or fully serviced, both to firms which would 
develop for their own use and to speculative developers. Disposal was 
strictly leasehold, mainly on 99 year leases but occasionally for as 
long as 125 years. 
The building of unit factories started in the igSO's mainly for re-
locations and was being continued mainly for employment purposes: at the 
beginning of 1980 Coventry owned about 150 units, of between 32 and 750 
sq. m. The emohasis had shifted to building the smaller units, but some 
larger factories were still being constructed in order to enable firms 
occupying the smaller units and wanting to expand to vacate those 
smal 1er um ts. 
Those factories and warehouses were built on the Council's own 
industrial estates either by the Council itself or (because the Council 
could not raise the necessary finance) by a private developer under a 
"lease and leaseback" arrangement. Under the latter, the Council leased 
the land to the developer which built with its own funds then leased 
the factories back to the Council: the advantage was that the City 
retained the freehold of the land and managed the completed buildings, 
which had been constructed at no capital cost to the authority. The 
buildings were then leased to the users, usually on short leases 
(normally between 12 and 25 years). 
Coventry's Financial Assistance Scheme used powers given in sections 
12, 13 and 14 of the Coventry Corporation Act 1972, powers which lay 
unused until the beginning of 1977. (15) The scheme offered the 
following assistance to firms within the City or outside the City 
but on city-owned land: 
- rent-reduced or rent-free periods for two years to firms building 
their own premises on local authority sites 
- guarantees for rent payments 
- loans at a low interest rate (min. 2%) for the first two years, 
thereafter at market rates, to manufacturing firms for buildings, 
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machinery, and fixed equipment and to commercial firms for buildings 
In practice, no applications for the first two forms of assistance had 
been made The only net cost to the local authority of the third form 
was a revenue subsidy for the first two years By the beginning of 
1980, 3 loans had been approved and taken up, 2 had been approved but 
not yet taken up, and 1 application was being considered At that time, 
the Scheme had just been extended to give small (up to £5000) risk 
loans at market interest rates to firms which had not been able to 
raise the full amount elsewhere A further extension just started was 
to guarantee loans for erecting buildings The Financial Assistance 
Scheme was available only to firms which could demonstrate that new 
employment would be created in Coventry (which included firms moving 
to Coventry from elsewhere) (16) 
The reasons for the measures 
Unemployment in general Industrial land was being supplied because 
what vacant land there was left within the city was unattractive to 
private developers because of poor access or other restrictions (17) 
The Council was using its powers, therefore, to bring land into use 
which would have been impossible or unorofitable for private developers 
notwithstanding which, the land was being let at prices which covered 
the costs Small industrial units were being supplied because, it was 
claimed, developers were reluctant to build units smaller than 300 sq 
m , the main reason being the difficult and expensive management which 
such units require Generally, the Council managed to cover its costs 
on such developments 
Both those measures were being taken, therefore, in order to allow the 
demand for labour to grow Moreover the land measure was being 
operated more positively, in that it was Council policy not to let 
sites to firms which could show no exoected employment growth (apart 
from lettings to firms relocated as a result of local authority 
redevelopment schemes ) The Financial Assistance Scheme was being 
operated even more positively the giving of aid was conditional on 
an expected employment growth 
Unemployment of certain groupings Those measures constituted.therefore.an 
attempt to stimulate the demand for labour in general, not the demand 
for those types of labour in most need There were two reasons for this 
- that there were too many uncertainties in trying to direct this type 
of measure at a particular type of labour, and that both the local 
authority and central government were taking other types of measure 
(e g training and retraining) which were being explicitly directed at 
the vulnerable groups (which groups should, therefore, become better 
able to benefit from an increase in the general demand for labour) 
The location of the unemployed The Council wished to improve the 
employment chances of those people in particular who lived in the 
older parts of the city, and with that aim it had developed some unit 
factories there However, the availability of land was a strong 
constraint on the choice of location Moreover, the Council suspected 
that firms in those older areas did not employ a disoroportionate 
number of local residents, and so did not regard the choice of location 
within Coventry as being very important 
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The inter-local effects. On the other hand, it was desired to help 
residents of Coventry, if necessary at the exoense of other areas. 
In oarticular Coventry was competing for new firms against the Assisted 
Areas and was in danger of losing existing firms to those areas In 
that competition, Coventry was the weaker, and wanted extra oowers in 
order to be able to give rent reductions on the buildings (not just the 
land) that it leased: firms had left to go to the Assisted Areas 
ostensibly because they were attracted by the rent reductions there 
Nearer to home there was the competition with adjacent Warwickshire, 
first because Warwickshire residents took many of the new workplaces 
being created in Coventry and second because Warwickshire also was try-
ing to attract firms Coventry claimed not to be unduly disturbed by 
this however: Warwickshire residents used the opportunities being 
created in Coventry, but Warwickshire too was creating new workplaces 
and Coventry residents were filling those, and whereas Warwickshire 
had the better industrial sites Coventry could offer better financial 
assistance 
Other measures being taken. The three sorts of measures were related to 
each other in that unit factories were supplied only on Counci1-owned 
land. The Financial Assistance Scheme was applied independently. (18) 
There was, however, an important relationship between these measures 
and other employment measures (in particular training) being taken by 
the City, the first set of measures aimed to increase the demand for 
labour in general, while other measures changed the labour being 
supplied by certain vulnerable groups so as to enable those people 
to compete more effectively for the new workplaces. 
Speed and flexibility. In its provision of land, buildings, and 
financial assistance the Council likened its activities to "planting 
seeds", which would probably not bring immediate results This was 
consistent with its analysis of the causes of the problem being not a 
temporary recession but a structural weakness in Coventry's economy. 
Speed and flexibility were not, therefore, prime requirements. 
The relevant knowledge. Neither was it regarded as being particularly 
important to be able to oredict with any certainty the results of taking 
the measures. The uncertainties surrounding any such prediction were 
regarded as being insurmountable, moreover, both the Councillors and 
Officers were quite willing to take measures experimentally and to try 
out new measures. The most serious ignorance was felt to be of the 
needs of small firms: how could they be helped most effectively7 In 
order to answer that, the Council was carrying out a survey of small 
firms. 
Outside controls on the agency. The existing measures were being taken 
by the Council with hardly any interference from outside bodies. Over 
its land dealings Coventry had to keep the West Midlands CC informed, 
but that body showed little interest. And since the raising of IDC 
limits, approval to build factory units did not have to be obtained 
from the Department of Industry. 
Local pol i ti cal attitudes. It was the Councillors' crinciple to fill 
gaps in the market but not to compete with private industry It will 
be remembered that that was the principle in Dudley also, but it was 
interpreted in Coventry as allowing much more activity and intervention 
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in the local economy than in Dudley For example, Coventry Council had 
a firm and explicit policy of not relinquishing ownership of its land, 
a point which had not been the source of political dissension within 
the Council. Further, the Councillors welcomed suggestions from the 
Officers and were continually wanting - without, apparently, any 
political qualms - greater powers for intervening in the local economy. 
A related point is that the Councillors were willing to expennent and 
try out new ideas (with the proviso that the success of the schemes 
should be monitored). In the terms introduced in chaoter 2, the local 
policy-makers had a high "oropensity to intervene". 
The effects of the measures 
In appendix I we describe in general how the neasures of supplying 
land, premises and finance might be evaluated. What had been done in 
Coventry7 The local authority knew that there was a strong demand for 
the land it was providing, demand mainly by existing firms in and 
around Coventry which wanted land on which to expand. It could not 
claim that all of its activities under this heading were "filling a 
market gap" because there was still a (small) private supply of 
industrial land, and other sites were available in Warwickshire. Probably 
the Council's most important contribution was in developing the poorer 
sites which private developers would not touch, the demand for these 
sites was not as high as for the better located estates, but as 
industrial land in and around Coventry becomes steadily scarcer the 
Council's activity will be seen to have allowed more employment within 
Coventry than would otherwise have been the case. 
The description "filling a market gap" can properly be applied to the 
Council's measure of building small unit factories the demand for these 
was very strong and there was no other supplier. For that reason, the 
employment in new firms in these factories, and the growth in employment 
in existing firms after moving into the factories, can orobably 
legitimately be attributed to the measure. In 1978 the local authority 
had sponsored a survey of the 50 firms occupying Council-owned small 
factories (i e. smaller than 2500 sq ft , 250 sq. m ) on two of its 
industrial estates. For the 29 firms responding, it was not known how 
many people they had employed before moving to those units, but 18 firms 
had moved from other premises in Coventry and 11 were new firms. Data 
on employment after the move were incomolete, but in total emoloynent 
in the firms had grown and most firms expected to employ yet more people 
The fact that most of the firms surveyed had looked only within Coventry 
for their expansion space suggests that, had the Council not provided 
these factories, few of the firms would have expanded anywhere, let 
alone in Coventry: the Council was not just allowing employment growth 
within its own boundaries, but possibly also employment growth which 
would not have occurred elsewhere 
When discussing in appendix I to what extent a public agency providing 
finance allows or stimulates employment growth, we point out that the 
finance might have been obtainable from other sources. That depends, 
of course, on the way the assistance is given. Coventry gave its 
interest-reduced loans only as a supplement to funds obtained from other 
sources: without further information it is impossible to say what would 
have happened had the supplements not been given. As it was, the Council 
estimated that the first five projects partly financed by those low 
interest loans (£275,000 in total) would create together 150 to 200 
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extra workplaces. Many of those places would be for skilled workers, so 
the effect on those with the worst unemployment (the unskilled and the 
inexperienced) would be indirect. The risk loans would be given only 
as top-up loans where banks were unwilling to provide the full amount 
of finance required: without the risk loans, therefore, the projects 
would either be smaller or not take place at all 
The appropriateness of the measures 
Within the local authority, the adoption and imolementing of those 
measures had proceeded smoothly and with no aooarent reversals of 
policy in the first 6 years of the Metropolitan District's existence 
The employnent policy had been activist and experimental, which seems 
to have been fully in keeping with the attitudes of the Councillors 
and Officers. It had, moreover, enjoyed the full support of the local 
Chamber of Commerce and the local Trades Council 
The taking of those measures seemed to have caused no frictions out-
side the local authority either, a modus vivendi had been achieved on 
this topic with Warwickshire, while the West Midlands CC and the other 
West Midlands districts had not attempted to influence what Coventry was 
doing, and the nature of the measures was such that central government 
could not easily intervene in them. 
It is, however, instructive to look at the recent history of Coventry/ 
central government relationships on this subject In the five years 
1975-80 Coventry made repeated attempts to obtain wider powers to enable 
it to take employment measures, such as: 
- that it be one of the "designated districts" under the Inner Urban 
Areas Act 1978 
- that it be allowed to increase its expenditure, against the general 
central government directives, so as to be able to take more employnant 
measures 
- that IOC restrictions be eased in Coventry (that was before the 
general easing in July 1979) 
- that its financial powers be strengthened, via the West Midlands 
County Council Consolidation Bill 1979 
And in most cases central government was unhelpful,one of the main 
reasons being that the "inter-local effects' of stronger measures 
applied in Coventry might damage the Assisted Areas, and that had the 
additional effect of excluding Coventry from any E E C funding 
The present package of ermloyment measures being taken by the City 
can be seen to represent, therefore, the maximum that central government 
will allow at present, the measures have become 'contextually 
appropriate". 
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THE BIRMINGHAM INNER CITY PARTNERSHIP 
In June 1977, central government published its White Paper "Policy for 
the Inner Cities" (CMND 6845) in which Birmingham was sinaled out for 
special attention and help. Within this policy, special funding was 
given for the Birmingham inner area in 1978, and in 1979 the Birmingham 
Inner City Partnership (ICP) between Birmingham Metrooolitan District 
Council, West Midlands County Council, and central government started 
its first Programme. In this report we shall describe some of the 
physical and financial measures being taken within that ICP framework 
in order to reduce unemployment in the Birmingham ICP area (see 
figure 4.1) But first, some qualifications 
First it must be made clear that the measures taken within the 
Birmingham ICP Programme included far more than measures to influence 
employment, and even the latter included more than we describe here 
Second, both the West Midlands County Council and the Birmingham 
District Council were taking employment measures outside the ICP area 
as well as inside it: (19) occasionally, these other measures will have 
to be mentioned Third, we do not imply that neither of these Councils 
had taken any employment measures before the Inner City Initiative 
began. For example, the County as soon as it began life in 1974, started 
to analyse its employment problems and propose remedies, and in 1976 the 
District co-operated with the Home Office in commissioning a study by 
the present author of the employment measures it was taking (Needhan 
1979a) Fourth, the Partnership as such took no measures, implementation 
was by the two local authorities, separately, but in a framework which 
required co-ordination. 
Unemployment in the Partnership area increased from 16,000 in 1971 
to 51,000 in February 1981.(20) In the five years 1971-6, there was 
a loss in that area of more than 57,000 work places in manufacturing 
and construction and a gain in service employment of only 5,000: it 
is not surprising to find, therefore, that most of the registered 
unemployed in the Partnership area had occupations best suited to 
manufacturing firms (in 1979 13% had craft occupations, 32% were general 
labourers, 36% had other manual occupations). Social groupings with 
particular unemployment difficulties were young people and people from 
ethnic minorities The National Dwelling and Housing Survey for 1977-78 
identified residential unemployment rates of 9.0% for the Birmingham 
Core Area (see figure 4 1), 7.1% for the District, and 5 2% for England, 
and in the Partnership area lived 66% of the District residents (1978) 
and 73% of the District unemployed (1979). 
The measures 
Birmingham City (21) had had an active land acquisition policy for many 
years, buying up land for the comprehensive redevelopment of its older 
areas. That meant that it was in the second half of the 1970ls able 
to supply industrial land out of stock: in 1979 the City Council had 
reviewed the property holdings of its Committees and found "significant 
areas of unused or under-used land available for immediate development". 
These were being offered on the open market in order to alleviate 
"the shortage of suitable develooment sites for allocation to 
industrialists" Nevertheless, the City was also acquiring further sites 
especially in order to supply them for industry, sites which for one 
reason and another would otherwise not have been brought on to the 
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market Since central government started giving large grants towards 
local government expenditure on schemes approved within an ICP Programme 
(22) the City had increased its supply of industrial land and advertised 
it widely In 1978, for example, the City had offered 180 industrial 
sites covering 55 ha. 
The land was suoplied cleared, serviced and unserviced, strictly at 
market prices and preference was given to users with a high employment 
density. The land was sold leasehold or freehold to the 'individual 
developing industrialist" (i.e. the firm building for its own use), 
but strictly leasehold to speculative developers 
In connection with its redevelopment schemes of the 1950's and 'ôO's, 
Birmingham City Council had in 1957 built two "flatted factories" 
comprising 86 units for accommodating relocated firms. When redevel-
opment ceased, so did this activity, especially as it became Council 
policy not to compete with private developers. Later, however, within 
the ICP Programme the City resumed supplying small unit factories, and 
it was both doing the development itself and in partnership with 
developers (the City provided the land, the developer the buildings) 
Disposal of the City's buildings was by sale or lease, of the 
developers' buildings by lease. 
Towards the end of 1978 the City launched its "Business and Employment 
Scheme' to offer financial help to small firms (throughout the City, 
not just in the Partnership Area) The following financial instruments 
had been made available by the Inner Urban Areas Act 1978 (sections 2, 
9, 10, 11 respectively) and 75% of local government expenditure on them 
was refunded by central government: 
ι to make loans of up to 90% on commercial terms (in practice, the 
Public Works Loan Board rate + J"») for the acquisition of land and 
for carrying out building and site works 
n to make loans (which may be interest-free for up to two years) 
for site preparation and the installation of services 
m to make grants to assist with rents paid by firms taking new 
leases of industrial or commercial premises 
iv to make grants towards loan interest paid on land and buildings 
by small firms employing under 50 people 
Birmingham City Council had supplemented those instruments by using 
its own money and section 137 of the Local Government Act 1972 (23), 
as follows: 
- to extend the workings of ι. to iv. from the Partnership area to the 
whole City 
- to extend the working of iv to include firms with more than 50 
employees 
- to guarantee loan and interest payments 
- to give cash grants towards working capital for plant and equipment 
and towards fixed capital. 
The emphasis was on small manufacturing concerns, and to qualify for 
financial assistance it was necessary to demonstrate that a oroposal 
would create or preserve 5 or more workplaces Further, any business 
was eligible for help which found that the normal sources of finance 
could not meet its requirements and which was able to demonstrate that 
the proposal would not proceed in Birmingham without financial assistance 
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from the City. 
In its first year (Dec. 1978 - Nov. 1979) 13 firms had been helped 
financially under the Business and Employment Scheme. The total cost 
over 3 years of these 13 schemes was expected to be £25,000, of which 
£10,400 was the City's share: there was also a contingent liability 
where loans had been guaranteed. 
Some of the other powers which the Inner Urban Areas Act 1978 gave 
to selected local authorities will be mentioned here, because the ways 
in which the powers are supposed to work are interesting and because 
they were important in the Birmingham ICP area. These are powers to give 
grants to private persons who carry out physical improvements within 
certain industrial areas, by our definitions, the powers are financial 
but they aim to influence employment via changes in the physical 
environment induced by the financial instruments. The powers are 
applicable only within designated Industrial Improvement Areas (IIA's) 
and the grants may be given towards the cost of exterior works (section 
5 of the 1978 Act) or towards the conversion and improvement of 
industrial or commercial buildings (section 6). The grant is given 
by the local authority and amounts to 50% of the cost of the works. 
Birmingham District Council was implementing several IIA's using mainly 
the section 5 powers. 
Within the same Birmingham ICP area, the West Midland County Council 
also was taking somewhat similar measures with the same aim - to relieve 
unemployment. 
The County had decided in principle to supply industrial land- but, 
unlike the District, it owned no stocks of land (24) and so had first 
to acquire it. The County had a big programme of reclaiming derelict 
land, so could supply for industrial use the land thus acquired. That, 
moreover, was consistent with the policy adopted on the political change 
of Council in 1977, the policy of helping industry while "concentrating 
on those types of development which are not attractive to private sector 
developers", for it was noted that the private sector was reluctant to 
reclaim derelict land. The County had acquired very little non-derelict 
land for industrial use. 
The County had been more active in providing small factory units, 
which it disposed of leasehold or freehold. It planned to extend this 
measure, for financial reasons develooing in partnership with private 
developers. Another way of increasing the supply of smaller cheaper 
factories was being taken by the County - buying existing vacant 
factories, refurbishing them, and converting them into small units. 
These were then disposed of leasehold and freehold. The County was even 
refurbishing and converting factories which were not in its ownership. 
Like the Birmingham District (and sometimes in co-operation with it) 
the West Midlands CC had implemented section 5 of the Inner Urban 
Areas Act in order to bring about external environmental improvements 
in Industrial Improvements Areas. That decision had, however, not been 
taken without a full debate of the political implications of the 
instruments contained in that Act and the explicit decision "to make 
use of those provisions ... stopping short of actually giving direct 
financial assistance to industry" Certain financial instruments had 
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therefore been ruled out, and extra limits had been placed on those 
financial instruments (e.g. section 5 of the Inner Urban Areas Act) 
which had been accepted. 
The reasons for the measures 
Unemployment in general. There was a great shortage of industrial land 
in Birmingham, especially in the inner parts of the city. The age of 
the city meant that all the land within its boundaries had an urban 
use, and the main source of land for new industry was that left derelict 
by the closure of firms. (25) The cost and administrative difficulties 
of bringing such land on to the market and of assembling adjacent plots 
to make viable building sites were in many cases so great as to preclude 
private initiatives: it had to be a task for a local authority. More­
over, there was a very great and continuing demand for industrial land. 
It was argued, therefore, that by supplying the land the local 
authority was allowing employment growth. (26) 
A similar argument was made about suoplying small unit factories (less 
than 100 sq. m. according to the County, less than 200 sq. n. according 
to the City): there was a demand for them, the market was not supplying 
them, so the local authority was filling a "gap in the market". (27) 
The County was even able to quantify this: the rate of return on all 
of its schemes had to be evaluated, most of its schemes to supply 
factories would fetch between Ы and 9%, that was unprofitable to a 
private develooer at the then current interest rates, in effect there­
fore the County was giving a revenue subsidy to those schemes. The 
advantage of refurbishing old factories was that manufacturing floor-
space could be supplied more quickly and cheaply than by building new 
the units did not let, however, as quickly as new factories 
In Birmingham, private developers had recently started to build 
smaller factory units (less than 500 sq m. ) and to refurbish older 
factories. The County was trying to avoid comoeting with the private 
sector by building mainly the smallest units (less than 100 sq m.) and 
by not refurbishing factories until they had stood emoty for several 
months with no indication of private interest in them. 
The District decided to offer financial assistance above that avail­
able in the Inner Urban Areas Act after noting that "the powers given 
(in that Act) are almost entirely directed to extending the assist­
ance which a local authority may give in relation to land and build­
ings and not to assisting established small firms or persons seeking 
to establish a new small business with working capital, temporary 
finance for the ourchase of new machinery ... etc. Finance for such 
purposes may in fact be more critical to the retention or establish­
ment of a small business than the provision of land or oremises" 
The loans made available under the Business and Employment Scheme were 
provided according to the principle of "filling market gaos", for 
they were offered at commercial rates and only if the firm could not 
raise finance elsewhere (28), and loan guarantees were offered in order 
to help firms raise finance elsewhere The Scheme also offered grants 
(contrary to the recommendation of the Council Officers) the " 
justification for which was more pragmatic, grants were offered only 
if necessary for heloing a firm over a difficult initial period the 
interest relief grants were more generous than the deferred capital 
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repayment available from the Industrial and Commercial Finance Corporat-
ion or from banks, and the other grants under the BES were not available 
elsewhere. Nevertheless, all the different forms of finance assistance 
were directly related to emoloyment-generating projects 
The ways in which the environmental measures undertaken in Industrial 
Improvement Areas were supposed to stimulate employment were much more 
indirect. It was clamed both by the District and the County that they 
would give a psychological boost to firms and workers in decaying 
industrial areas, perhaps helping to dissuade those firms from moving 
out of the city, and also that they would stimulate private investment 
in areas that had suffered from indecision for many years It was hoped 
that improvements to roads, parking, etc. would increase business 
efficiency.And it was claimed that the measures comolemented the provision 
of new or refurbished factories by helping to keep the industrial 
building stock in a reasonable state of repair so as to be available 
for future users, but that argument applies more strongly to the 
(largely unused) section 6 powers for internal improvements than to 
external improvements In fact, the reasoning behind the IIA's was 
unclear. What are we to make, for example, of the statement from the 
ICP Committee that "the emphasis would be on economic regeneration, 
this being interpreted to mean that substantial efforts should be 
focussed on environmental improvement, some job provision, and a 
greater variety of housing in inner areas"7 
The answer, probably, is that employment was not the only reason for 
taking the measures. The 'ICP Programme 1980-83" identified two aspects 
- "industrial regeneration" and "employment pronotion" - and suggested 
that, although the two were difficult to separate, the latter should 
be given additional emphasis "in future years". The 1979-82 Programme 
said something similar, "the initial emphasis is on the physical 
environment rather than on people. ... Such (physical) improvements 
are seen to be essential before jobs and people will come back to, and 
feel more secure in, the inner areas". Some of the Officers, moreover, 
were rather sceptical about the Members' committment to the employment 
aim. At the County it was pointed out that the measures fitted in well 
with the pro-manufacturing industry bias of the ruling politicians 
at the District it was said that the way in which the measures were 
actually being implemented sometimes resembled an "industrial strategy" 
(29) than a strategy to increase emoloyment 
Unemployment of certain groupings The aim of "enoloyment promotion" 
had not been directed at any specific social grouping. However, it was 
suggested that labour supply measures being taken in the city (by 
central as well as local government) would help specific social 
groupings and so complement the general labour demand measures. It was 
pointed out by County Officers that there was (by design7) a good fit 
between the types of firm being helped - manufacturing - and the skills 
and experience offered by the unemployed in the ICP area (see earlier). 
The location of the unemployed. It was, on the other hand, explicitly 
desired to help people specified by area - the residents of inner city 
areas. In 1978 a note internal to the County suggested that the ICP 
should adopt the target of creating 1800 new jobs net a year for 
residents of the Partnership area, most of whom would want to continue 
working within that area. Moreover, the County had a rule of thumb that 
only 1 in every 4 jobs provided in the inner city would go to inner city 
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residents which would mean creating 7,200 new jobs net a year in the 
ICP area 
In other words, increasing the demand for labour by firms in the ICP 
area should help to increase the demand for labour living in that 
area, but the two were certainly not identical In recognition of this, 
in the ICP Programme 1980-83 money was set aside (£100,000 ρ a ) to 
support projects aimed directly at the employnent needs and oroblems 
of inner area residents, but no proposals were made as to how that noney 
should be spent And the 1980 Review of the ICP Programme said, rather 
plaintively, "Projects for the benefit of inner area residents are more 
difficult to design The door is wide open for any agency with ideas 
in this direction ' 
Within the ICP area it was recognised that unemployment was worse in 
some locations than in others However, the locations of the measures 
were not determined by that consideration (land and buildings had to be 
provided where the sites were available, financial assistance went to 
where the applying firms were) it was considered that the ease of 
travelling to work within the ICP area made it unnecessary to locate 
the measures right next to the unemployed (30) 
The inter-local effects Although any extra commuting into the ICP 
area to take advantage of the new employment there would reduce the 
benefits to the ICP residents, most of the commuters would be residents 
of the District or the County, so neither of those two authorities was 
seriously concerned about that locational effect 
The biggest locational effects outside the County would be created by 
the migration of firms For example, it was reported that some of the 
financial assistance had gone to dissuade firms from moving to new 
towns, and it was certainly envisaged that the measures should attract 
new firms into the area (althouqh the main aim was to help existing 
f ι rms) 
Other measures being taken The measures described above were related 
to each other as follows The supplying of land was a measure which 
was taken on its own, new buildings were supplied only on local 
authority-owned land, the County had refurbished factories standing 
on land not in its ownership, and the financial assistance offered by 
the City was operated independently of the other measures 
It was not clear to what extent those measures were being taken in 
conjunction with other measures (e g for influencing the labour 
supply) in order better to tackle unemployment within the ICP area The 
ICP Programme included, in fact, no specific measures to influence 
labour supply it listed measures being taken by other agencies outside 
the Partnership, but did not indicate whether the supply and demand 
measures would be co-ordinated 
Speed and flexibility Had speed and flexibility been required of the 
measures
7
 The first ICP Programme laid emphasis on the need to include 
projects which were "capable of producing early results so as to boost 
the confidence of the inner area economy" That is a rather ambiguous 
phrase, however, and some Officers suggested that it meant that visible 
environmental improvements should be made quickly, rather than that new 
exmployment should be generated quickly, and that the former was the 
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reason for starting with the external improvements in IIA's. 
Whether or not soeed in reducing unemployment was considered to be 
important, it had certainly not been achieved. These were new measures 
for both the District and the County, and for both Members and Officers, 
and the lack of experience with the measures had led to a gross under-
estimation of the 'lead times' (the time between deciding to take a 
measure and completing it): experience has shown this to take between 
2 and 3 years for the physical measures. Further delays had been caused 
by the caution, when faced with new measures, of both Councillors and 
Officers. That had led to delays in implementing the Business and 
Employment Scheme also, but experience in its first year showed that it 
"worked" (that is, oroduced employment gains) quickly, the new jobs were 
created soon after giving the assistance. 
The results of those delays was massive underspending of the budgetted 
amounts. For example, in the capital account for the District 1977-78 
the "probable" expenditure on the Inner City Construction Programme 
had been budgetted as £729,000 and only £234,000 had been spent, for 
1978-79 the "probable" capital expenditure on Inner City Initiatives 
was £8,844,000 in the budget and only £5,881,000 had been spent. 
Flexibility, in the sense given to this term in chapter 2, had not 
been regarded as important The ICP initiative was a 10-year strategy, 
of which the main guidelines had been laid down, and it was considered 
that there would be a continuing need for those types of measure . 
The relevant knowledge. It was suggested in the District that, although 
it had not been specified that the results of the measures be accurately 
predictable, nevertheless the Councillors wanted value-for-money and 
were cautious therefore about applying new or experimental methods 
The delays that this had imposed had, in fact, allowed useful knowledge 
to be gained of the effects of applying the measures 
Within the County also, accurate predictions had not been required: 
but it was said that the initial ignorance about the measures and the 
situation in which they were being taken could have led to serious 
miscalculations and to the measures falling into disrepute. For example, 
a large programme of providing land and buildings had been launched, 
with no preparatory investigation of the demand for these, had the 
programme been implemented at the intended pace, demand might have been 
inadequate. In fact, the great delays in the programmes had led to the 
measures being marginal and to useful experience being gained. In 
effect, the Officers said that their initial ignorance should have led 
them to restrict the size of their programmes. 
Outside controls on the agency All the above mentioned measures, except 
some of the applications of the B.E S , were being taken within the 
framework of the Inner City Partnership, which consisted of the County, 
the District, and central government (working through the Department 
of the Environment). All schemes proposed by the local government 
partners had to be approved by the central government partner 
Officially, the District and the County may not veto each other's 
schemes, but it was suggested that if there was great hostility between 
the two local government partners over a proposed measure then the 
central government would step in and veto it in order to prevent a rift. 
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The raising of IDC limits in 1979 meant that the aporoval of the 
Department of Industry for factory building was not required, it was 
suggested, however, that if the DI considered that the ICP measures were 
beginning to damage the Assisted Areas, then the DI would persuade the 
DoE to moderate the scale of the proposed measures The only other 
outside agencies with which the local authorities were obliged to work 
had only a marginal influence - for example, in giving financial advice 
about firms applying for help. 
Local political attitudes. At the time that those measures were being 
taken, both the County and the District Councils were Conservative-
controlled Moreover some Councillors served on both Councils, and the 
local party organisations strove to ensure that their Councillors 
followed the same line at both levels So it is not suronsing that the 
attitudes of the Councillors with respect to these measures were similar 
in both the authorities. 
The ruling political principle seemed to be - complementarity, not 
competition, with the private sector, and the County Council in 
particular had been diligent in preserving its ideological purity The 
principle had been applied in three ways. First, do not do anything 
which the private sector is prepared to do. so the County, for example, 
started to investigate refurbishing a vacant factory, but stopped a 
month later because "it was likely that the property in question would 
be bought by a private firm", and the City would develop factories on 
industrial land only if that was the only way of bringing that land 
into use. Second, do not take measures which require too great an 
intervention in the running of private firms, so the County had an 
explicit policy of not acting as "bankers by providing financial 
assistance towards commercial and industrial enterprises" and in line 
with that it had rejected a number of financial instruments The County 
was moreover unhappy about giving loans to private firms because that 
involved continuing intervention in the affairs of those firms, and 
when, in the second half of 1980, the County relaxed its policy of not 
aiding industry financially, the scheme it introduced - help with rent 
and rate oayments - gave grants rather than loans And third, that old 
political football, sell land if you can rather than lease it. so the 
County Council, for example, resolved "that the freeholds of industrial 
premises developed by the County Council . be offered to the tenants 
concerned ..." (31) 
There was a further attitude of the ruling Councillors which seemed 
to have been important in the selection of measures - caution For 
example, when the City was considering declaring its first Industrial 
Improvement Area it said "At this stage very little is known about the 
level of uptake of aid to be expected with IIA's It is suggested 
that in the first instance a pilot declaration is made" And the County 
decided to start its first IIA "on an experimental basis" There was 
possibly a general caution about spending public money: there was 
certainly a particular caution about what to do with new and untried 
powers, especially as they were powers which had been given to only a 
few local authorities in the county by a central government of a 
different political complexion, which their political opponents in the 
West Midlands had asked for when they were in control of local govern-
ment but which the present Councils had not requested, and to some of 
which they were actively hostile. 
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The effects of the measures 
The ways in which the effects of the measures on enroloyment might be 
evaluated are discussed in apoendix II The measure not considered there 
is environmental improvements in IIA's, the employment effects of which 
could perhaps be evaluated by comparing actual employment changes after 
the improvements with expected employment changes in the absence of 
improvements, but the results could never be interpreted conclusively 
In fact, there had been no evaluation by the County for the very good 
reason that it had only recently started with the measures: it had 
collected the necessary base data and had set up a monitoring system 
for collecting information about changes in those variables. The 
measures being taken within the Inner City Programme by the City were 
also very recent. If however the assumption is correct that firms 
moving to ICP land and buildings are no different from firms moving co 
new industrial estates in the city built both publicly and privately 
since 1972, then the results of the annual survey of such firms carried 
out by the City Planning Department can be apolied to the ICP measures 
also. The 1979 survey included 9 warehousing firms and 10 industrial 
firms which had been included in the equivalent survey in 1976/77, so 
employment change in those firms could be measured. For the warehousing 
firms, total employment had not increased, two firms which had expected 
to employ more people had not done so, and almost all firms exoected 
no further employment growth. By contrast, the industrial firms had 27°' 
more employment in 1979 than in 1976/77, which growth was more than 
expected, and these firms expected to expand even further Both the 
1979 and 1980 surveys found a large proportion of the firms on the new 
estates to be new (23 out of 56 in 1979) or under 2 years old (19 out 
of 62 in 1980) and the 1980 survey found that one of the main reasons 
why existing firms had moved to a new estate was to get room for expans-
ion. In a further analysis of the findings, of the 30 firms which 
had moved (a complete relocation) from another part of Birmingham, 
employment before the move was compared with enroloyment afterwards 
The 30 firms together showed a 20% employment growth (between, typically, 
1977 and 1980), 24 of the 30 firms had exoanded their employment, and 
the small firms were more likely to grow than the larger ones 
Those findings indicate that new industrial estates do allow employment 
growth to take place If that conclusion can be applied to the land and 
buildings provided by the local government Inner City Partners, and if 
such land and buildings would not have been provided privately (i.e if 
the two Councils were successful in their striving to do no more than 
fill market gaps), then those measures had indeed reduced unenroloyment 
in the City. 
Employment in firms receiving financial helo under the City's BES was 
being monitored quarterly In the 13 firms assisted in the first year 
it was predicted that 90 workplaces would be created or preserved in 
1979/80 and a further 56 in 1980/81: the quarterly monitoring would 
allow those predictions to be checked, but that would say nothing about 
how much of that employment could correctly be attributed to the 
financial helo The use being made of this orogramme was disappointing. 
in its first year of operation, 200 firms apolied for financial 
assistance but most were not eligible under the rules and only 13 firms 
received the help, no more than £25,000 was given out, when the amount 
available was almost £1M a year. The 1980 Review of the Inner City 
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Programme said "The first year has demonstrated that the provision of 
public finance may not necessarily be the most severe problem in the 
'economy' topic area". 
The appropriateness of the measures 
Within both local authorities, we have seen how the Councillors had 
applied the instruments in conformity with their own political wishes. 
No criticism is implied by that statement - Councillors are elected 
for that purpose - but it must be remembered that the Birmingham City 
Council has for many years now been highly ooliticised with frequent 
changes of political control between Labour and Conservative and 
concomitant violent changes in policies. The West Midlands County 
Council did not exist until 1973, but the change of power in 1977 was 
accompanied by policy switches as violent as those in the City. As a 
result, political attitudes at the time the Inner City Programme was 
being implemented were hard and explicit, making quite clear the 
process by which the measures were adapted to become "aopropriate" to 
the Councillors' political attitudes. 
That seems to have caused more internal frictions within the County 
than the District. In the latter, the Officers advised giving 
assistance in the form of loans rather than grants "since loans are 
self-financing" but the Councillors did not follow that advice. In the 
County, however, the Officers advised the giving of financial assistance 
to firms but the Councillors rejected that, the Officers several times 
proposed the acquisition of particular buildings for industrial 
refurbishment but the Councillors would not agree, the Officers 
recommended that freeholds of industrial premises developed by the 
County be not sold but the Councillors went ahead (albeit not in-
discriminately) . 
The result of those internal arguments in the County was great 
delays. The affair of the Saltiey Gas Works - a redundant site of 10 ha 
suitable for 40,000 sq. m. of industrial floorspace - is a good example. 
In July 1978 the Council gave its approval to a report by the Officers 
that the site should be investigated, and one year later approved in 
principle its acquisition. A few days later the mam policy committee 
of the Council proposed that, rather than begin negotiations with the 
owner to purchase, the Council should advise the owner to offer the 
site for sale on the open market and the County would make an offer for 
it. The full Council approved that resolution. 
What reactions had there been from outside the local authorities to 
those measures'7 Relationships between the County and the District were 
reported as being harmonious. Relationships between those two and the 
DoE (the third partner in the ICP) were also good. In fact, the DoE had 
not withheld its approval from any scheme prooosed by the local 
governments and had, on the contrary, been pressing those two to act 
more quickly: the DoE was willing to exoenment, impatient of the 
delays, and critical of the gross underspending. 
One might have expected a reaction from the Department of Industry 
which is always jealous of its powers to steer industries and always 
wary when local governments outside the Assisted Areas try to influence 
industrial location. But in fact the institutional context had been 
designed to take account of such reactions: the DI was not one of the 
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Partners but could if necessary apply pressure through the DoE. 
There had been a reaction from the adjacent Shire Counties 
(Warwickshire, Staffordshire, Worcestershire, and Shropshire, see 
figure 4.1). The ICP Programme 1979/82 argued that attempts to stim-
ulate industry in the inner areas should be supported by constraints 
on industrial developments on the periphery of the West Midlands County, 
and that policy was adopted by the West Midlands County Council in its 
Structure Plan Review. The Shire Counties pointed out - correctly -
that that would reduce industrial overspill from the conurbation and, 
hence, their industrial growth. But once again, the organisational 
context had been designed to incorporate such reactions: objections 
to Structure Plans must be made to the DoE which can weigh up the 
competing claims of the inner area and the periphery and which can, as 
the Inner City Partner with the power of veto, moderate if necessary 
the industrial stimulation in the inner areas. It will be seen that 
central government, in giving extra powers to certain local authorities 
by the Inner Urban Areas Act, had surrendered none of its control. 
NOTES 
(1) Permission to use the files in this way was kindly granted by the 
Department of Environment (West Midlands Region) and by the Dep-
artment of Architectural Planning and Urban Studies, University of 
Aston in Birmingham. 
(2) By concentrating on three only of the employment measures being 
taken by a local authority we give only a partial picture of 
the employment policy being followed by that authority. That is 
perhaps unfortunate for the authority, but not for our argument 
which is about the choosing and taking of certain types of measure, 
not about total policies. However, when describing the reasons for 
choosing those particular measures we consider the relationship 
between the selected measures and any other employment measures 
being taken by the local authority: in that way a fuller picture of 
the employment policy being pursued is given. 
(3) Note that the figures on these graphs are for wider areas than the 
local authority districts discussed here. Note also the definition 
of unemployment percentage rate: the Department of Employment 
defines it as the number of registered unemployed expressed as a 
percentage of the latest available mid-year estimates of all 
employees plus the unemployed at the same date. 
(4) The departments in which those council officers worked varied with 
the local authority: in some, Planning, in others, Land and 
Buildings, sometimes Finance, and sometimes a specially created 
Industrial Development Unit. 
(5) The old County Borough has been defunct since 1974 and is now 
replaced by the larger Metropolitan District. 
Statistics for the. Dudley/Sandwel 1 "travel-to-work area" (larger 
than Dudley M.D.) are given in figure 4.2. The Black Country is 
the area of heavy industry to the west of Birmingham. 
(6) In England "freehold ownership" of a plot of land is the nearest 
that anyone besides the Crown can get to outright ownership of 
that land. 
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(7) Dudley, like other Districts in the Black Country, was the scene of 
unbridled mneral extraction in the 19th and early 20th century, 
which left it in 1975 with 1065 ha (13% of its total area) of 
derelict and waste land. 
(8) Of the 4 industrial estates we studied in order to estimate the 
employment growth they had allowed (see later), one had been a 
disused quarry, one a refuse tip, and one a derelict site with 
lagoons and difficult access. 
(9) In July 1979 the maximum size of factory which may be built without 
an IDC was raised so high (from 15,000 sq. ft. to 50,000 sq. ft. 
i.e. from 1,500 to 5,000 sq m.) that this central government 
control was no longer of any practical inportance. 
(10) As a research method this has two weaknesses only that emoloyment 
change associated with a development requiring planning permission 
is detected and the employment change is that predicted by the 
applicant and it might not in fact be realised. 
(11) A survey carried out in 1980 showed that it was, in fact, the 
smaller firms which had been increasing their employment and that 
they could be expected to increase their employment more than 
larger firms. The assumptions on which the District had been 
acting were, therefore, happily confirmed. 
(12) The first two statistics are for the Coventry Employment Exchange 
Area which extends beyond the local authority boundary, the third 
for the local authority area itself. Statistics for the Coventry 
"travel-to-work area' (larger even than the Employment Exchange 
Area) are in figure 4 2. 
(13) In July 1980 one of the largest manufacturing firms in Coventry 
declared itself bankrupt and other firms laid off thousands of 
workers. 
(14) That the City should reject a passive role is not surprising, given 
its history as the city which rebuilt itself after the disastrous 
bombing of the last World War, which played host to Friend and 
Jessop while they carried out their famous research into local 
government and strategic choice (1969), and which voluntarily 
exposed itself to fierce criticism from one of the Community 
Development Projects (Hillfields) 
(15) Under the Local Government Act 1972 section 262 all Local Acts in 
Metropolitan Counties were to have been rescinded in 1979. however, 
their life had been extended to the end of 1980 and probably for a 
further 4 years after that 
(16) The Council had also the financial powers given by section 3 of the 
Local Authorities (Land) Act 1963 and section 137 of the Local 
Government Act 1972, the uses of which by Dudley and Birmingham 
respectively are described elsewhere in this chapter Coventry had 
not used these powers, considering that its own Local Act powers 
rendered the General Act powers unnecessary 
(17) In 1976 there were 173 ha undeveloped land zoned for industry of 
which 132 ha were not immediately available because of access diff-
iculties etc In 1979 the total area of land zoned for industry had 
decreased to 90 ha of which 55 ha were not immediately available 
The changes are to be explained by the take-up of industrial land 
and by the Council bringing into use some of the zoned but difficult 
-to-use industrial land. 
(18) It happened that some of the apolicants were also occupants of 
Council-owned land or buildings Moreover, the application of the 
financial schemes to firms outside the authority's boundaries was 
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restricted by law to firms on Council-owned land. 
(19) Birmingham Council was concentrating its activities, but not 
exclusively, on its ICP area, the West Midlands Council was 
concentrating its activities on several priority areas, of which 
the Birmingham ICP was just one. 
(20) Statistics for the Birmingham "travel-to-work area" (much bigger 
than the Partnership area) are to be found in figure 4 2. 
(21) Up to 1974 Birmingham was a County Borough, thereafter a 
Metropolitan District with rather larger boundaries. 
(22) Central government grants were for 75% of revenue expenditure and 
75% of debt charges (which includes repayment of the principal). 
These central government grants apply to all the approved ICP 
Programme measures described here. 
(23) This allows any local authority to spend up to the product of a 2p 
rate on anything which is in the interests of the area 
(24) There has been a West Midlands County Council only since 1974 so, 
unlike the new District, the new County had not been able to 
inherit land stocks from its predecessor. 
(25) The District was carrying out a survey of unused industrial land 
held by existing firms - as reserves etc. - to see if such land 
could be brought into use. 
(26) Insofar as the demand was to buy industrial land, however - and the 
demand to buy was reoorted as being strong - and insofar as this 
was the demand to obtain security and an asset rather than 
expansion space, then this argument is weakened. 
(27) Speculative developers have built large quantities of warehousing 
and some larger factories, but not the small units for manufacturing 
firms. The demand for land and buildings provided by the District 
was sometimes so high that there was a queue of applicants. Then 
the District was selective and favoured those who would use the 
land or premises to employ the most people Moreover, the District 
reckoned that the demand for small factory units varied directly 
with the amount of unemployment, a large number of people declared 
redundant created a large demand for small factories as some of 
those redundant workers set up business on their own 
(28) It should be said that private loans to small firms are much more 
readily available than was the case a few years ago. And the exper-
ience of the BES was that most small firms could get finance from 
other sources for viable schemes 
(29) This comment must be interpreted in the light of the White Paper 
"An Approach to Industrial Strategy" (CMND 6315) issued in 1977 
which emphasised the primary importance for national economic 
recovery of improving industrial performance and increasing 
productive potential In July 1977 central government sent a 
circular (71/77 Department of Environment) to all local authorities 
advising them how they could and should contribute to that 
industrial strategy See the reference in appendix II also. 
(30) The boundaries of the Partnership area had, in fact, been drawn 
with this consideration in mind It was desired to give particular 
help to the residents of the "core area" (see figure 4 1) but sites 
for industrial development were scarce in the core area, so a wider 
Partnership area was drawn accessible to the core area and 
containing more physical possibilities 
(31) It is noteworthy that the emphasis given by the two Councils to the 
inner city programme was very similar to that urged by the 
Birmingham Chamber of Industry and Commerce 
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Dudley 
Social aspects of a town development plan: a study of the С В. of 
Dudley, University of Liverpool, Department of Social Science, 1951. 
Annual Statistical Abstract, West Midlands C.C., 1975. 
Human resources and job opportunities, Dudley M.D., Dec. 1976. 
Report of the Principal Careers Officer, Dudley M.D., Feb. 1977. 
Special supplement, Dudley Express and Star, 4 Apr.1978. 
The future of the Dudley economy, Dudley M.D., Sept. 1977. 
Dudley's local economy, problems and prospects, JURUE University of 
Aston in Birmingham, 1980. 
Minutes since Nov. 1973 and up to Feb. 1980 of the meetings of the 
Dudley Metropolitan District Council and its Policy and Resources 
Committee, Land Committee, Finance Committee. 
Coventry 
City of Coventry econome policy, a discussion paper, Coventry M.D., 
Dec 1975. 
Financial survey of the 15 largest manufacturing firms in Coventry, 
Coventry M.D , Jan. 1976 
Quarterly monitor of the local economy, Coventry M D., Nov. 1976 
Quarterly monitor of the local economy, Coventry 'I.D., Jun. 1977. 
Coventry Financial Assistance schemes, Coventry M.D , undated 
Coventry City Council Risk Loans scheme, Coventry M D. , undated. 
A monitoring of the Coventry City Council's policy for the building 
of small industrial units, Τ Karman, Department of Urban and 
Regional Planning, Lanchester Polytechnic, Coventry, 1978 
Small firms' package, Coventry M.D., Mar. 1979 
Getting an accurate forecast of local employment prospects, the Coventry 
experience, Hunt H.J , Stanton Ρ G., Hodges D , The Planner, vol. 66, 
1980 
A directory of assistance available to business in Coventry from public 
sector sources, Coventry M.D , Mar 1980. 
Plans into practice: the Warwickshire Industrial Development Programme, 
paper at conference, Warwick University, Jun. 1980. 
Minutes since April 1973 and up to Feb 1980 of the meetings of the 
Coventry Metropolitan District Council and its City Development and 
Property Management Committee, Policy and Advisory Committee, Finance 
Committee, Planning Committee. 
Birmingham 
A time for action, economic and social trends in the West Midlands, 
West Midlands C.C., 1974. 
Manpower resources of the Birmingham Metropolitan District, Birmingham 
M.D., May 1975. 
A time for action, policy proposals, West Midlands C.C., 1975. 
The economic problems of the inner areas in the West Midlands County, 
West Midlands С С , 1976. 
Birmingham Inner City Partnership, Initial Policy Paper, Birmingham 
I.С P., Dec. 1977 
Inner City Partnership Programme, 1979-82, Birmingham I.СР., 1978. 
Birmingham Inner City Partnership, the economic and industrial aspects 
of the first I.СР., West Midlands С С , Feb. 1978. 
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An approach to the inner city problem, Birmingham Chamber of Industry 
and Commerce, Feb 1978 
Development of industrial and warehousing estates - employment densities, 
Birmingham M D , Aug. 1979 
Birmingham inner city profile 1979, Birmingham I.С P., Oct 1979 
Inner City Partnership Programme, 1980-83, Birmingham I С Ρ , Oct 1979 
West Midlands Country Structure Plan Review, draft proposals for 
alterations. West Midlands С С , Oct. 1979. 
Industrial renewal in the inner city: an assessment of potential and 
problems, Williams H. et al. Department of the Environment, Inner 
Cities Directorate, 1980. 
Birmingham Inner City Partnership, supolement, Birmingham Post, 22 Jan 
1980 
Development of industrial and warehousing estates - employment densities, 
Birmingham M.D., Oct. 1980. 
An empirical study of unemployed men on the register in Small Heath 
Birmingham in 1976, Smith В D Μ , Centre for Urban and Regional 
Studies Birmingham, 1980. 
Minutes since April 1976 and up to May 1980 of the meetings of the 
Birmingham Metropolitan District Council and its Finance and 
Priorities Committee, General Purposes Committee, Planning and 
Highways Committee, Land Sub- (later Property Services) Committee 
Minutes since April 1976 and up to May 1980 of the meetings of the 
West Midlands County Council and its Policy (later Policy and 
Priorities) Committee, Finance Committee, Planning Committee, Legal 
and Parliamentary (later Legal and Property) Committee 
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5 Three Dutch gemeenten 
The purpose of the Dutch case studies is the sane as that of the English 
ones, to develop, by practical investigations, the ideas oresented in 
chapter 2 about the ways in which a public agency chooses a type of 
instrument and to obtain information about the working of physical and 
financial instruments in preparation for chanters 7 and 8. 
We have used the same structure for the Dutch as for the English 
reports, although there were some significant differences between the 
two sets of cases, the most important of which are: 
- when an English local authority decides to provide industrial land, 
that is an exceotional decision, whereas in the Netherlands it occurs 
regularly, what is interesting in the Netherlands therefore is the 
discussion around providing more industrial land. 
- the English principle of ultra vires has the effect of channelling 
initiatives into a limited number of measures, so the interesting 
decisions are about whether or not to take one of the available 
measures: the Dutch principle of autonomy (although severely 
constrained) leaves a wider range of measures open to a gemeente 
(see appendix II) 
- it seems that the taking by local government of financial measures 
to combat unemployment is more recent and therefore not yet so 
developed in the Netherlands as in England. On the other hand, the 
Dutch habit of discussing everything in extenso, in public, and in 
print means that the considering of whether or not to apply such 
measures is well documented. 
Those three differences have led to a difference in emphasis between 
the two sets of case studies whereby in the English reports more 
attention is paid to the measures themselves and to the effects of 
taking them, in the Dutch reports more attention is paid to the 
discussions about possible measures. 
THE DUTCH CASES 
In the autumn of 1979 a research project was started into the policies 
for employment and unemployment being pursued by a number of the larger 
gemeenten in the Netherlands The research was financed by the Economic 
Institute of the University of Nijmegen, the present author was one of 
the two directors of the research, and the results were published in a 
report by Geraets (1980). Eleven gemeenten, each with more than 100,000 
residents, were surveyed. They were asked about the unemployment problems 
they perceived within their boundaries and about the measures they were 
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taking or thinking about taking, to tackle those problems Twenty four 
possible measures were identified (they are listed in appendix II) and 
as they include the types of measure in which we are interested (direct 
local physical and direct local financial) we have been able to use the 
results of the survey for selecting three gemeenten for a deeper study 
We chose gemeenten which had taken or were considering taking local 
physical and local financial measures and we selected three for further 
study as follows: (1) 
- den Haag This had a desparate shortage of industrial land, so we 
expected discussions about physical measures to be particularly 
pointed It was one of the few gemeenten to have provided industrial 
buildings and it had financed these in such a way as to keep rents 
low in the first few years The politicians had firm ideas that 
financial measures should not 'distort competition' The College 
van Burgemeester en Wethouders (the executive committee, henceforth 
abbreviated to College В en W) was a broad political coalition 
(afspiegelingscollege) which we expected to be important for political 
attitudes. And den Haag was in the Randstad, the west of the country, 
where central government was trying to restrict industrial growth in 
order to favour development areas in the north and the south, we 
expected, therefore, differences of opinion between the local and the 
central governments 
- Eindhoven Industrial development in Eindhoven was neither restricted 
nor stimulated by central government, we expected, therefore, a 
different relationship between the gemeente, the province, and central 
government than in den Haag Moreover, Eindhoven had had to modify 
one of its financial instruments in order to make it more acceptable 
to the central and provincial governments A further interesting point 
was that the emoloyment measures were being taken by the gemeente 
Eindhoven but in co-operation with other gemeenten in the agglomeration 
Eindhoven Unlike many gemeenten, Eindhoven set the price of land on 
its industrial estates with an eye to the employment effects of that 
price level And the College В en W was a sort of "afsoiegelings-
college". 
- Groningen This was in the north of the country,in a reaion where 
industry received much financial assistance from the central govern­
ment- we expected, therefore, relationships between the local and the 
central governments to be different than in either den Haag or Eind­
hoven Moreover, there were in that region many other public agencies 
which were trying to attract extra employment Another interesting 
point was that Groningen had a 'programmacollege', a narrow coalition 
made up of political parties all of which could associate themselves 
with one election manifesto (one might exoect such a programmacollege 
to be more similar to an English local council) In the measures it 
used, Groningen was somewhat unusual in that it provided both new and 
existing factory space. It had, like Eindhoven, frozen industrial land 
prices in order not to frighten away industry, and it was taking a 
number of other financial measures 
The location of those three gemeenten is shown on figure 5 1 and the 
course of unemployment in them on figure 5.2. (2) The way in which the 
information for the Dutch case studies was collected was slightly 
different than for their English counterparts As in England, the 
starting point was background information fron a survey By comparison 
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with England, however, the survey information was more recent (one year 
old instead of four years old) and there were available piles of reports, 
background notes, verbatim minutes of council (raad) meetings, and so 
on It was this wealth of up-to-date material that was made the basis 
for the following studies. Whereas in England, interviews with officials 
formed the basis and were afterwards supplemented with information from 
reports, in the Netherlands the procedure was the reverse. As in 
England, however, a draft of our description and analysis was sent to 
the officials with the request that it be checked for inaccuracies 
The supplementary information was gathered in 1981. 
GEMEENTE DEN HAAG 
Den Haag (3) is undergoing the processes common to big cities in the 
industrialised West, it is losing peoole and employment. In 1958 it 
had a peak of more than 600,000 residents which number had dropped to 
457,000 in 1980, in 1970 it contained about 223,000 workplaces and in 
1980 about 198,000. Common to this general process is that unemoloy-
ment in the city rises and that some social groupings experience worse 
unemployment than others (see Ayodeji and Vonk, 1980, for the Dutch 
experience) and den Haag is no exception Unemployment there was 
around 3,000 at the beginning of the 1970ls and by mid-1981 it had risen 
to around 11,000 people (see figure 5 2) 
The composition of the employment offered within den Haag is very 
different from the national average, for not only is it the seat of 
central government but also an important and growing office and service 
centre in its own right By 1980 the manufacturing sector (excluding 
construction and public utilities) had no more than 8 of the employment 
within the gemeente boundaries and was continuing to lose workplaces, 
service employment had grown to nearly 84% of the total and was still 
growing (but not by enough to replace the lost manufacturing work-
places) Employment in the surrounding gemeenten was growing steadily, 
but even so there was in the whole of the city region (gewest den Haag) 
a net loss of workplaces over the 1970's 
The supply of and demand for labour cannot be considered for den Haag 
alone for it is at the centre of a v^ry large labour market in 1976 
about 55,000 people travelled daily into the gemeente for their work 
and 32,000 travelled out This commuting helped to remove some of the 
difficulties caused by the biassed nature of the employment offered in 
den Haag,for service workers commuted in and manufacturing workers 
commuted out, many as far as the industrial areas on the Rijnmond 
Nevertheless, it was becoming steadily more difficult for those living 
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in the city to find work in manufacturing industry, while office 
floorspace and office employment were continuing to grow, much of the 
latter being filled by extra workers commuting into the gemeente. 
The problem of outworn areas which need to be renewed adds a special 
dimension. The Council had declared 10 urban renewal areas (called the 
"aandachtsgebieden") which together contained (in 1976-77) about 
8,500 establishments and 82,400 workplaces, nearly 40% of all employ-
ment in the city. Many of those firms would have to be rehoused during 
the renewal process, yet research had shown that many of them might 
not survive the move. 
What must also be mentioned is the large number of immigrants who, 
since 1975, had settled in den Haag from the Netherland's former 
colonies (mainly Surinam), for many of them had no modern work skills. 
In 1976 it was calculated that 60% of all the unemployed under 19 
years old were immigrants from the ex-colonies and it was estimated 
that of all the unemployed immigrants two-thirds could not be found 
work without first undergoing training. In 1980, 22% of all unemployed 
came from Surinam, the Antilles, or were from "gastarbeider" families. 
It will be readily understood that unemployment in den Haag was not 
distributed evenly. Young people (15-24 years old) had a higher 
percentage unemployment than the average as did immigrants: people who 
were both young and immigrants were particularly badly affected (e.g. 
in March 1980 the average unemployment rate was 3.3%,for young Dutchmen 
that was 9.6%>and for young men from Surinam and the Antilles 22.9%). 
The number of women unemployed had risen much more rapidly than the 
average, and the unemployment rate of females from "gastarbeider" 
families was five times greater than for all females. People with few 
skills had the usual difficulties: 58% of all the unemployed had left 
school without completing their secondary education (city region den 
Haag, March 1980). In fact, the level of education of the unemployed 
(in the city region) was below the average for the Netherlands as a 
whole. 
Several of those aspects coincided and had caused a situation where 
unemployment was heavily concentrated in the "older districts": in 1980, 
those districts accommodated 35% of the population of working age but 
59% of the unemployed. 
The measures 
In den Haag the physical and financial measures being taken (or being 
considered) in order to tackle local problems of unemployment can 
usefully be divided into two - for offices and for manufacturing firms. 
The policy for offices was presented as a measure against unemployment, 
as follows. First, it was the aim of the Council to stabilise (at the 
very least) the level of employment in den Haag, but employment in 
manufacturing was falling and it was proving almost impossible to attract 
replacements in the same sector (manufacturing employment was declining 
generally, space for manufacturing was scarce in den Haag, and the 
central government's location of industry policy had not made the Rand-
stad attractive for manufacturing industry): extra workplaces had, 
therefore, to be found in the service sector, and that meant more office 
floorspace (which, moreover, uses the scarce land in den Haag most 
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efficiently) Second, if the Post Office Headquarters left for Groningen 
(and the Girobank settled in Amsterdam, and service firms in the older 
districts did not survive urban renewal, and the "chip" revolution 
automated many routine administrative tasks, and some central government 
llimstries carried out their threat to leave den Haag in search of 
expansion space) then replacements must be found for that lost office 
employment The measures being taken by den Haag were largely physical 
- making land available, handling applications to develop, directing 
developers to certain sites and steering them away from others 
While the office policy was directed towards growth, the policy 
towards manufacturing firms was directed mainly towards preventing a 
further decline in workplaces That was important because of the 
vulnerability of manufacturing firms in the urban renewal areas, but 
also because the gemeente did not want to lose what little diversific-
ation in industrial structure it still had 
The issue of industrial land was of great importance in den Haag, for 
the city was fully developed naht up to its boundaries and its 
industrial estates were practically full the shortage of industrial 
land was desperate That was seen both as a reason for the decline in 
manufacturing employment (industrial reorganisation leads to more 
floorspace per worker) and as a reason for not pursuing an aggressive 
industrialisation policy (for taking a "defensive policy" as the 
Wethouder put it) for what is the use of industrial promotion or 
offering financial assistance if there is no land for firms wishing to 
take advantage of those7 Increasing the supply of industrial land had, 
therefore, to come first 
The shortage of space was not new and in the early 1970ls the gemeente 
had provided outside its boundaries and in co-operation with the adjacent 
gemeenten two industrial estates but those had become almost fully 
occupied The promise of relief was offered in the regional plan 
Zuid-Holland West with its proposal for two industrial estates outside 
but near to den Haag, a proposal wholeheartedly supported by the gemeen-
te 
That would supply large industrial sites In the meantime the gemeente 
was taking (or considering taking) several measures to improve the 
supply of land within its boundaries for the benefit of smaller firms 
a so-called infilling policy" (verdichtingsbeleid) These measures 
incl uded 
- re-orgamsing existing industrial estates so as to use the space more 
efficiently 
- monitoring and mediating between the supply of and demand for 
industrial land 
- promoting a ' f 11 tenng-down ' of old floorspace as firms move into new 
premises 
- when offering land to local firms, showing preference to those firms 
which sell their vacated plots to the gemeente 
- acquiring vacant industrial premises for re-accommodating existing 
firms and so as to have a stock to offer new firms 
- filling in a little-used inner dock 
What little industrial land it had, the Council disposed of as follows 
It sold either long leases (for 50 years with extensions possible) or 
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the outright freehold (in districts covered by a statutory land-use 
plan - "bestemmingsplan - disoosal was in principle by leasehold), 
leases were revised every 5 years in line with inflation, and prices 
were set as to cover costs but no higher. After spending many years 
considering whether to implement a "sociaal-vestigingsstatuut" (whereby 
land is issued only to firms which satisfy certain criteria - see 
appendix II), the Council turned the idea down and operated only two 
tests: preference was shown to firms with a high emoloyment density 
and to firms from the urban renewal areas. 
For many years the gemeente had been involved in the orovision of 
factory space, but only on a small scale and only for firms affected 
by urban renewal. Den Haag had a small property-owning company (N.V. 
Stedelijk Belang) the profits from which it had on occasion used to 
build accommodation for small firms displaced by urban renewal The 
space was not subsidised however, rents had to cover costs The gemeen-
te had become involved because it was prepared to build very basic 
accommodation, so the rents could be lower than for most new commercially 
built premises. 
In a time of high unemployment the loss of workplaces caused by 
forced removal of firms in urban renewal areas into more expensive 
premises becomes a matter of great concern. So central government 
offered financial assistance to firms (first the Beschikking Steun 
Bedrijven Stadsvernieuwing - BSBS - and since 1980 the Kaderregeling 
Steun Bedrijven Stadsvernieuwing - KSBS) in a limited number of renewal 
areas. The gemeente den Haag had found that assistance inadequate, 
partly because the accommodation available to displaced firms was so 
much more expensive than the previously occupied premises that many 
firms (even those receiving financial aid fron central government) 
would not survive the move. So the Council had pioneered a scheme 
(opened in 1979) whereby it had built a complex of small factories and 
supplied them in such a way that the rents would be very low in the 
first few years. (4) That experience had proved so successful that at 
least three more similar schemes were being prepared. For those, rents 
could be kept low not only by the "dynamic rent" scheme but also by 
using the subsidies in the new KSBS - see above (5) It would be a 
mistake, however, to see that provision of industrial floorspace purely 
as a financial measure (a way of reducing rents): it was important also 
as a way of using space more efficiently. (6) 
There were two financial measures to aid manufacturing industry which 
the gemeente had considered carefully. One was a supplement to the 
financial assistance offered by central government to firms in designated 
urban renewal areas (the BSBS, see above), which was limited to such 
a few of den Haag's renewal areas that the gemeente wanted to be able 
to offer similar help to firms in its other renewal areas and it started 
a fund (Haagse Gemeentelijke Steunregeling) for this purpose. However, 
in 1980 the BSBS was replaced by the KSBS (see above), so the need for 
a gemeente initiative became less. 
The second financial measure that was proposed had a longer history 
The Councillors of one of the larger parties wanted to be able to offer 
financial aid and incentives to firms developing in den Haag: proposed 
were variously a regional development agency which could set up firms 
operating where existing private firms were not active; financial aid 
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to medium and small firms in the form of credit guarantees, subsidised 
loans, reduced or postponed taxes; a stimulus for light industry; and 
a premium to firms in the region towards the development and investment 
costs associated with new products and new production processes. Those 
ideas were considered carefully by the Council but not accepted. 
Finally, in the latter half of 1981, the College В en W proposed in 
outline a scheme with two applications. One would be to give subsidies 
to or to invest in firms, or in unit-factory schemes for firms, dis­
placed from urban renewal areas (a supplement to the KSBS 1980) but also 
in special cases to firms - existing or new - outside those areas. 
The other application would be providing and subsidising accommodation 
for young firms which had demonstrated their viability. It will be seen 
that such a scheme would be more selective than some of those proposed 
by the Councillors. 
The reasons for the measures 
Unemployment in general. Den Haag had made a sharp distinction between 
two causes of unemployment - a reduction in the general level of demand 
in the economy, and changes in the structure of the economy which had 
led to a mismatch between the type of labour supplied and the type 
demanded and as a result to a high unemployment of certain social 
groupings. Correspondingly, den Haag had divided its unemployment policies 
into two - one to increase (or at least to stabilise) the number of 
workplaces (werkgelegenheidsbeleid) and one to combat the unemployment 
of the vulnerable social groupings (werkloosheidsbestrijding) by training 
schemes, job creation, etc. (7) It is clear that all the ohysical and 
financial measures described above were being taken as part of the first 
policy (werkgelegenheidsbeleid). 
The policy for offices required only passive actions. There was a 
demand to build offices, the Council did not want to refuse then (for 
a number of reasons, of which the associated employment was very 
important), so office development was allowed under conditions which 
restricted undesirable side-effects. 
The reasons for paying so much attention to industrial land were the 
following. The recent decrease in manufacturing employment had not 
released any industrial land nor was it expected that the continuing 
decline in this sector would make much land available: shortage of 
expansion space was shown in a survey to have been the most important 
reason for firms leaving den Haag: it was Council policy to try to 
retain some manufacturing employment and, moreover, the urban renewal 
policy was displacing manufacturing firms: so it was necessary that 
industrial land be provided, and the gemeente is by tradition the 
supplier of land. Moreover, the College В en W seemed to think (a few 
years ago, perhaps no more) that providing more land would on its own 
allow manufacturing employment to grow, that there was an unsatisfied 
demand by manufacturing firms to locate in den Haag. (8) The reasons 
for the Council providing the industrial floorspace at low rents were 
by re-orgamsation to gain floorspace, to reduce the loss of workplaces 
caused by the disruption of urban renewal, and because the private 
sector would not provide such cheap premises - the risks were too great 
and the time taken to recover costs too long. 
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It is probably too simple, however, to think that those measures were 
being taken solely for employment reasons, (even for the very general 
reason of stabilising employment in total). There was in addition 
a concern for "the economy" of den Haag apart from the amount or type 
of work offered by that economy: den Haag must remain economically 
strong and retain its national function as an administrative centre (9) 
The fact that there are two interrelated aims explains some of the 
ambiguities surrounding the measures described here. 
Unemployment of certain groupings. The gemeente had chosen to give 
priority, within its general policy of 'werkloosheidsbestrijding" (see 
above) to helping those who had been unemployed for more than 6 months, 
those who were financially dependent on paid work, racial minorities, 
and those younger than 25. There was, however, no connection between 
the physical and financial measures described above and the unemoloyment 
of particular social groupings. "The policy for emoloyrnent will offer 
little hope - certainly in the short run - for those in a weak 
competitive position on the labour market" said the College in 1981. 
For those people, therefore, a separate set of measures was being taken 
which offered the prospect of a place in a job creation scheme (werk-
gelegenheidsverruimend projekt). (10) 
The location of the unemployed. Had den Haag tried to locate its 
employment measures near to the location of the unemployed7 It must be 
recognised that the gemeente had little freedom to choose the location 
of its measures, for physical restrictions within its boundaries were 
so tight. (11) Nevertheless, this consideration had been given little 
attention (and the Council was consciously taking other measures, which 
were actually increasing work journeys: we refer to the development of 
offices in the centre and refusing to contemplate their being built 
outside the city, although so many of the office workers lived outside 
also). 
The inter-local effects. The question here is: given that the gemeente 
den Haag wants to help its own residents (wherever they live within its 
boundaries) what consideration did it give to the possibility that 
non-residents instead might take advantage of those measures7 As we 
have seen, den Haag could not allow itself the luxury of thinking too 
narrowly: it was dependent on adjacent gemeenten for providing the 
industrial land its own residents needed (and for supplying the labour 
force for its new offices). It is significant however that den Haag 
is joint-manager of the two big industrial estates developed outside 
its boundaries in the early 1970's and that it instigated the setting 
up of a workgroup to provide further industrial estates in the city-
region: den Haag wanted to ensure that its own citizens (and its own 
firms) were able to benefit from those measures. 
A related question is: when choosing measures, what consideration did 
den Haag give to the possibility that the spillover effects of the 
measures would endanger the employment of its residents7 This had 
influenced its land disposal oolicy: den Haag fixed prices for its own 
land with a careful eye on industrial land prices in the region and one 
of the reasons for not introducing a "sociaal vestigingsstatuut" was 
that none of the surrounding gemeenten did so. 
Other measures being taken. Some of the individual measures were related 
to each other: the factory building could take place only on industrial 
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land owned by the gemeente, and the proposed financial assistance would 
be given partly in the form of subsidised factory accommodation. The 
gemeente had decided not to try to relate its two policies - for 
increasing labour demand and for helping unemployment-prone social 
groupings - by trying to acquire firms which could offer work to the 
unemployed with low skills: such an attempt was regarded as being 
"totally unrealistic". Instead, the two policies were related by 
training schemes, which attempted to change the nature of the labour 
supplied by the unemployed so that it fitted better the labour demanded 
by the existing and new industries. It follows that the gemeente's 
measures for increasing the number of workplaces were stimulating the 
demand for a type of labour which could often not be supplied by the 
unemployed living in den Haag. 
Speed and flexibility. The desire to achieve results quickly had not 
been an important consideration in the choice of measures. The problem 
of unemployment was seen to lie in the structure of the economy and as 
such not to be tackled from a short-term perspective. And the many years 
taken to come to a decision whether to use certain instruments (e.g. 
the "sociaal vestigingsstatuut" and the financial assistance scheme) 
indicates that the speed with which a measure works could not weigh 
heavily. 
The relevant knowledge. On the other hand, it did seem to be important 
to the gemeente that, before taking a measure, the effects be predicted 
with some certainty. The gemeente "wants to avoid measures - financial 
or otherwise - which would not achieve the desired employment effects, 
both qualitative and quantitative" said the College В en W: that might 
seem self-evident, but not all local governments tread so carefully, 
as the other case studies show. And in order to help it design effective 
policies den Haag commissioned studies and investigations where necessary. 
Outside controls on the agency. Consideration of the reactions of 
other public bodies was important for at least three of the measures. 
First, we have seen how den Haag, if it is to provide more industrial 
land on any appreciable scale, can do that only in co-operation with 
the neighbouring gemeenten. So it had been careful to stress the 
necessity for an employment policy co-ordinated at the city-region scale 
and to set up a city-regional organisation on which it was reoresented 
for providing industrial land. 
Second, in order to be able to finance the building of the small fact­
ories in such a way that costs would not be covered for the first few 
years, approval from the Province was necessary. That had been obtained 
without difficulty. 
And third, considerations of how central government would respond were 
one of the main reasons for not going ahead with some of the suggestions 
for giving financial assistance to firms. For, argued the College В en 
W, such measures might run counter to the national location of industry 
policy ("that is what we intend" said the proposers) and might duplicate 
the national policy for stimulating commercial innovations. We have 
already had preliminary discussions with the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs which point to the proposals not being accepted, and what is 
the point of jeopardising our relationships with central government by 
a confrontation at this stage, when it is not even clear that such 
financial measures are necessary or would be effective7 Let us wait 
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until national policies are clearer, then we can investigate whether 
we can usefully supplement them with our own financial measures And 
that is precisely what the College did, and it led, after further 
discussions with central government, to the proposed scheme for financial 
assistance as described above. 
It must be pointed out that those relationships between den Haag and 
other public bodies were both crucial for the gemeente 's employment 
policy and rather delicate. For example, central government had a 
location of industry policy whereby den Haag fell in a region where 
industrial development was discouraged in favour of other areas of the 
country: how could the gemeente stimulate employment without running 
counter to national policy7 (12) Further the Province of Zuid-Holland 
in which den Haag lies was pursuing a policy for offices and shoos 
which could endanger the regional dominance of the city of den Haag 
And finally den Haag is surrounded by geneenten, including the new town 
of Zoetermeer, which were also trying to attract new firms, which had 
more land to offer than den Haag, and the city-regional co-operation 
with which was weak, yet den Haag was pursuing a policy of retaining 
its regional dominance and the highest valued work and functions. It 
is not surprising that den Haag had to choose the form of its enoloyment 
policy and the instruments for carrying it out with extreme caution 
and continuous consideration for the reactions of others. 
Local political attitudes. In Dutch local politics it is the College 
В en W which is dominant: decisions are taken by a majority vote of 
the full Council, but the College В en V prepares the agendas, the 
background information, and most of the proposals that are put to the 
vote, and those proposals are usually acceoted. (13) When we talk 
therefore, about measures fitting in with the attitudes of the local 
politicians we are talking mainly about the attitudes of the local 
College В en W. 
In the gemeente den Haag the College В en W at the time of this study 
was a coalition of the three major parties. From a coalition we would 
expect to find no clearly delineated political philosophy, nor was any 
apparent.Nevertheless, there were some political attitudes (as distinct 
from a coherent philosophy) which had clearly influenced the choice of 
measures, and of these the most striking was the use of the idea of 
"a distortion of competition" (concurrentievervalsing). If financial 
assistance is to be given to local firms, argued the gemeente, it must 
not be at such a level as to distort competition between firms locally 
and firms elsewhere: such assistance should be no higher than was 
necessary to comoensate for the disadvantages den Haag suffered in 
comparison with other areas (disadvantages mainly of noor accessibility) 
And the same attitude influenced also the choice of a method of 
financing the factory complexes - market rents would be too high, but 
the firms must not be given a subsidy, so 'dynamic' rents were charged 
In one other matter was a political attitude clear One of the questions 
posed by the survey of Geraets (1980) was whether the gemeente had tried 
to stimulate employment bybuying an equity interest in local firms 
Den Haag turned down that possibility as a matter of principle risks 
must be taken by the entrepreneur, not by the gemeente. (1д) 
Apart from those political attitudes there was a clear oreference - one 
might almost call it a style of working - for caution. There was much 
criticism by the Councillors about the resulting di latonness, ("we get 
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lots of reports and investigations, but nothing else") and one put it 
very sharply, "As society changes, there are those people who take the 
lead and others who bring uo the rear. The College В en W is consistent 
in its wish to be counted among the latter". Supporters of the College 
expressed it differently: we prefer to work quietly, behind the scenes, 
diplomatically, rather than manning the barricades in a confrontation 
with firms and all the other relevant agencies. 
The effects of the measures 
At the time of this study very few measures had, in fact, been taken -
the interest has lain in the discussion over possible measures - so 
there are hardly any effects to be traced. (15) The exception is the 
first small factory scheme where about 50 firms and 400 workolaces are 
accommodated: but no estimate had been made of the number of those 
places which might not have existed had that floorspace not been 
provided. 
The appropriateness of the measures 
The very small amount that has so far been achieved makes difficult 
an assessment of this aspect: but, as we have seen, the slow orogress 
is partly the result of the very careful attention paid to aopropnate-
ness. (16) Moreover, that care seems to have oaid off, not so much 
with regard to the gemeente's own measures (about which it is too early 
to pass judgement) but in persuading central government to adaot its 
own measures. The change in 1980 of the BSBS into the KSBS (financial 
assistance from central government to firms in urban renewal areas) was 
made after strong representations from the four largest cities including 
den Haag and the modifications announced in 1981 to central government's 
location of industry policy (Nota Regionaal Sociaal-Economisch Beleid 
1981-1985), by which industrial development in the big cities of the 
Randstad is now regarded more favourably, are also the result of 
constructive political pressure exercised by - among others - the ge­
meente den Haag. 
GEMEENTE EINDHOVEN 
In 1976 a new government entity called the "Agglomeratie Eindhoven" 
wasset up by law, consisting of the gemeente Eindhoven at the centre 
and the surrounding gemeenten of Best, Geldrop, Heeze, Nuenen, Oirschot, 
Son en Breugel, Valkenswaard. Veldhoven and Waalre: later Leende joined 
in. The new law allowed the agglomeration to "make provision for the 
needs of industrial establishments and other employment in the interests 
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of the agglomeration", and this body was very soon playing an important 
role in preparing an employment policy for the city region In 1978 the 
gemeente Eindhoven even resolved to make the agglomeration responsible 
for drawing up a joint and co-ordinated labour market policy. And yet 
it is not nonsense to talk about the gemeente Eindhoven choosing and 
taking employment measures, for the agglomeration could propose measures 
but not - except in exceptional circumstances - take them. Each gemeente 
could decide whether or not to imolement a measure, and the agglomeration 
was largely restricted to co-ordinating in order to try to orevent 
inconsistency and conflicts between the separate gemeenten So although 
we shall have to make frequent reference to the agglomeration, 
nevertheless this is a case study of the gemeente Eindhoven. And, as we 
shall see, that had an active and independent employment oolicy. 
"Eindhoven is the city of technology, is the city of Philips Electrical 
Industries" is the image which most people have, and there is a lot of 
truth in it. Of the 97,000 people working in the gemeente in 1977, 
32,000 (i.e. 33°) worked in electrical engineerma which, in this case, 
was almost synonymous with the one firm of Philips. In the vehicle 
industry worked another 6,500 people, and that was almost entirely the 
one firn of DAF Trucks so two firms together accounted for around 40% 
of the workplaces in the city After 1971 those two firms ceased to 
provide extra work, as did other branches of manufacturing industry, 
but employment in service industries grew throughout the 1970's, and 
the agglomeration held the enviable position of showing a net growth 
in total employment in the second half of that decade. 
Why, then, was there such a steep rise in unemployment in the gemeente 
in that period (from 1,000 in 1970 to 6,000 in the middle of 1980 - see 
figure 5.2)9 The answer lies in the rapid rise in the size of the 
working population competing for the available jobs in Eindhoven (and 
that means more than the residents of Eindhoven: in 1977 those occupied 
only 52/0 of all the jobs in the gemeente Eindhoven) The population 
was younger than the national average (mainly because of the many young 
families attracted to the town when Philips was growing), so many young 
people were entering the labour force, and many women were too. This 
was expected to be the cause of a continuino rise in unemployment up to, 
at the least, 1985 
Unemployment arising in that way is not distributed evenly. Young 
people enter the labour market and cannot find work (in May 1975 26% of 
the unemployed were under 23 years old, in 'lay 1979 that had risen to 
33°o, and at the later date more than half the unemployed females were 
younger than 23 years - all data for the agglomeration) Women enter 
the labour market and experience the same difficulty (between the same 
two dates male unemployment in the agglomeration rose by 28% to 6.7% 
of the male working population and female unemployment by 122c/ to 10 8% 
of the female working population) And employers can demand higher 
standards, which means that unskilled, inexperienced, and handicapped 
people find extra difficulty in getting work 
In those circumstances Eindhoven had taken as its employment aim "a 
durable equilibrium between labour supply and labour demand, not only 
quantitatively but also qualitatively". 
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The measures 
One of the Wethouders sketched the development of the employment policy 
of the gemeente Eindhoven as follows. In 1974/75, unemployment had 
risen to such a level that the gemeente started to design a two-pronged 
policy One prong was to increase the number of workplaces (and at the 
same time to reduce the dependence on Philips), and this was pursued 
by a pronotion campaign and by offering advice to local firms A second 
prong was felt to be necessary because it was not exoected that the 
first one would bring unemploypient down to an acceptable level, for 
those who wanted to but could not find work, it was necessary to keep 
them occupied, to keep their skills up to scratch, and to develop new 
skills. This policy was directed towards young people and was called 
the "opvang" policy: we shall call it the "occupying-young-people" 
policy. (17) In the second phase, the employment policy was out into 
the administrative structure of the agglomeration Eindhoven And in 
the third phase, which began 1978/79, the first prong - increasing 
employment - was strengthened by setting up in co-operation with the 
agglomeration a special office for acquisition and promotion, and by 
the gemeente itself increasing the advice and help to local firms and 
taking on temporary supernumeraries. 
It is immediately apparent, when that list is compared with the 
measures being taken in den Haag and in the English local authorities, 
that Eindhoven made no mention of providing industrial land and 
buildings That does not mean, however, that it was not done, rather 
that it was not regarded as new or problematic. Between 1970 and 1980, 
the gemeente Eindhoven disposed of around 155 ha industrial land (not 
all of it inside the gemeente itself, some outside also where Eindhoven 
had co-operated with the gemeenten in providing industrial estates) and 
further provided land for about 100,000 sq m. of office floorsoace 
In 1979 it was estimated that the reserves of industrial land in the 
agglomeration were sufficient up to around 1984, and a start was made 
in 1980 to increase the supply by a further ДО ha and also to vary it. 
Over the price at which that land should be supplied, opinions 
differed between the agglomeration and the gemeente. In 1977 a report 
from the agglomeration said that land price was only a very small 
consideration in choosing an industrial location, but a year later a 
gemeente report pointed out that Eindhoven had the highest land prices 
in the Province, and a further gemeente report in 1979 claimed that 
high land prices could be a psychological deterrent to firms. The 
gemeenten constituting the agglomeration had to recognise that the 
co-ordination of land prices was an obvious task for the agglomeration 
but it appeared that sectional interests were too strong, for in 1978 
a consultation group said there was no need for any action as the 
actual differences in land prices were not found to be "disturbing". 
In the meantime, in 1977, the gemeente Eindhoven had acted independently 
and frozen the price of its land then available, and it had already 
in two cases given assistance to firms by disposing land to them at 
prices considerably below the market level (see later). 
The opinion of the gemeente as to whether it should itself provide 
industrial building had changed several times. It had in the past built 
eight factories for rent, but at the beginning of our investigation it 
was of the opinion that it was not the task of a gemeente to run the 
risks involved in such speculative development So it had transferred 
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the pianagenent of those faetones to a foundation (now called the 
Stichting Middenstands- en Bedrijfshuisvesting) which it had set uo in 
1969 together with the local Chamber of Commerce (Kamer van Koophandel). 
The function of that foundation was to provide industrial and commercial 
buildings to small firms, which it did independently and without subsidy 
from the gemeente (and it had built four factories in 1980 and was 
building nine more in 1981). The gemeente restricted itself to making 
(through an agency on which it was represented) an arrangement with two 
building contractors whereby firms wanting industrial space were 
recommended to use those builders, because there was a standard design 
and some continuity in the demand for them, the contractors could build 
quickly (within three months) and cheaply (the costs cane out at a level 
which was comparable with that level - after subsidies - in the 
surrounding areas where central government subsidies were available). 
Opinions in the gemeente were changing once again, however, and at the 
time of writing consideration was being given to incorporating the 
foundation in a new "Regionaal Instituut" which would be responsible 
to the gemeente and the agglomeration 
The financial measures being taken by the gemeente Eindhoven present 
us with an interesting story In 1977 a reoort for the agglomeration 
recommended setting up an "employment fund' to help in cases of temporary 
financial difficulty, to help with enforced relocations, and to help 
new ideas with good commercial prospects to get off the ground The 
response of Eindhoven to that recommendation was that such helo should 
be limited to referring the firms to the existing specialised agencies 
for had not the Wethouder for Economic Affairs said in 1975 that it was 
not for a gemeente to try to attract new employment by giving financial 
aid, that that was a task for central government, and that in any case 
the Province would withhold its approval from such measures7 The 
agglomeration's reaction was that in "exceotional cases" it should be 
possible for the gemeenten themselves to supplement the assistance 
offered by central government agencies. 
However, in 1976 the gemeente Eindhoven already had its own 'employment 
fund' which it had used several times In one case a local firm in old 
cramped premises was talking of moving to Breda Eindhoven sold it land 
on a new estate at less than the market price (representing a subsidy 
of /250,000) and gave a grant of ЛОО.ООО out of the employment fund 
towards the removal costs, on condition that the permanent employment 
of 250 people was maintained for 10 years and that the gemeente be a 
privileged creditor in case of bankruptcy, towards the end of 1979 the 
firm had increased its workforce to 370 In another case, a local firm 
wishing to expand was sold land at below the market price, representing 
a subsidy variously estimated at /100,000 and at /2 M the promise was 
that the firm would create 200 extra workplaces and the conditions were 
that it should have 320 people in employment by the beginning of 1979 
and that f2 M be repaid if it resold the land within 7 years however, 
by the stipulated date only 230 oeople were being employed, the gemeente 
did not know what to do in order to enforce the condition, and was 
discussing the natter with the Ministry of Economic Affairs In several 
other cases, Eindhoven had used the fund to guarantee private loans to 
firms 
All those actions had been taken in a rather ad hoc way and it was 
becoming apparent - especially after the second case quoted - that 
rules needed to be laid down. In 1977 the gemeente transferred ƒ500,000 
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from an unexpected surplus into its employment fund, but the Province 
was very unhappy: it found that such a transfer was not in the financial 
interests of the gemeente (e.g. the money was being given out without 
adequate conditions) nor was the transfer in the interests of the 
country as a whole (e.g. such uses of the fund threatened to run counter 
to the national policy for industrial location) and the Province forbade 
any use of that money until appropriate conditions had been approved. 
In any case, it was clear that Eindhoven had transgressed the 1961 
Guidelines governing assistance to local firms (see appendix II) and 
the Province wanted to curb further uses of the fund Thereafter, there 
was stalemate for a few years: every proposal to use that money had to 
be approved by the Province and all that was allowed was a few more 
cases of guaranteeing loans, while the gemeente tried, in consultation 
with central and provincial government, to devise a set of rules which 
would satisfy those higher authorities 
At the end of 1980, the following framework ("kaderregeling") was 
agreed. Manufacturing and "basic" service firms (stuwende dienstver-
lenende bedrijven) which want to relocate within the gemeente boundaries 
as a result of the growth of the firm may receive a contribution towards 
the costs of the preparatory investigation, towards the removal costs, 
and a subsidy over 5 years of l/5th of the interest costs on not more 
than /250,000 worth of loan, subject to a maximum subsidy to any one 
firm of /100,000. About the above and any other uses of the fund, the 
gemeente has to be satisfied that no central government policies are 
contradicted. 
The advantage for the gemeente of the new rules was that clarity had 
at last been created, as a result of which the fund could now be used 
to respond quickly to events Of the many disadvantages, it was 
particularly regretted that financial aid was restricted to within the 
gemeente boundaries. That dissatisfaction very quickly led the gemeente 
to try to devise ways in which it could give financial help to firms 
more widely, and at the end of 1931 proposals for a "Regionaal Insti-
tuut" were being discussed. This would be able to give credit or rent 
guarantees to new firms, mortgages or guarantees on land and buildings 
for existing firms, and temoorary credit guarantees to firms in 
short-term financial difficulties (but no help to lame ducks - nood-
lijdende bedrijven). 
That description of the physical and financial measures being taken 
by the gemeente Eindhoven has by no means included all its employment 
measures, in oarticular we have said little about the "occupying-younq-
people" policy, the second prong of the attack. Such measures will be 
described where necessary for understanding the reasons for the physical 
and financial measures. 
The reasons for the measures 
Unemployment in general. The effects on unemployment in general which 
it was hoped the measures would bring about were not always clear. The 
case for ensuring a good supply of industrial land was obvious Equally 
obvious were the reasons for keeping down the price of industrial land 
and buildings. Eindhoven was competing for jobs with other locations. 
The reasons for giving subsidies to firms relocating within the gemeente 
(the "kaderregeling") were given as follows, "investigations have shown 
that the relocation of expanding firms can contribute strongly to the 
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growth τη employment, therefore (sic) stimulating short distance 
removals of expanding firirs should increase eiroloyment". Whether this 
measure does in fact work in this way is a matter for empirical 
investi gation. 
The reasons for wanting to be able to give financial help more widely 
were different. When a bank judges a request for a loan, it was said, 
the employment effects are not considered; so a loan might be refused, 
although it would bring employnent growth or stability, because it was 
too risky. A public body on the other hand might well be prepared to 
accept that risk as part of the price of its emoloynent policy. And 
that need not be the preserve of a national body, said the gemeente, 
for a local body is in closer touch with local firms and can act more 
quickly and fill gaps left by the national bodies. 
Unemployment of certain groupings.lt is clear that, al though the gemeente 
Eindhoven was very concerned about the unemployment of certain social 
groupings none of the physical or financial measures being taken had 
been designed to relieve the unemployment of those groupings in 
particular. That made the concern for those people no less real, however 
it found its expression in other types of measures, such as the 
"occupying-young-people" policy, creating supplementary workplaces on 
the staff of the gemeente and giving priority when filling those places 
to women and young people. 
The location of the unemployed. The location of the unemployed within 
Eindhoven had not influenced the location of the physical and financial 
measures, for those measures could only be applied where there was 
industrial space available, and Eindhoven is a relatively small city 
within which for most people distances are no obstacle to journeys to 
work. (18) 
The inter-local effects. The labour market for people living in and 
firms established in the gemeente Eindhoven extended far beyond the 
gemeente boundaries. That was the опте reason why Eindhoven co-ordinated 
its labour market policy with the other gemeenten in the agglomeration: 
because many of Eindhoven's own residents found work outside its 
boundaries and because half of the workplaces in Eindhoven were filled 
by the residents of other areas, then Eindhoven wanted to ensure that 
those other areas were Dulling their weight in trying to provide work 
(and so Eindhoven was involved with two other geneenten in providing 
industrial land in those surrounding areas) but Eindhoven was also 
concerned that those surrounding gemeenten should not damage its own 
position (hence the concern about land price differences and competitive 
land disposal policies within the agglomeration). Only by a careful 
co-operation with its neighbours, and by not restricting its measures 
to within its own boundaries could Eindhoven helo its own unemployed 
residents. However, where Eindhoven could limit the use made of its 
measures to its own residents, then it acted independently: it was left 
to each gemeente to arrange its own "occupying-young-peoDle" policy. 
Other measures being taken. The physical and financial measures described 
had been chosen to complement other measures already being taken. For 
example, it was stated that an "occupying-young-people" policy was 
only justified if there were real prospects of those young people 
finding work, so policies to expand employment must also be pursued. 
"It becomes inhumane to keep on talking about keeping people occupied 
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if you can offer them no other perspective', said the Wethouder. More­
over, that "oDvang" policy was being directed at the longer term un­
employed partly to fill a gap left by the central government emoloyment 
service, the local office of which (Gewestelijk Arbeidsbureau) had 
chosen to give lowest priority to just those peoole who had been 
unemployed more than 6 months. 
Speed and flexi bility The ability to respond quickly ('slagvaardig-
heid") had been an important consideration in the choice of the detail 
of the measures. For example, it was partly the long delays caused by 
having to seek approval from the Province that led the gemeente to 
recast its employment fund into a form that it knew to be acceptable 
to the higher authorities And in order to be able to respond quickly 
to demands for industrial land, the gemeente not only kept a substantial 
amount always in reserve (which most Dutch gemeenten do) but it also 
went to the considerable expense of preparing some of that reserve well 
in advance (the extra expense is then the interest charges) so that it 
was immediately available for building 
It is interesting to note that organisational considerations had 
forced the gemeente to sacrifice flexibility for speed. If there are 
no rules you can react very flexibly, so in the beginning the use of 
the employment fund had not been formalised That was, however, not 
acceptable to the Province and the resulting friction delayed aoplicat-
lons of the fund intolerably the gemeente decided to choose soeed 
rather than flexibility 
The relevant knowledge. That the effects of aoplying the measures be 
accurately predictable was not an important consideration It was said 
that certainty could never be expected when the effectiveness of some 
of the local measures depended on macro-economic developments and on 
measures taken by central government Moreover, the gemeente underwrote 
the recommendation of the agglomeration that the role of local 
governments in labour market policy should be to take experimental 
measures and that the central government should allow the agglomeration 
to become a test bed for special measures (financed, it should be added, 
by central government!) (19) 
Outside controls on the agency Did the reactions (actual or expected) 
of other public bodies influence the choice by Eindhoven of its physical 
and financial measures7 In the case of the 'employment fund" Eindhoven 
did not take those reactions into consideration (or it miscalculated 
them), and it was Dulled up short by the Province As regards the 
organisational framework imposed by the agglomeration, however, it would 
be misleading to say that the gemeente Eindhoven had been influenced 
by the necessity to obtain the approval and co-operation of the other 
gemeenten, rather was it the case that the gemeente was an enthusiastic 
member of the agglomeration, that through that agency it had arrangements 
with the surrounding gemeenten, and that those arrangements then 
influenced its choice of measures Moreover, towards the end of 1981 the 
gemeente was even proposing expanding those arrangements in the form of 
a "Regionaal Instituut" (at a lower scale than the Province) for 
pursuing employment policy 
Local political attitudes A clear political or ideological attitude 
of the College В en W to the problem of unemployment and to the 
acceptable ways of tackling it was not detectable, but then we would not 
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expect that from an "afspiegelingscollege", a coalition of the najor 
political parties What was clear, however, was a change in the general 
approach. In 1974 it was said that the situation in Eindhoven did not 
call for great concern, but that the gemeente should be prepared to 
press the higher authorities for more action and should take measures 
to help and support those made unemployed. In 1978, the gemeente wanted 
to pursue a more active labour market policy and gave the following 
reasons - that although bringing together labour supply and labour 
demand was the responsibility of central government this did not relieve 
a gemeente from its duty to initiate new forms of mediating in order 
to help the vulnerable groupings, that equilibrium between labour 
supply and labour demand would probably not be reached so the gemeente 
should do something to help the unemployed, and that the fact of some 
social groupings suffering worse unemployment than others provided an 
opening for the gemeente to improve the information which firms had 
about those groupings. Then in 1980 we find Eindhoven saying, "the 
seriousness of the employment situation demands that the gemeente 
exerts itself to the utmost, and fortunately the gemeente can do a lot". 
Finally, in 1981, the Wethouder for economic affairs said that the 
gemeente can play an important role in regional social-economic policy 
and that this role should be strengthened. That is a change in attitudes 
which follows closely the worsening unemployment in Eindhoven. 
Behind the public statements which gave a formal justification for 
acting we can detect in the last few years a fairly constant wi11ingness 
to act, a pragmatic and experimental approach, a "get out and do some-
thing about it" attitude. (20) "We must be prepared to take risks" 
said the Burgemeester in his 1979 New Year's Speech, "the seriousness 
of the matter demands it". The risks Eindhoven took with its employment 
fund have already been described. A somewhat similar problem befell its 
"occupying-young-people" policy This policy attracted wide publicity 
(it was put forward in Council discussions in den Haag as a model to 
be followed) but ran into difficulties with the two central government 
ministries that funded it Eindhoven incorporated activities which fell 
outside the scope of the relevant Act (article 36 of the Wet Werkloos-
heidsvoorziening) and was obliged to find other ways of financing them. 
(21) And, as a final example of Eindhoven's pragmatic aoproach, while 
a report for the agglomeration was saying that it was the job of central 
government to prevent a comoetitive war between the regions by 
"correcting and directing" the regions, the gemeente was quietly trying 
to attract new firms, was helping firms to get their factories built 
cheaply, and in a few cases was aiding firms financially. "We don't want 
to be slowed down by our agglomeration partners', was the reason given. 
The effects of the measures 
In the study of den Haag we said that the question "what have been the 
employment effects of providing the industrial land7' had little 
significance, because it was unthinkable that a gemeente would not 
provide industrial land unless it was prevented from doing so Eindhoven 
offered an answer, nevertheless, although it claimed no particular 
significance for it. in 1979 it was said that every year 25 ha of land 
were being issued (within the agglomeration) on which 600 to 1000 work-
places were being created (22) The question about the employment 
effects of giving financial assistance to firms is a valid one, but 
could not be answered the scheme had not been in operation long enough 
in its present form 
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The appropriateness of the measures 
Two sets of relationships were important to Eindhoven when choosing the 
measures described above. One was with the other geneenten in the 
agglomeration: there, relationships were on the whole smooth, and 
Eindhoven gained much and lost little from the co-operation and co­
ordination with its neighbours. The second was with the Province (over 
the shoulder of which central government looks closely): we have seen 
how this relationship was troubled by uses of the employment fund. After 
several years, Eindhoven managed to achieve "appropriateness" for this 
instrument: it decided that discretion was better than valour and that 
it was better not to continue fighting the Province for the sake of a 
freer, more flexible (and possibly more effective) use of the fund 
Nevertheless, the search for a new form which would also be "appropriate" 
was continuing 
GEMEENTE GRONINGEN 
One of the main reasons why Groningen was chosen for study is that it 
was in a "development area" where the central government was trying to 
stimulate industrial development. (23) Moreover, there were many other 
agencies taking employment measures in that region, there was the 
province of Groningen, the N.O.M (Noordelijke Ontwikkelings-maatschap-
pij, a development agency for the northern provinces), the С I G 
(Commissie Industrievestiging Groningen consisting of the province, 
the gemeente Groningen and 7 other gemeenten), the Havenschap Eems-
haven-Delfzijl (a port complex about 30 km away from Groningen), and a 
few individual gemeenten. We expected to find that the gemeente 
Groningen had taken all those other agencies into account when choosing 
its own measures. And so it had - in one way or another But the problem 
of unemployment was acute in the province, so the co-operation between 
the agencies often turned into competition (in which Groningen presented 
itself as the innocent and aggrieved party) Before we start to paint 
that confused picture, however, we shall sketch the nature and extent 
of the problem itself, unemployment in Groningen. 
During the 1970's, the number of workplaces there increased - a slight 
increase, from 71,100 in 1971 to 71,700 in 1979 but an increase 
nevertheless - yet the number of unemployed increased more than 5-fold 
(from around 1,000 in 1970 to more than 5,000 at the end of 1980, see 
figure 5 2). How was that possible, especially when the population of 
Groningen had fallen (from 169,000 in 1970 to 161,000 in 1979) ? (24) 
The answer lies in the increase in the economically active population 
looking for work in Groningen (which includes many more people than 
those living in the gemeente in 1977 the latter filled only 48,000 
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of the 72,000 workplaces there). The growth was mainly in young people 
leaving school and entering the labour market for the first time and in 
women, proportionately more of whom wanted to work. So it is not 
surprising to find these two (overlapping) groups over-represented in 
the unemployment statistics. For example, total female unemployment 
rose 6.2 times between 1968 and 1978 (2.5 times for men), in that same 
period female unemployment rose from 16°' to 33% of all unemployment, 
and at the end of that period the female unemployment rate was 12.3°' 
(male unemployment rate 6.9%). (25) And in November 1980, 40% of all 
the unemployed in the gemeente were under 25 years old, 62% of all the 
unemployed women in the gemeente were under 25. 
How was that situation expected to change? First, it was predicted that 
the supply of labour would continue to increase and that the trends 
which had brought more women on to the labour market would continue. 
In order to be able to predict changes in the demand for labour we must 
look at the industrial composition of employment in Groningen. In 1971 
no less than 64% of employment in Groningen was in the service sector 
and no more than 20% in manufacturing (the public utilities and 
construction are excluded from both those categories). Throughout the 
1970's efforts continued to be made to attract to the city more work-
places, both service and manufacturing, but by 1978 there were only 600 
more than in 1971, the manufacturing sector had lost nearly 2,800 work-
places and represented only 16% of the total, the service sector had 
grown by 6,100 to more than 70% of the total, and within that sector 
non-commercial services had grown by 5,400 to 34% of all workplaces. 
The future industrial composition was difficult to predict. The small 
manufacturing sector would probably continue to lose employment: 
commercial services were hardly growing: and the growth of the non-
commercial services was almost totally dependent on governmental 
decisions about the size of the public sector in general and about 
building up that sector in Groningen. 
Changes in the amount and composition of unemoloyment were, therefore, 
difficult to forecast but a worsening was expected, and the gemeente 
had adjusted its employment aims accordingly. In 1977 it wanted not just 
more workplaces but also employment of a particular quality: it must 
match the - relatively high - skills offered by the local residents 
and must satisfy the demands of the local environmental and ohysical 
planning policies. In 1981 the gemeente had become less demanding: it 
wanted to retain and strengthen the existing employment in all sectors. 
The measures 
Like most other Dutch gemeenten, Groningen provided industrial land as 
a matter of course, but in 1977 it intensified this measure. The reason 
was not that there was insufficient land in stock but in order always 
to have on offer a variety of land, (including small plots in urban 
renewal areas) and the gemeente had adopted a programme of preparing 
10 ha a year. 
The disposal price of that land had received careful attention. The 
policy was to fix a price so as to cover its costs (net of subsidy) 
but then, for a given industrial estate, to increase that price by 1° 
a month in order to recoup the mounting interest charges. At the end 
of 1978 however, the gemeente decided that it was in danger of pricing 
itself out of the (regional) market and so froze industrial land prices 
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at /56 per sq. m. serviced (around £50,000 per acre). There were still 
fears that this was too high: Gromngen offered better facilities 
(especially accessibility) than the surrounding gemeenten but its land 
prices were considerably higher, and firms were inclined to react by 
locating outside the city. Disposal was by sale or lease, as the firm 
wished, which was usually an outright sale. The gemeente applied no 
selection criteria: it said that it could not afford to turn firms 
away. 
The provision of office land was a more recent activity, and the 
gemeente noted in 1979 that it had in the last few years lost several 
office firms by not being able to offer immediately available land. 
So it had prepared 3 ha for office use and had modified 12 local plans 
(bestemmingsplannen) so as to rezone a further 4 ha for offices. A year 
later it noted with satisfaction that a large part of that land had 
been taken up and it started to make more available. 
The gemeente Gromngen was one of the very few in the survey by 
Geraets (1980) which provided industrial premises. It did not do that 
directly but through a foundation, the S.I.G. - Stichting Industrie-
en Handelsgebouwen Gromngen - which it set up in 19^7 in co-operation 
with local industry and which it financed with long-term loans. The 
SJ.G was a very flexible agency which could build speculatively or to 
order; could dispose by sale, rent (with or without the right to 
purchase after 5 years) or by a sort of hire purchase (huurkooo); and 
could buy existing buildings in order to let them out to industrial 
users. The activities of the S.I.G. had been on a modest scale - in its 
30 years of activity its average output had been 850 sq. m. a year -
but Gromngen was taking advantage of its flexibility by using it for 
several experimental schemes. So the S.I.G. was building accommodation 
suitable for small office-using firms: it was renovating a building 
to be used by new small firms sharing central services (Jonge Bedrijven 
Centrum), using central government money and directed jointly by 
Gromngen and the N.O.M.: and it was renovating (again with mostly 
central government money) a factory for use by crafsmen displaced from 
urban renewal areas. 
Until recently, Gromngen had given loans but no subsidies to the 
S.I.G. - which had therefore to charge rents which covered its costs -
but the S.I.G. could and did use its loans to provide mortgage finance 
to firms buying S.I.G. buildings. Moreover, Groningen covered the costs 
of risks taken by the S.I.G. in building in advance of demand. In a 
change of policy, whenever the S.I.G. paid more than 10"' for its loans, 
Gromngen paid all interest charges above 10°: that allowed the S.I.G. 
to charge lower rents. 
The story of other financial measures proposed or taken by Gromngen 
shows an interesting change in attitudes. In the middle of the 1970's, 
the possibility of giving financial assistance to firms was frequently 
discussed but not acted upon. For example, the Wethouder out the question 
to the Council: if the gemeente is to give financial aid to firms which 
do not qualify for help from central government or the N.O.M., what 
sort of firms could they possibly be? And if the gemeente were to give 
extra aid to firms already being helped, then E.E.C, rules setting the 
maximum assistance that may be given would be broken (see, e.g.. Harst 
and Klaver, 1978, chap.16). Another example: Groningen said that if it 
used subsidies to reduce land prices in order to attract firms, then the 
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Province would disallow the move 
The attitude was then other agencies are giving financial assistance, 
we can add nothing further At the beginning of the IQSO's, however, 
dissatisfaction with those other agencies had led the gemeente to devise 
its own financial neasures Subsidising interest charges above IO" on 
loans to the S I G has already been mentioned The price at which 
industrial land had been frozen [fSb per sq π ) had been elevated into 
an aim subsidies must be found so that new industrial land could be 
offered at that same price And the possibility of setting up a bank 
for making loans to (very) small firms, with subsidies to cover any 
losses, was being investigated 
A change in attitude to becoming involved in business risks can also 
be detected A few years ago there was a resistance the gemeente 
criticised the N O M which gave financial assistance to firms but 
which put 'too much emphasis on orofitabilιty and too little on 
maintaining existing employment" when aiding firms, but the College В 
en W which had nominal shareholdings in a regional co-operative 
maintained that it would not be correct to use those for a display of 
political convictions' (26) Then, just a few years later, Groningen 
bid for some of the capital goods and stock of a clothing firm which 
went bankrupt the aim was not to provide a subsidy but to keep some 
of the activities intact while negotiating financial assistance from 
central government to save (at least part of) the firm That venture 
failed, but the latest idea is to support the setting up of a private 
bank which would buy equity shares in high risk comoames (a "particu­
liere participatiemaatschappij') thus filling a gap in the capital market 
That description of the physical and financial measuies being taken 
by the gemeente Groningen covers by no means all of its employment 
policy in particular Groningen had a package of measures to help 
unemployed young people, not unlike the measures being taken by Eind­
hoven 
The reasons for the measures 
Unemployment in general The measures were exoected to have the following 
effects on unemployment in general The gemeente provided industrial 
land because land was a necessary condition for employment growth, a 
wide variety of types of land made it possible to satisfy more types 
of firms, and no other agency - public or private - supplied industrial 
land There were similar, but more pressing, reasons for supplying 
office land it appeared that there was a shortage and that Groningen 
had lost office firms for that reason 
The reasons for providing industrial accommodation are especially 
interesting for it is not apparent why they are not equally applicable 
in other parts of the country and, if so, why they have not led other 
gemeenten to do likewise The S I G was set up shortly after the '»'ar 
at a time when all accommodation was scarce and building licences were 
severely rationed, and it had continued in operation for four main 
reasons it built in advance of demand which no other agency in the 
region was doing and which ensured that accommodation was always available 
without delay, it provided rented premises for which the demand was not 
great but of which there were very few other suppliers, it could build 
to order very quickly (a standard factory of 1000 sq m in 4 months), 
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and it could build to design for local firms which wanted to or had to 
rehouse The S I.G factories had proved attractive to firms disolaced 
by the gemeente (in connection with roadworks, urban renewal, etc ) and 
which might otherwise have closed down or moved elsewhere, and to 
foreign firms which otherwise might not have settled in Groningen 
The main reason for freezing land prices was to avoid loosing firms 
to surrounding areas with cheaper land. It was argued that land prices 
were not a significant item in a firm's costs but as long as some firms 
let this consideration influence them then the gemeente had to act 
accordingly A second reason was to ease the transition for firms moving 
out of cheap premises in urban renewal areas 
The reasons for the other financial measures recently introduced are 
not always clear: they have the character of ad hoc experimental 
reactions to a demanding problem. There seems to be a mixture of reducing 
business costs and of filling gaps in the (financial) market, in both 
of which cases there could be expected both an increase in employment 
nationally (depending on the alternative uses of the money used for the 
subsidies) and an attraction of employment to Groningen 
Unemployment of certain groupings Between the unemployment of the 
vulnerable groupings and the physical and financial measures there was 
little direct connection: but then other types of measure were being 
taken to help those people Nevertheless, it is clear that the main 
thrust of Gromngen's employment policy had become to retain existing 
firms and to expand the number of workplaces in total. It would be nice 
to direct that policy at the sort of workplaces that could most easily 
be filled by the unemployed, but that would be a luxury (and, if it 
should on occasion prove to be necessary, the unemployed could be 
retrained to fill the new workplaces) 
The location of the unemployed The locations of the measures had not 
been influenced by the location of the unemployed but by the location 
of the physical oossibi11 ties where was there land available7 That was 
not serious, however, for the journey-to-work distances were short. 
The inter-local effects. In 1981, Groningen declared that its employment 
policy was being pursued for the benefit not only of its own residents 
but for the city region also It is interesting, however, that although 
its own physical and financial measures could be enjoyed by peonie 
living outside (27) it had made (or been able to make) no arrangements 
with the surrounding gemeenten to ensure that they also pursued an active 
employment policy. The gemeente Eindhoven had worked at a city-regional 
scale (see earlier): in Groningen co-ooeration at that scale was lacking. 
And the gemeente regretted it· "A large number of the extra workplaces 
(created in Groningen) benefit the population of the neighbouring 
gemeenten" it said. ' It is better that neighbours should work together 
constructively then sneakily steal the fruit from each other's gardens". 
Other measures being taken The measures being taken by other agencies 
had been a very important influence on the gemeente Groningen, as is 
well illustrated by the issue of oromotion and acquisition Should it 
do this itself, leave it to the other agencies ooerating on a wider 
scale (the province of Groningen and the N O.M.), or leave it to the 
co-operative agency on which it was represented (the С I.G.J7 With the 
latter, Groningen had an on-off relationship· it begrudged the annual 
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contribution (ƒ70,000 a year) it oaid for it reckoned that the C.I G. 
was ineffective, it considered that the possibilities for enforcing the 
agreement with the other gemeenten were too loose, but then it took 
the advice of consultants to remain a member of the C.I.G. and not to 
pursue an independent promotion and acquisition campaign. Then in 1981 
Groningen became so disenchanted with the C.I.G. that it announced its 
intention of withdrawing, of increasing its own oromotional activities, 
and of trying to persuade the Province to carry out acquisition no 
longer through the C.I.G. but on its own. A similar development with 
respect to financial measures has already been noted - from leaving 
such activities to other agencies already carrying them out, to dis-
satisfaction with those agencies, to taking its own measures. 
Speed and flexibility Speed and the ability to react quickly were 
important considerations in the choice of measures and were the nam 
reason why good reserves of industrial land were held and why the S.I.G. 
built in advance of demand. (28) Note also that, once it had been 
decided to provide more office land, most of this was made available 
very quickly by rezomng. It is understandable why Groningen was so 
critical of the delays caused by other public agencies - the Province, 
the N O.M. and central government Flexibility in the sense of being 
able to adapt or even reverse its measures was not regarded as imoortant 
the problem was so great and the gemeente could do so little that the 
need for such flexibility was not felt. 
The relevant knowledge There was a similar attitude towards the need 
to be able to predict accurately the effect of its measures. What we 
have learnt in the last few years, it was said, is that unemoloyment 
in Groningen is of such a scale and has so many national causes that a 
gemeente can do no more than fiddle around on the edge of it (rommelen 
aan de marges) Nevertheless, the need for an indication of the marginal 
effects of taking an employment measure was recognised, in order to be 
able to choose between alternative expenditures 
Outside controls on the agency. In providing industrial and office land, 
the gemeente's proposal s had been subject to the usual approval of the 
Province,but that had never caused difficulties More problematic had 
been the necessity of obtaining provincial aoproval for gemeente loans 
to the S I.G. The Province judged those loans by the 1961 Guidelines 
(see appendix II) in a way which was, according to the gemeente, very 
rigid: it had always been possible to reach agreement, but sometimes 
only after long delays. Gromngen's actual capability, if not its legal 
powers, had been restricted by its poor relationships with some of the 
other gemeenten in the Province. The example of the tensions with the 
С I.G. has already been mentioned as has also the competition to attract 
firms by offering cheap land Groningen would have welcomed an agreement 
over land policy with its "competitors" in the region. (29) 
Local political attitudes. Groningen had a orogrammacollege", the 
College В en W did not try to follow a political programme which 
reflected the policies of all the major political parties represented 
on the Council, but the policies of a majority coalition of like-minded 
political parties Not surprisingly, therefore, political attitudes were 
clearly expressed in the employment measures Moreover, the coalition 
was to the left of centre, so we found the familiar frictions which 
arise when a local government which rejects important parts of the 
social and economic system nevertheless has to work within it 
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In 1978, the College В en V published a note in which it remarked 
bitterly that as long as central government chose to remain with a 
"directed market economy" then every attempt to help industry locally, 
other than as a neutral banker, would "run up against objections of 
distorting competition, disturbing the market, damaging the industrial 
structure (structuurverslechtering) and such like" (30) However, one 
must accept the world, especially if one is more of a beggar than a 
chooser. "Groningen has a bad image in the business world" said one 
of the opposition Councillors, "the anti-capitalist tone of the College 
В en W i s not good for attracting firms" said another The gemeente 
could not afford to scare off new and frighten away existing firms, 
and one of the functions of the business advice centre (the Bureau 
Bedrijfsleven) was to improve relationships between the geneente and 
industry. 
The effects of taking those measures 
As has already been said, in the Netherlands it makes little sense to 
ask. what would have happened had the gemeente not provided land9 but 
it is perhaps worthwhile mentioning that Groningen was disposing of 
12-15 ha of industrial land, involving a few hundred workplaces, every 
year. The provision of industrial oremises is different, we can ask, 
what would have happened in the absence of this measure7 And the geneen­
te was not slow to claim that it increased the demand for labour 
locally, that a factory being built would bring 20 more jobs to the 
area, that another factory would lead to the retention of 100 workolaces 
in the gemeente, and so on. 
A method of assessing the net employment gain attributable to building 
factories is described in appendix I, and one of the key considerations 
is. if the local government (or in this case the S I G.) had not 
supplied the factories, would any other agency have supplied them7 In 
the difficult and commercially unattractive conditions in the middle 
of the West Midlands conurbation it is more likely that the local 
government would be the sole supplier than on a newly laid-out industrial 
estate on the outskirts of Groningen. Assessment of the net employment 
effects of S I G 's activities is, therefore, difficult As it was, 
there were not even figures for the number of people working in S I.G 
provided-premises. 
The appropriateness of the measures 
From a gemeente with strong and radical political attitudes, which 
stresses the freedom of local government, and which adoots a rather 
belligerent attitude to other public agencies in the region, one would 
expect frequent organisational difficulties Certainly, one can detect 
difficulties within the gemeente For example, the setting up of the 
Bureau Bedrijfsleven in order to provide information to firms could 
have helped employment in Groningen but was suspected by the left as 
being a "lobby club for industrialists" as it was its establishment was 
delayed by several years Another internal difficulty was with 
publishing the third part of the "Economische Inventarisatienota" 
In 1978 this was promised for mid-1979 but it did not aopear until the 
end of 1981: it was first written as an inventory of the instruments 
available to a local government but in that form it was not approved 
for it was not sufficiently pol ι cy-onented. 
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Perhaps it was the weak position of the gemeente which explains the 
rather surprising absence of substantive clashes between the gemeente 
and the higher governments over the many issues on which there were 
differences of opinion or interest: the gemeente had not the money nor 
any other weapons to fight effectively, and expressed its dissatisfaction 
in snide and carping comments in its reports and notes, hoping to 
achieve effects through political channels. The gemeente's measures had 
had, perforce, to be made appropriate but Groningen had obviously 
found that painful. 
NOTES 
(1) Note that it is not our aim to give a full picture of the complete 
employment policy being followed by a gemeente, only of the 
choosing and taking of certain types of employment measure. 
However, the framework requires that we place the choosing of those 
measures within the context of the wider policy, and in that way 
a fuller picture of each gemeente'semployment policy has to be 
sketched. 
(2) Absolute unemployment is measured as the people registering at a 
labour exchange: they must register at the exchange in the gemeen-
te where they live. Percentage unemployment is absolute unemploynent 
as a percentage of employees in employment (in loondienst werk-
zame personen) plus those looking for work (werkzoekenden zonder 
werkkring). 
(3) The official name of this city is 's-Gravenhage, but that would be 
a constant tongue-twister in an English text. In the Netherlands, 
the city is usually referred to as den Haag, and we shall follow 
the same practice here. 
(4) The rents are set low initially and gradually increased in such a 
way that the initial financial losses, including the debt charges 
on those losses, are covered by surplusses in the longer term. 
After a period of 9-10 years, it was calculated, the project would 
become profitable. It is interesting to note that a similar method 
is used for setting rents in social housing. 
(5) The problem of urban renewal has come only recently to Dutch cities, 
so the difficulties of finding suitable cheap accommodation for 
firms displaced from urban renewal areas have only recently been 
recognised. Den Haag's measures have been an interesting example to 
others. A recent article (Schreiner, 1981) describes the measures 
being taken in England and France and recommends that Dutch ge-
meenten learn from that experience. 
(6) In the Houtwijk scheme, for example, by redeveloping industrial 
space used very wastefully, not only were those displaced firms 
rehoused but also 1,600 sq. m. of additional industrial floorspace 
were provided for firms out of other renewal areas and further 
28,000 sq. m. of land were made available for housing. 
(7) In the light of the discussion in appendix III it is interesting 
to note that the gemeente had taken no account of the possibility 
that a general increase in the demand for labour would increase 
the employment of the vulnerable social groupings also. Mismatches 
between supoly and demand or "qualitative discrepancies" are not 
absolute but are relative to the general level of demand. 
(8) That was one of the reasons why there was no urgency to follow up 
the proposal for investment grants: let us provide land first and 
only if that is not taken up shall we try offering financial 
assistance, said that College. 
(9) It will be remembered that we detected a similar interweaving of 
aims in the Birmingham case study also - see chapter 4 - where 
there was a policy to reduce unemoloyment and a policy to regenerate 
industry, both being pursued with the same measures. 
(10) The measures being taken for such people were very limited, for all 
the talk there was of maintaining a diversified industrial 
structure and influencing the quality of the demand for labour. 
And that was one of the main criticisms within the Council of the 
policies: "the accent is on the prestige of the city, not on the 
well-being of its individual citizens" was a typical comment. 
(11) It must be added that one attemot to place a measure near to the 
unemployed had not been successful. With central government money, 
some labour-intensive projects had been carried out in districts 
with high unemployment especially in order to involve the local 
unemployed, but it was found that those working on the projects 
often lived in other areas 
(12) Part of that policy was to redistribute civil service jobs to the 
depressed areas, including 3,000 to 4,000 places in the Post Office 
Headquarters from den Haag to Groningen - see the section on 
Groningen later. 
(13) In that way, the College В en W in the Netherlands is similar to 
the caucus of the majority party in English local government. 
(14) It is of interest to note that this gemeente operated two limited 
compames - a building firm and a property company (N V. Stedelijk 
Belang, see above) - but the reason for carrying out its activities 
in that way was to give those agencies of the gemeente more freedom 
of action, not a financial advantage. 
(15) It is true that den Haag has for many years been oroviding 
industrial land: but to measure the employment effects of providing 
that land would tell us nothing, seeing that the gemeente has a 
virtual monopoly in this field (the question: what would have 
happened had that measure not been taken7 cannot be anwered 
meaningfully) 
(16) There is evidence of this sane care and wish not to provoke a dis­
agreement with central government in another of den Haag's policy 
areas - housing In its draft housing plan (Concept nota volks-
huisvestingolan) the gemeente suggests new ways of using the 
legislation, then notes sorrowfully that it is not certain that 
the Crown would approve such an application 
(17) This name refers to the idea supported by Eindhoven that everyone 
has a right to be occupied, a "bezigheidsrecht". 
(18) Nevertheless, it was known in which districts the unemployed lived 
(a special analysis of the unemployment register had been made) 
and for those measures designed to help the least mobile (the 
occupying-young-people policy) it was the rule to make the 
provisions in the neighborhood where the unemployed lived 
(19) One of the proposed special measures was the encouraging of the 
provision of part-time jobs instead of (fewer) full-time jobs. 
This proposal was accepted by central government which in Jan 
1980 gave /10 M to be spent in Eindhoven and five other areas 
(experimentele regeling bevordering deeltijdarbeid) 
(20) In the words of Young et al (1980) and already quoted in chapter 1, 
the local policy makers in Eindhoven were "managerialists" with 
a high "propensity to intervene" In that way they were similar 
to their Coventry counterparts (see chapter 4). 
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(21) The gemeente was obliged to make a distinction between helping the 
unemployed to find employment (by training schemes etc.) and 
helping the unemployed not to get bored and to keep out of mischief 
(by hobby classes etc ). 
(22) During Council Meetings the Wethouder offered three similar pieces 
of information: 
- in 1975, that a oromotion campaign had cost /250,000 and that 
250 extra workplaces had been created, which worked out at 
ƒ1000 a place 
- in 1976, that in the previous year 300 more firms had settled in 
Eindhoven than had left it, "and that has not come about by our 
not doing anything about promotion" (sic) 
- in 1981, that in the first full year of the agglomeration's 
"Economic Bureau" it had helped to bring 21 firms to the 
agglomeration, accounting for 149 workplaces in 1980/81 and an 
expected 878 in 1985 
(23) There is both a gemeente Groningen and a orovince of Groningen. 
In this report, whenever we talk about "Groningen" we mean the 
gemeente and if we talk about the "province' we mean the province 
of Groningen. 
(24) Towards the end of the 1970's, the population started to grow 
again: the effects of Groningen having been declared a "growth 
city" were beginning to be felt 
(25) All statistics for the labour exchange area (rayon) consisting of 
the gemeente Groningen DIUS 7 others. However, 90% of the un-
employed in that area lived in Groningen itself 
(26) Since then that firm - AVEBE - has declared several hundred people 
redundant. 
(27) But Groningen had built locational restrictions into some of its 
other measures: when appointing staff it gave a slight preference 
to those living in the region. 
(28) This could be an expensive policy. In 1981, for examole, the ge-
meente paid /31,000 to the S.I G. as compensation for loss of 
rents on factories built speculatively too far in advance of demand. 
(29) Once again, the comparison with Eindhoven is interesting. There, 
employment policy was co-ordinated on the city-regional scale, but 
not in Groningen. In neither case, however, had it proved possible 
to co-ordinate policy for disposing of industrial land. 
(30) The main aim of the physical planning policy is worth quoting here, 
as it gives a clear picture of the political attitudes. The aim 
is "an allocation and management of scarce space in such a way that 
the legitimate demands of the economically weaker functions, and in 
particular of the lower income grouos, can be satisfied". 
PUBLICATIONS USED 
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Nieuw Evenwicht - een reactie op het NEI rapport. Planning for decline, 
gem. den Haag, 1973. 
Council response to public comments about, and minutes of Council 
discussions over, the note - Nieuw evenwicht, gem den Haag, Aug 1974 
Beleidsprogramma 1978-1982, gem. den Haag, 1978." 
De leegstand aan Kantoorruimten te den Haag, Rijswijk, Voorburg en 
Leidschendam naar de situatie eind feb. 1978, 1979, 1980, gen den 
Haag, 1978, 1979, 1980. 
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Werken en ruimte in den Haag, gem. den Haag, 1978. 
Wonen, werken, welzijn, gem. den Haag, 1978. 
Written answers by College В en W to questions from Councillors about 
this note, gem. den Haag, 1978. 
Reacties van de vier grote gemeenten op de Beschikking Steun Bedrijven 
Stadsvernieuwing 1978, gem. den Haag, Amsterdam, Utrecht, Rotterdam, 
Oct. 1978. 
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bijlage, gem. den Haag, 1980. 
10 jaar Haagse stadsvernieuwing Plan Vol. 12, no. 1, 1981. 
De bouw van bedrijfsverzamelgebouwen als maatregel ter versterking van 
de plaatselijke werkgelegenheid. Inleiding van de waarnemend Wethou­
der Economische Zaken, gem. den Haag, congress 18-03-82. 
Een beleidskader voor gemeentelijke maatregelen ter verbetering van de 
arbeidsmarktpositie van (kwetsbare) groepen werkloze werkzoekenden, 
gem. den Haag, May 1981. 
Sociaal-economisch beleid, 's-Gravenhage, gem. den Haag, May 1981. 
Bevordering industriële en ambachtelijke werkgelegenheid, in het bij-
zonder door bevordering van innovatie, gem. den Haag, August 1981. 
Kwalitatieve discrepanties voor de arbeidsmarkt van de regio 
's-Gravenhage, deel IV, E.T.I. voor Zuid-Holland, Oct. 1981. 
The minutes of the Council Meetings (Handelingen van de Gemeenteraad) 
from January 1975 to June 1981. 
Eindhoven 
Eindhoven, centrum van werkgelegenheid, gem. Eindhoven, June 1972. 
Werkgelegenheidsnota, supplement to council documents of 21 Jan. 1975, 
gem. Eindhoven, Dec. 1974. 
Behoefteraming industrieterreinen in Zuid-Oost Brabant tot 1986, 
agglom. Eindhoven, Nov. 1976. 
Samen werkend verder.gem. and agglom. Eindhoven, May 1977. 
Nota coördinatie economisch beleid, agglom. Eindhoven, Jan. 1978. 
Rapport coördinatie bedrijfsterreinen, agglom. Eindhoven, Jan. 1978. 
Voorstel ter realisering van de aanbevelingen van het rapport "Samen 
werkend verder", gem. Eindhoven, Apr. 1978. 
Interimverslag van een onderzoek naar de toekomstwensen en toekomst-
mogelijkheden onder schoolverlaters van het voortgezet onderwijs, 
studiejaar 1976-1977, gem. Eindhoven, Apr. 1978. 
Rapport: Jones, Lang, Wootton bv, Jones Lang and Wootton, July 1978. 
Statistiek van bedrijvigheid en werkgelegenheid in de agglomeratie 
Eindhoven, gem. and agglom. Eindhoven, Aug. 1978. 
Gemeentebegroting 1979, gem. Eindhoven, 1979. 
Bedrijfsbegrotingen 1979, gem. Eindhoven, 1979. 
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comimssie Zuid-Oost Brabant, Feb. 1979. 
Sociaal-economsch beleidsplan, agglom. Eindhoven, Feb. 1979. 
Nota arbeidsmarkt opvang, agglom. Eindhoven, Feb. 1979. 
Nota grondbeleid 1979, gem. Eindhoven, 1979. 
Het arbeidsmarktbeleid van de gemeente Eindhoven, gem. Eindhoven, Feb. 
1980. 
Afstemming van vraag en aanbod op de arbeidsmarkt, deel 1, gem. en 
agglom. Eindhoven, Oct. 1980. 
Bedrijfsbegeleiding als instrument voor bevordering van de werkgelegen-
heid, Inleiding van de Wethouder Economische Zaken, gem. Eindhoven, 
congress 18-03-1981. 
Sociaal-economisch beleidsplan, agglom. Eindhoven, Apr. 1981. 
Stimulering van werkgelegenheid in de Regio, H. Jooren, Katholieke 
Hogeschool Tilburg, Sept. 1981. 
Voorstel inzake structuur en uitvoering gemeentelijk arbeidsmarktbeleid, 
gem. Eindhoven, Oct. 1981. 
Minutes of the Council Meetings (Verslagen van de Gemeenteraad) from 
Jan. 1975 to April 1981. 
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Economische inventarisatienota, deel I, gem. Groningen, 1977. 
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Begroting 1979, gem. Groningen, 1978. 
Rol- en takenpakket, bureau bedrijfsleven, stad Groningen, gem. 
Groningen, 1979. 
De positie van het midden- en kleinbedrijf in stadsvernieuwingsgebieden, 
gem. Groningen, 1979. 
Integraal beleidsplan 1980-83, gem. Groningen, 1979. 
Economische inventarisatienota, deel II, gem. Groningen, 1980. 
Het grondprijsbeleid: een instrument voor bevordering van de werkge-
legenheid?, Inleiding van de Wethouder Economische Zaken, gem. 
Groningen, congress 18-03-81. 
Werkloosheid dreigt groei van Groningen te doorkruisen, H. Stevens, 
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6 The theory and the practice, some 
interim conclusions 
Now the practical investigation has been finished it is appropriate to 
pause and take stock of progress. In chapters 1 and 2 a number of 
theoretical statements about how public agencies choose a type of 
instrument was made and in chapters 4 and 5 how that is done in practice 
was described: we pointed out in chapter 2 that the description must 
not be regarded as testing the theory:nevertheless, some comments on 
the theory in the light of the practice can legitimately be made. 
This work is based upon the distinction between physical and financial 
instruments, and that distinction was made larnely deductively. But is 
it useful for analysing practice, and is it recognised by the practition-
ers themselves7 In England, the answer is - Yes. Perhaos that is not too 
surprising, given the importance there of the ultra vires principle 
which limits a local authority to a prescribed set of discrete and 
permissible instruments. In the Netherlands a local government has more 
freedom in its choice of instruments so it is more significant that the 
distinction physical/financial is equally strong in the Dutch practice. 
In both countries, local governments have qualms and ideological 
objections to financial instruments but not to physical instruments; 
in both countries central government restricts local governments much 
more tightly in their use of financial instruments than physical 
instruments, and in both countries the attitude tends to be that the 
taking of physical measures is an integral part of a local government's 
task whereas financial measures are marginal to that The consideration 
of why this should be so must wait until the fuller investigation of 
the natures of the two types of instrument (chapters 7 and 8): for the 
moment we note that practice supports the distinction between physical 
and financial instruments. 
Two other assumotions which are fundamental to the general argument 
are that it is valid to talk of a public agency making a choice, more-
over that a public agency can make a rational choice. The case studies 
cast more light on those assumptions, for they show that the practice 
of local governments choosing and taking measures does conform in many 
ways to the model of an individual making a rational choice, problems 
are identified and examined, measures are proposed and evaluated against 
(explicit or implicit) criteria, neasures are chosen and implemented 
in the hope of reducing the problem, sometimes the effectiveness of the 
measure is evaluated. 
What we found does not measure up to the model of rational-
comprehensive planning (as described, for example, in Paludi, 1973, 
chap.8): the findings do not even fit the later modifications of that 
93 
model whereby comprehensiveness applies only to the "initial outline of 
the decision situation" (Paludi, 1979), for we detected no signsthat 
either problen or context or possible technical solutions had ever been 
scanned comprehensively (oerhaps they had, but we could not detect it!). 
What we found cannot be described as - even an attempt at -
comprehensiveness but more accurately as following the tried and trusted 
ways enlivened by a little originality or creativity here and there 
Nevertheless, it seems to us that the cases we investigated of public 
agencies choosing and taking measures can usefully be described as 
"rational": insofar as rationality is as much a question of degree as 
of an ideal type then many of the stages of the rational-comprehensive 
model had been followed and certainly the descnotion "rational" would 
be more accurate than 'irrational' or 'having to follow the dictates 
of a oarticular social group' or 'determined by socio-economic Dressuren'. 
(1) If we apply the concept of rationality to an aoproach, an attempt 
at a method of working, then it is an empirical question whether an 
agency tries to, and to what extent it manages to, follow that approach. 
(2) We conclude, that these seven local governments had tried to act 
rationally and had to a large extent succeeded in doing so, but that 
their rationality had by no means been comprehensive 
Based upon those foundations, a framework was set out in chapter 2 
with which the choosing of measures by public agencies could be 
analysed That choice is based upon certain considerations which could 
be divided into two classes - technical and contextual the case 
studies show that both classes were recognised and were influential in 
the choice, and that it would be seriously one-sided to omit or ignore 
either 
The framework divides the considerations further into ten Now, the 
more detailed we make the framework, the more we must expect that the 
relative importance of its parts will depend on the problem and the 
local circumstances to which the framework is aoplied For example, 
three of the technical considerations are - the soeed with which the 
desired effect can be achieved, the flexibility with which the effects 
of applying the instrument can be negated or reversed, and the 
flexibility with which the application of the instrument can be adapted 
to a range of situations. In the circumstances of none of the case 
studies was any of those considerations important but that does not 
mean that they would be unimportant in other circumstances The meagre 
attention they had been given by our seven local governments could be 
explained by the particular conditions 'the problem of unemployment 
will be with us for many years so speed is not important, we think we 
know which measures will be useful so we do not consider the ease of 
reversing them to be important, our efforts are so marginal that a 
precise application and adaptation is not important" 
Of the other considerations, the knowledge of the external environment 
had not been given much emphasis in our cases But here again there were 
good reasons for that, the measures are experimental, small-scale and 
incremental, so there is little need for accurate prediction before-hand. 
we shall learn by doing and if we make a mistake it will not be a big 
one' The consideration of directing the help towards specified persons 
had been important in most of the cases - it was desired to help those 
with the worst unemployment - but the consideration had not influenced 
the choice between physical or financial instruments As we shall see 
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further in chapters 7 and 8 it is difficult to use either type of 
instrument on its own to direct help in that way, and the local govern-
ments studied had come to the same conclusion. 
The renaming considerations had all played a large part in the 
choice of an instrument. These are: 
- the nature of the problem situation 
- the inter-local effects of applying a local instrument 
- the capability of the agency 
- the relationship to other measures already being taken 
- the reigning political attitudes 
Bearing the above qualifications in mind we can conclude that the 
framework has been both useable and useful, which gives us the confidence 
to apply it when investigating the nature of local physical and local 
financial instruments. However, before leaving the case studies we can 
usefully apply the framework to explaining a particular finding of 
those studies, vis: the choice that was made between physical and 
financial measures. The information was not collected for that purpose, 
but the framework - if it really does have analytical power - should 
help to offer an answer. And that should then help to achieve our main 
aim - a better understanding of when to choose physical and when 
financial instruments. 
What are the findings to be explained7 The three English cases and 
the survey of 22 local authorities (JURUE, 1979) show that a few local 
authorities are providing industrial land, that as many if not more are 
providing industrial buildings (new or rehabilitated), and that very few 
are providing financial assistance but that those few do it systematic-
ally. From the three Dutch cases and the survey of 11 gemeenten 
(Geraets, 1980) we obtain a rather different picture, all gemeenten 
provide land, very few provide buildings, and the systematic provision 
of financial assistance has only recently begun, although a few gemeen-
ten use industrial land prices as a sort of subsidy. So there is 
simlanty between the English local authorities, similarity between 
the Dutch gemeenten, and a difference between the two countries, this 
is summarised in figures 6.1 and 6.2 
In order to explain those findings we look first to differences in the 
"nature of the problem situation", divided into the problematic personal 
circumstances and the explanatory conditions The first aspect was more 
or less the same in both countries It is true that percentage un-
employment is probably higher in England (although differences in 
definitions make an accurate comparison difficult) and that the un-
employment of vulnerable groups (the distributional aspect of the 
problem) probably receives more attention in the Netherlands (see 
appendix II): but there was no evidence that the latter had influenced 
the physical or financial measures being taken in either country 
The explanatory conditions, on the other hand, were different-
employing labour requires land and buildings and these were available 
in different degrees in the English and the Dutch cases. In England 
there is no general shortage of industrial land, but the studies were 
of a big conurbation where industrialisation had begun in the late 
eighteenth century There was some vacant land within the built-up area, 
but this was usually derelict or abandonned and could be made usable 
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only by a large and unprofitable expenditure (Williams et al, 1980). 
As a result the only industrial land which could profitably be made 
available privately was a considerable distance away on the edge of the 
conurbation. There was no general shortage of industrial buildings 
either, but the private market would provide them only on greenfield 
sites, and in the Birmingham conurbation that can mean a long Journey 
to work. However, because of the history of the conurbation there was 
a stock of old vacant factories some of which could be rehabilitated to 
provide cheap industrial space but not in such a way as to be financially 
attractive to private developers. Without local authority intervention, 
therefore, there would have been a shortage of industrial land and 
buildings within the conurbation, and the private provision outside the 
conurbation entailed for many people long journeys to work. 
In the Netherlands, by contrast, it does not make sense to think of 
the provision of industrial land without local governnent intervention 
(although the opportunities for gemeenten to do that are more difficult 
in some places - e.g. den Haag - than in others - e.g. Eindhoven and 
Groningen). And because the conurbations are smaller, the lack of 
private provision of industrial buildings within the conurbation does 
not cause journey to work problems. The need for gemeenten to provide 
industrial premises is usually not pressing, therefore. (3) 
Another of the technical considerations which had been important in 
the choice of measures is the inter-local effects. They had, moreover, 
been used positively: measures had been taken in one area in order to 
have effects in other areas. So local governments had taken financial 
measures within their own boundaries in order to attract firms from 
outside (and it was precisely for that reason that higher authorities 
had tried to prevent such measures). Further, local governments had 
taken physical measures outside their boundaries (oroviding industrial 
land) in order to help the unemployed living inside the boundaries. 
interestingly, the higher authorities had not tried to prevent those 
measures 
There were three contextual considerations which had also influenced 
the choice of measures, leading to similarities within each country 
and differences between them. The capability of local governments is 
significantly different in the two countries, in the way in which the 
central restricts the local government In England, it is fairly clear 
what a local authority may do, and if it wants to apply one of the 
few permissible financial instruments it knows in advance that the 
centre cannot prevent it. In the Netherlands, a gemeente is uncertain 
about the reaction it will meet from national or orovincial level if 
it should try to take financial measures, and Dutch gemeenten are so 
dependent financially on central government that they orefer to avoid 
a confrontation. Perhaps that situation will change in the next few 
years, there is uncertainty about the so-called 'upoer limit (see 
aopendix II), that is determined by precedent, and if enough gemeenten 
are concerned enough about local unemployment to try to aoply financial 
instruments, then certainty will be created, and gemeenten will apoly 
their (probably very restricted) financial instruments as readily as 
they now apply their physical ones The examples of the gemeente Eind-
hoven attempting to find a way of being allowed to use its employment 
fund" and of den Haag slowly working out an acceptable way of aiding 
firms financially point in this direction. There is one particular 
difference in the capability of local governments which has a small but 
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definite effect on the choice of neasures a gemeente is not supposed 
to supply industrial land below the cost of provision but is further 
not restricted in setting a disposal once, whereas an English local 
authority must dispose of land strictly at market prices (4) and the 
level can be checked by the central government District Valuer. For 
that reason, the price of industrial land is sometimes used as an 
employment measure in the Netherlands but not in England. 
The choice of measure can depend on other measures already being 
taken, and that also differs significantly between the two countries. 
In England, industrial land is provided mostly by private developers, 
sometimes by central government agencies (5) and local authorities 
contribute only where local circumstances make it impossible or un-
profitable for the market and where the central government agencies 
are inactive: in the Netherlands, the necessity in the oast for concerted 
action in order to reclaim land, tradition, and the legislation that 
has grown up around it keep the supplying of industrial land mostly 
out of the private sector, central government does not do it, so the 
gemeenten must. 
The offering of financial assistance to firms is another example: 
in locations where the centre gave such assistance, local governments 
did not, for they could add little that would have been significant. In 
England, the background survey and the case studies were all in one 
region (the West Midlands) and in only one of the local authorities 
(Oswestry District) was financial assistance given by the centre. We 
have seen that one of the m a m reasons why the West Midlands cases gave 
financial aid was because the central government did not, so the local 
areas were at a disadvantage compared to the "Assisted Areas" In 
contrast, of the 11 Dutch gemeenten surveyed, firms in four of them 
were eligible for central government aid. One of those four was Groningen, 
and there we saw how the availability of financial assistance from 
central government was one of the main reasons why the gemeente itself 
offered no such aid. (6) And in the two other case studies, it was mainly 
because central government assistance was not available locally that 
the gemeente had taken, or thought about taking, financial measures. 
The remaining consideration in the analytical framework is the 
reigning oolitical attitudes. These were found to be influential and 
significantly different between the two countries, in two resoects. The 
first is that the Dutch concept of distorting competition (concurrentie-
vervalsing) is almost unknown to and is certainly not used by English 
local authorities, which are usually only too keen to distort competition 
in their favour. The second is that Dutch gemeenten seem less willing 
to challenge and openly confront central government than their English 
counterparts. (7) And we saw in the case studies that both of those 
factors had discouraged Dutch gemeenten from taking financial measures. 
(8) 
We can conclude this short chapter by saying that not only was the 
analytical framework useful for the case studies, also that it has been 
shown to be helpful in explaining the outcomes of the choosing of 
physical and financial measures in the two countries 
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NOTES 
(1) Of course, the processes took place within a given institutional 
framework and it might be correct to say that that framework had 
been constructed according to the dictates of a particular class 
or grouo or had been determined by particular socio-economic 
oresssures. That possibility raises the idea of "constrained 
rationality", whereby people or agencies try to act rationally withr 
a context which they do not try, or are not able, rationally to 
change. (Note that this is a broader concept than "contextual 
rationality" - Paludi, undated The latter neans acting rationally 
within a given context, "constrained rationality" includes also 
the idea of not trying to change that context). In the case studies 
described here, we would say that the local governments had a lot 
of freedom within the constraints and that they had all tried to 
use that freedom rationally (but not comprehensively). How the 
constraints had been determined, whether that had been by a rational 
process, and whether the constraints were open to rational 
discussion and thereafter modification, are all questions important 
for the arguments over the rationality of decision-making, but our 
practical investigation does not allow us to offer an answer. 
(2) This is logically distinct from the normative question whether a 
public agency should try to follow that approach. 
(3) It should be added that an English local government receives signifi-
cant local taxes from industries within its area, which gives it a 
financial incentive to provide industrial land and buildings The 
different system of local taxes in the Netherlands means that that 
financial incentive is very much weaker there. 
(4) There are certain exceptions, see e.g. the Local Government Act 
1972, S.123. 
(5) CoSIRA and the English Industrial Estates Corooration 
(6) Moreover, had it tried to do so, the EEC ceiling on such regional 
assistance might have been transgressed. 
(7) That seems paradoxical, considering that Dutch local governments 
have a constitutional right to autonomy whereas English local 
authorities exist by the grace of central government. Perhaps the 
explanation lies in the greater financial independence of English 
local governments - see appendix II. This paradox is highlighted 
also in Hamnett, 1981, chap. 3 
(8) It is tempting to try to delve deeper into such differences between 
the two countries by asking what it is that is responsible for the 
differences between them, in particular the differences in agencies 
and legislation (affecting the capability of local governments) 
and in political attitudes Clark (1974) suggests the following 
three "Laws": 
- constituency representation leads to more local autonomy than 
proportional representation 
- the larger the country in territory and in population, the 
stronger the local community autonomy 
- the more legitimate the national government is with the national 
population, the less is the local community autonomy 
On the first two points, and on the third also if a coalition govern-
ment wins more legitimacy than a simple majority government, local 
autonomy would be expected to be greater in England than in the 
Netherlands Our case studies would seem to confirm that deduction. 
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7 Local physical instruments 
In this chapter we try to deduce the inherent technical possibilities 
of and the context appropriate to local physical instruments. The 
deduction is theoretical, but it is important to repeat what was said 
in chapter 2: the working out of these theoretical ideas has been 
strongly influenced by information obtained from the case studies about 
the decisions made in practice about taking local physical measures, 
and by information about the technical effects and organisational 
difficulties caused when those physical measures were applied. The 
framework for this deduction is that developed in chapter 2, and we 
consider in turn each of the ten "considerations". First,however, we 
state more fully what is meant by a "physical" instrument. (1) 
A physical instrument is one which allows measures to be taken which 
act directly uoon the physical environment - land and buildings and 
the general uses to which they ілау be put. Glasbergen and Simonis (1980) 
offer a classification of those instruments which makes their nature 
clearer. This was proposed for the legislation concerning landed 
property (Wetgeving Onroerend Goed) and it distinguishes between: 
- determining the use that may be made of a piece of land or a building 
(bestemming) 
- realising that proposed land use by legal and technical means, which 
could include both negative and positive planning (inrichting) 
- care for the property by maintenance etc. so that it can continue to 
fulfill the use which has been determined for it (beheer) 
A further indication of how widely "measures which act directly upon 
the physical environment" can be interpreted is given by the meaning of 
"development" in English town planning legislation, which aims to control 
development defined as "the carrying out of building, engineering, 
mining or other operations in, on, over, or under land, or the making 
of any material changes in the use of any buildings or other land" 
(see Cui 1ingworth, 1976, p.99). Moreover, the class of instruments so 
defined is broader than that handled by most town planning agencies: it 
includes also the granting of building certificates, some aspects of 
pollution control, implementing public works, the maintenance and 
management of oublie parks, and so on. 
THE TYPES OF PROBLEM SITUATION THAT CAN BE CHANGED 
The means (physical measures) have just been defined: what ends can they 
be used to achieve7 Using the approach to problems as explained in 
chapter 1, we ask: what are the causal relationshios between problematic 
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personal circumstances (to alleviate which is the "end") and the 
physical environment (to influence which we have certain direct means)7 
Existing theories of physical, spatial or town planning give practic-
ally no help with answering that question, mainly because the ends of 
such types of planning are usually so vaguely stated (2) "... With 
regard to the ends of intervention in respect of land markets and land 
development, the picture is no clearer Invariably ends have been 
stated in a most unrevealing form - to reduce land-use conflicts, to 
encourage the best use of land Stated in this form, they disclose 
very little. In oarticular, they avoid the thorny issue of linking ends 
with means. ' (Pearce et al, 1978, po 1-2) (3) 
There are, it is true, theories which are used in town planning and 
which are relevant to the ends-means question Sometimes they are very 
simple such as in the statements if that slum is demolished and 
replaced with a new dwelling then living conditions will be better, or 
if that road is widened, then traffic will flow more freely and less 
time will be wasted on it Sometimes they are more complex, such as in 
the statements, if a by-pass is built round the town centre the nuisance 
and danger from traffic on the main shopping street will be reduced to 
an acceptable level, or if housing is built with 'defensible spaces", 
then it will be safer and more pleasant in that estate The point, 
however, is that there is no general theory of physical, town or spatial 
planning which tackles "the thorny issue of linking ends with means" 
We attempt to offer such a general theory here, by borrowing some ideas 
from economics and distinguishing between three ways in which people 
use the physical environment - as a consumer good, as a producer good, 
and as the physical setting for personal relationshios 
The physical environment as a consumer good 
When a person lives in a house, relaxes in the garden, enjoys a bracing 
walk in the park, groans at a particularly ugly building, is inconven-
ienced by the layout of the local shopping centre, that person is 
'consuming" the physical environment The jargon is from economics, it 
means that the physical environment is being used directly, it is valued 
or deplored for itself. 
The physical environment as a consumer good may be poor, causing prob-
lems or dissatisfaction to the people using it If the conditions thus 
caused fall below a quality or standard which has been publicly set as 
the minimum acceptable, the resulting personal problems are the con-
cern of a public agency Examples are houses with no running water, 
shopping streets on which there are many accidents to pedestrians, eye-
sores in national parks, unhealthy noise and fumes at the kerbside of 
motor roads. By improving the physical environment, personal problems 
can be directly alleviated 
The physical environment as a producer good 
There is no satisfaction to be derived directly from a factory it 
might be beautiful or ugly, but otherwise it is neither valued nor 
deplored for itself The only value which the factory has is indirect 
by its use, shoes are produced and people value shoes directly, or the 
factory provides workplaces The factory is a "producer good" its value 
lies in the contribution it makes to the production of consumer goods or 
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services or to personal incomes. Simlarly, a shop is valued because 
it helps the shopkeeper to produce retailing services, a school helps 
people to learn, roads helo people to travel. 
Concerned with ends which are expressible as personal problems, we 
want to look at shortcomings in consumer goods and services or in 
personal incomes. These are provided with the help of the physical 
environment as a producer good, what can be achieved by changing the 
producer good'' The answer is: oossibly nothing at all' If the sole 
reason for the consumer good or service not being provided adequately 
is that the physical environment is hindering its production, then 
changing the physical environment can remove the hindrance and allow an 
adequate provision. In that case, physical measures can helo to alleviate 
personal problems. If there are other reasons why the consumer good or 
service is inadequate, physical measures can do nothing to help. 
That conclusion can be expressed in a number of ways The physical 
environment is a facilitator, which makes possible the provision of a 
consumer commodity and the earning of personal incomes The ohysical 
environment is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the 
commodity to be satisfactorily provided. All that ohysical measures can 
do is to remove obstacles:they can clear the path for the horse to get 
to the water, but if the horse is not thirsty it will not use the path, 
let alone drink the water. If that is not understood, physical measures 
might be given impossible tasks to do: a good examule is to be found in 
the Greater London Development Plan which was roundly criticised by the 
Panel of Inquiry for making just that mistake (Greater London Development 
Plan, 1973, para 5). The Dutch say that physical measures are "voor-
waarde scheppend" (they create conditions) and "toelatingsplanologie" 
(permissive planning) (4), which terms express the limitations of 
physical measures well. 
The physical environment as the setting for personal relationships 
This is the third way in which we use the physical environment - as the 
physical surroundings in which we live and move and have our mundane 
being, in which we talk (or do not talk) to our neighbours, in which our 
children walk to school collecting their friends as they go along, in 
which we greet passers-by as we take the dog for a walk Are there any 
causal connections between the physical environment used in this way 
and personal problems'' For examole, is the ohysical environment the 
cause in any way of loneliness in a new housing estate, of anomie in the 
centres of big cities, of vandalism or mugging7 
The evidence suggests that physical environment is a faci!itator in 
this use too. For example, if oeople are lonely because the physical 
design of the housing estate makes it difficult to meet neighbours, then 
physical measures can redesign the estate in such a way that meeting 
is easier and, in that way, can help to reduce loneliness But if people 
are lonely because they have nothing in common with their neighbours, 
redesigning the housing estate will have no effect on loneliness The 
conflicting theory, that the physical environment can actively influence 
personal ralationships, is "physical" or "architectual determinism". 
It was first tested empirically (and found wanting) by Kuper (1953), 
and Broady (1968) in a further criticism said· "the physical form is 
only a potential environment since it simply provides possibilities or 
clues for social behaviour" (pp.20,21) and "Architectual design, like 
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music to a film, is complementary to human activity: it does not shape 
it" (p.22). So in this use too, physical measures can inhibit things 
happening and can remove hindrancesto things happening, but they cannot 
cause things to happen. (5) 
The above discussion can be summarised by saying that those problem 
situations can be changed by physical measures where the problematic 
personal circumstances: 
- are the direct result of the physical environment as a consumer good 
being inadequate 
- are the result, direct or indirect, of the physical environment 
hindering the production of all or certain goods, services or employ-
ment 
- are the result, direct or indirect, of the physical environment 
hindering certain types of personal or social behaviour. 
THE POSSIBILITY OF DIRECTING THE HELP TOWARDS SPECIFIED PERSONS 
This is the question of distribution or allocation: can it be ensured 
that the improvements brought about by the physical measures are 
enjoyed by those who were suffering the problem? The following types of 
cases have to be considered separately. 
When the problem is of the physical environment being inadequate as a 
pubiic consumption good (6) then improving the environment will not 
alter the accessbility to it or the distribution of benefits from it so 
those suffering before the improvement will be able to enjoy the 
benefits after. Examples are parks, landscape,etc. 
When the problem is of the physical environment being inadequate as a 
private consumption good, then the allocation mechanism is important 
(pricing, rationing, queuing, etc.) and might prevent the people with 
the problems from enjoying the improvements. For example, the Panel of 
Inquiry into the Greater London Development Plan (1973, para.6) 
distinguished two basic housing problems in London - the condition of 
the stock and the question of tenure and allocation. It recommended the 
use of physical measures to improve the former, but to tackle the latter 
it admitted the ineffectiveness of physical instruments and recommended 
administrative changes. 
When the physical environment is preventing the production of goods, 
services or workplaces the shortage of which is causing problems for 
certain people, then lifting that hindrance in order to allow extra 
production might not on its own help those people: in addition, the 
extra production might have to be allocated separately to the problem 
group. The case study of den Haag gives a good example: if more 
industrial land was provided there, some of the unemployed would be 
able to find werk, but they would not be the ones with the worst employ-
ment prospects unless complementary non-physical measures also were 
taken. 
When the physical environment is hindering certain types of personal 
or social behaviour and this is causing oroblems, then because the 
physical environment concerned usually has the characteristics of a 
public good removing the physical hindrance will allow those with the 
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problems to benefit from the change, there are no difficulties with 
allocation or distribution. 
SPEED 
How fast can a physical measure bring about the desired effect7 By 
distinguishing between construction (e.g. new roads, new buildings) and 
management measures (e.g. changing the use of existing roads, buildings, 
land) we see that the former takes longer than the latter. 
The Panel of Inquiry into the Greater London Development Plan (1973, 
para.5.26) gives an example of construction measures. "Broadly speaking, 
it is quite impossible for a (town and country) planning authority to 
operate quickly enough on labour demand or supply to have any effect in 
under three years: ... it would probably take longer than that for a 
developer to get the necessary permissions and complete the building 
of a factory or office building". We think, however, that that ex-
aggerates the slowness of construction measures The examples of 
Eindhoven (which kept a stock of industrial land serviced and available 
for development) and of Groningen (where they could build a standard 
factory in 4 months) show that many types of new construction need not 
take very much longer than changing the use of existing land and 
buildings. Perhaps more important are the physical circumstances where 
the new construction takes place - on green fields outside Eindhoven or 
Groningen, or inside an already built-up London where all new construct-
ion has to be preceded by acquisition and demolition. 
THE FLEXIBILITY WITH WHICH THE EFFECTS OF APPLYING THE INSTRUMENT CAN BE 
NEGATED OR REVERSED 
The distinction just made, between physical measures which require new 
construction and physical measures which change the use of existing 
land or structures, is relevant here also. If a piece of land or a 
building has had its use changed once without the need for any 
significant building works then the use can be changed again, easily -
from sportsfield to allotment to sportsfield for example, or a street 
from two-way to one-way back to two-way Changes brought about by new 
construction, however, are much less flexible: if it is decided to allow 
the redevelopment of a low density housing area to higher densities, for 
example, the density cannot easily be reduced again. It is true that 
structures once built can be used in the most unexpected ways (chapels 
as betting shops, schools as factories, swimming baths as storage depots, 
are some known cases) but changes of oolicy which would require the 
structure to be demolished are unlikely to be practicable until the 
structure is nearing the end of its economic life. 
THE FLEXIBILITY WITH WHICH THE APPLICATION OF AN INSTRUMENT CAN BE 
ADAPTED TO A RANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES 
There is some confusion in the literature on this point, with some 
economists claiming that physical instruments are inflexible and others 
that they are flexible Netzer (1974, chap 5) belongs to the first 
group the instruments are not "continuous' he says (and in that way he 
compares them unfavourably with financial instruments) but allow only 
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"yes-no controls", they do not allow "trade-offs" between community 
interests and private interests (or only in a very "clumsy" way). On the 
other hand, Harrison (1977, p. 117) considers that physical measures are 
"potentially very flexible". 
Part of the confusion can be cleared up easily: Netzer is talking 
about the practice of "zoning" such as is used in America whereby 
permitted land uses are specified in advance and are supposed to be 
adhered to, whereas Harrison is referring to the English town planning 
system whereby each proposed change of use is considered on its merits 
and even the land use shown on the approved plan does not have to be 
adhered to. The point is not that physical instruments are of their 
nature inflexible in this sense but that there are both flexible and 
inflexible physical instruments. 
Some discussions in Dutch town planning make this clearer. In the 
Netherlands the only plan with legal force is the "bestemmingsplan" 
which specifies permitted land uses and deviations from which are not 
permitted. It has been criticised as highly inflexible, and Paludi and 
Hamnett (1978) discuss ways in which it could be made more flexible. 
Further, de Jong (1979) distinguishes between planning by setting norms 
beforehand, norms which affect as yet unknown applicants and which must 
be rigidly enforced, and planning by negotiating with applicants, a 
much more flexible procedure. The former is what happens by the use of 
the bestemmingsplan, the latter could be achieved by the use of so-called 
"artikel 11" procedures. (That is often frowned upon as creating 
"uncertainty" but uncertainty is the inevitable concomtant of flexibil-
ity.) 
That was, however, only part of the confusion. For further clarific-
ation we use the distinction between "continuous" controls (the term 
of Netzer, 1974, p.169) and what we can call "discrete" controls. Some 
economists consider physical instruments to be so discrete as to be 
capable of no more than "yes/no" applications: for examole "the pure 
approach of development control by land-use category calls all pots 
black, assumes that there is no way of making then bright silver, and 
bans them at all costs from certain places" (Parry Lewis, 1979, p.173), 
or - more prosaically - "... the traditional policy instruments of town 
planning are crude ..." (Willis, 1980, p.260). That, however, is too 
simple: as we have already seen, develooment control powers can be 
operated so flexibly as to be "continuous" in their application (by 
negotiations about the amount of development to be allowed on a site, 
about the composition of the land-use mix, about the number of parking 
spaces, etc.). Nevertheless, there is one type of physical instrument 
where the charge "lack of continuity" (or "lumpiness") is valid - in 
some cases where positive ohysical measures are used to orovide infra-
structure. A road, for example, can be provided of 2-lanes, 4-lanes,or 
6-lanes: that measure is not continuous but discrete. The importance 
such cases should not be over-emohasised, however: other types of 
positive physical instrument can be applied more or less continuously 
(e.g. providing housing, public ooen space, a harbour, an airfield). 
Economists have sometimes argued the value of continuous controls in 
another sense. If the aim of a public measure is defined in an 
"economic" way then a financial instrument can be devised the size of 
which adjusts continuously and automatically to the size of the problem. 
The example which is often given in this context is from town planning 
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the aim of which, some economists say, is to combat the economically 
inefficient effects of land-use externalities: taxes on those who cause 
the external diseconomies, equal in amount to the diseconomy and trans-
ferred to those suffering the effect, provide a complete solution! If, 
however, different aims are chosen for town planning, then this argu-
ment about the greater flexibility of financial measures over physical 
measures ceases to be valid. 
And still the issue of flexibility is not totally clear, for it is 
sometimes considered in combination with the issue of general/specific 
instruments. Harrison (1977) makes the distinction between the "frame-
work" approach whereby a framework is set within which individuals and 
firms make their decisions, and the "regulatory" approach "which 
requires intervention in each decision which has social, as well as 
private, implications" (p.117). Financial instruments follow the first 
approach, physical instruments the second, he says. So does Netzer 
(1974, chap.5): financial instruments are general, physical instruments 
highly specific. As a result, Harrison concludes, ohysical instruments 
can be applied very flexibly. 
It is useful to make two comments on that argument. The first is that 
there seems to be no reason why ohysical instruments should not be 
"framework-setting" and financial instruments "regulatory". An example 
of the former would be a broad zoning plan which was neutrally (i.e. 
"inflexibly") implemented: as a framework within which individuals and 
firms would make their decisions that would be every bit as general as 
a framework of financial incentives and disincentives. An example of the 
latter would be the powers to tax or subsidise a given activity where 
each case was considered "on its merits": and that would be regulation 
every bit as specific as the English use of development control powers. 
The second comment is that regulatory instruments can be used more 
flexibly than framework instruments. (7) 
The only conclusion that we need to draw at this stage is that the 
flexibility with which physical instruments can be adaoted to a range 
of circumstances can be high or low: ohysical instruments, with the 
exception of the powers to provide "lumpy" infrastructure, are not of 
their nature flexible or inflexible in that sense. 
THE INTER-LOCAL EFFECTS OF APPLYING A LOCAL INSTRUMENT 
We now consider what happens when physical instruments are applied 
within a specific local area. To the provision of facilities, people 
both inside and outside the area can react (e.g. who uses the industrial 
land, the better roads, the parks?), and to the forbidding of develop-
ment people who would otherwise have made a physical change inside the 
area can react by making that change (e.g. building housing, shops, 
offices) outside instead. Those are direct responses to the physical 
measure, and, it was argued in chapter 2, for a comparison of the 
inter-local effects of physical and financial measures we could restrict 
ourselves to direct responses. 
The locational aspect of the direct response to a change in the 
physical environment in a particular area will always depend on a 
comparison: after the physical environment in location A has been 
changed, how does it compare with the physical environment elsewhere? 
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If the difference is great, and if people are mobile in response to such 
differences, then the inter-local effects will be significant. Attention 
will now be oaid to those two points. 
By local physical measures, can significant differences be created 
between one area and another'' Positive physical measures (providing 
roads, houses, etc.) can make the facilities in one area more attractive 
than in another, but to the size of the difference that can be created 
there is a natural limit set,very simply, by the boundaries of the area 
within which the positive measure is applied and by the competing 
land-use claims within that area By negative physical measures on the 
other hand certain tyoes of physical development can be forbidden 
within an area (e g. new factory building in the Randstad) thus creating 
a large and significant difference with other areas where that type of 
physical change is permitted, a difference which is not subject to a 
natural limitation 
The following question is, how mobile are people in response to such 
differences in the physical environment7 Positive measures we divide 
according to whether the facility provided is a public (consumer or 
producer) good or a private (consumer or producer) good. With a public 
good (e.g a park, a new road) a "spillover" does not imply a "leakage". 
if something provided inside location A is used not only by the residents 
of A but also by those from outside, then that does not reduce the 
benefit to those living in A With a private good (e g new housing, 
industrial land), the improvement has to be allocated· but that can 
be done specifically so as to control the locational effects (new 
housing within A allocated only to residents of A). (8) 
How mobile is the response to differences in the ohysical environment 
created by negative ohysical measures7 The important point here is 
that if, in a certain location, certain physical changes are forbidden, 
there is often a much simpler response than to move to another location 
where the change is permitted· use the existing physical environment 
more intensively (e.g less living space oer person if further house-
building is forbidden) 
That is, with positive physical measures the differences that can be 
created between areas are subject to natural limitations, the mobility 
with respect to those differences is beneficial when the facility 
provided is a public good, and when the facility provided is a orivate 
good the mobility can often be controlled by allocation rules With 
negative physical reasures, greater differences can be created between 
areas, but the mobility with respect to such differences is likely to 
be low. In conclusion, the inter-local effects (both spillover and 
leakage) of local physical measures are either naturally restricted or 
can be controlled by allocation 
THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT 
In chapter 2 we said that before an agency will even consider tackling 
a problem with a physical measure, it must have a "technology image" 
which links that problem and that sort of measure. In most cases, that 
image will support the use of physical measures: activities take plai,e 
in space so social problems always have a physical aspect 
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It was sand also that if it was important to the agency that the 
effects of taking a physical measure be predictable, then the knowledge 
of the relationship between the problem and the measure must be firm. 
Part of the relevant knowledge is that which was called, at the 
beginning of this chapter, "the causal relationships between problematic 
personal circumstances and the physical environment". We commented on 
the absence of a general theory of physical planning, but said also that 
some of the causal relationships were so direct as not to require 
complex theoretical explanations. That was so in general when the 
physical environment was used as a consumer good: when, however, the 
physical environment was used as a producer good or as a setting for 
personal relationships then the theories linking ends (personal 
problems) with (ohysical) means had not been well developed and might 
not be good enough to support action. A further aspect of the relevant 
knowledge is that relating to the inter-local effects of ohysical 
measures. (9) Referring to the previous section we can say that the 
inter-local effects of positive measures are probably easier to predict 
than of negative measures: particularly difficult with the latter is 
the prediction whether a prohibition on physical development in an area 
will cause people to move outside that area (and if so, where to?) or 
to use land and buildings inside the area more intensively. (For a fuller 
discussion of this ooint see Needham, 1982). 
THE CAPABILITY OF THE AGENCY 
What sort of sub-national agency would we expect to find in possession 
of the legal powers necessary for taking local physical measures? One 
with boundaries big enough to encompass the spatial range of the 
measures , it was suggested in chapter 2. The previous discussion of the 
inter-local effects of the direct response to physical measures can be 
used to give an indication of the spatial range of such measures, and 
we make two deductions from it. The first is that the limits of the 
spatial range are set by migrations in response to ohysical measures and 
they can be countrywide: nevertheless, such migration is a response to 
differences in the physical environment and the ability of positive 
physical measures to create such differences is limited. The second is 
that, although negative physical measures are not thus limited, 
nevertheless the further the migration considered in response to such 
measures, the greater the attraction of not migrating and of staying 
put and using the existing space more intensively. The conclusion is 
that the spatial range of physical measures is limited. It can be no 
accident that in both England and the Netherlands local governments have 
been allowed to use wide powers to apply physical instruments. 
OTHER MEASURES ALREADY BEING TAKEN 
This aspect of the organisational context will vary from agency to 
agency and its particular effect on the choice of an instrument will 
likewise vary, but one general point can be made. Almost all activities 
find their expression in the physical environment, and as a result most 
public policies have an effect on land and buildings. That means that 
physical measures are either an integral or a complementary part of 
most policies: other (non-physical) measures already being taken will 
usually require physical measures, even if they are only of the passive 
kind to allow the associated physical development to take place. 
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THE REIGNING POLITICAL ATTITUDES 
Are there any political attitudes which are (in)appropriate to or 
(in)consistent with the use of physical measures7 We said above that 
some people criticised physical instruments because of their regulatory 
character and because the personal or direct intervention which this 
implied was politically objectionable. We argued, however, that their 
criticism was mistaken because physical measures could be used for 
framework-setting just as well as for regulating individual cases. (10) 
That argument is confirmed by the evidence from some of the case 
studies. There was, indeed, a reluctance to intervene too closely or 
directly in private affairs, a preference for institutional/indirect 
intervention (i.e. the political consideration was important): but that 
was the reason for oreferring physical measures (making land and 
buildings available, a neutral activity carried out from a distance) 
to financial (in this case, making loans and grants to firms). That had 
been an important consideration for the West Midlands County Council 
and, less explicitly, for den Haag ("it is not our job to stand in the 
entrepreneur's shoes"). We can conclude that the political preference 
for framework over regulatory instruments (or vice versa) does not 
necessarily lead to an acceptance (or a rejection) of physical in-
struments . 
One of the clear outcomes of the case studies was that in the 
Netherlands the political wish to avoid "distorting competition" leads 
to a rejection of local financial measures. Why do financial measures 
distort competition while physical measures - apparently - do not7 We 
suggest the following explanation. "Distorting competition" is a matter 
of creating significant differences (in this case, between firms). By 
offering physical facilities at market prices (e.g. providing industrial 
land and buildings) no significant advantage is being offered to the 
users: by prohibitting change (e.g. no more industrial buildings) 
significant advantages could be offered to those already accommodated 
over those denied the chance, were it not for the possibility of mini-
mising the effects by using existing accommodation more intensively or 
by migrating. (11) Anticipating the following chapter, we can say now 
that the ability of local financial measures to create differences is 
greater. It follows that financial measures can "distort competition" 
more than physical measures can. 
Support for that interpretation is provided by a central government 
policy statement (Nota Regionaal Sociaal-Economisch Beleid 1981-1985, 
p.152). "Whenever a gemeente provides financial assistance to firms out 
of its own funds then the question of competition is raised. Competitive 
relationships can be influenced, both between firms in the industrial 
branch to which the subsidised firm belongsand between gemeenten and 
provinces. We consider it very undesirable that competitive relation-
ships in those senses should be disturbed". 
When local measures are taken in a framework-setting way then the 
differences created are between all the instances of a particular type 
in one area and all the instances of a particular type in another area. 
(If physical measures cannot create such big differences as financial 
measures, it follows that the inter-local effects of the former are 
less than of the latter - see later.). When local measures are taken in 
a regulatory way, then the differences created are between some instances 
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of a particular type in the area of application and all other instances 
of that type (whether in that area or elsewhere) If the political 
wish is not to create significant differences between areas (12) then 
the use of local physical measures (whether framework-setting or 
regulatory) is consistent with that wish and the use of local financial 
measures (framework-setting or regulatory) inconsistent. If the 
political wish is not to create significant differences between people 
or firms in the same area, then local framework-setting measures 
(physical or financial) are consistent with that, local physical 
regulatory measures less consistent, and local financial regulatory 
measures inconsistent. 
The informal attitudes of politicians might also be imoortant in the 
choice of an instrument, and the case studies provided several examples 
of local governments with a cautious approach preferring physical to 
financial measures. There are probably two reasons - that ohysical 
measures cannot create big differences between firms, individuals, or 
areas, which fact attracts agencies with an inclination to be careful,and 
that both in England and the Netherlands local governments are more 
familiar with physical than with financial instruments 
NOTES 
(1) We have tried to keep the investigation of physical instruments 
(this chapter) separate from that of financial instruments (chapter 
8). Occasionally, however, it proves much easier to describe the 
nature of physical instruments by making an explicit comparison 
with financial instruments. For that reason, discussion about the 
latter sometimes finds it way into this chapter 
(2) An exception must be made for some Marxist theories of physical 
planning. Their definition of this activity is similar to ours -
it is intervention by the State in the production of the physical 
environment - and they see the aims of physical planning quite 
clearly, it is to further the interests of dominant capital (see 
e g Leyten and Fahrenkrog, 1982, chap 1,1) For a number of 
reasons largely irrelevant to this present study we find Marxist 
theories unsatisfactory and so do not use them here. 
(3) For the same reason, we cannot work with the definition of town/ 
spatial planning (de ruimtelijke ordening) which is currently much 
used in the Netherlands: "a policy which is directed towards bring-
ing about the best conceivable reciprocal adaptation between space 
and society for the benefit of society" (quoted in Brussaard, 1974) 
(4) This is wider than the English concept of negative planning, where 
the oower consists of saying No' to private initiatives 'Toela-
tingsplanalogie" includes much of the English positive planning 
also, it includes the example given by the Gemeente Groningen 
(undated) where the local government can provide and service 
industrial land, but "if firms do not see any profit" in taking 
that land it remains "a playground for the birds" 
(5) Both when the physical environment is used as a producer good and 
when it is the setting for personal relationships it is a 
facilitator The limitations which that imposes has caused some 
writers to claim that the aim of physical planning should be to 
remove obstacles to personal freedom (e.g. Donni son, 1972, Milton 
Keynes Development Corporation, 1970, Cherry, 1970, chap 2) a 
claim at once both ambitious and modest. 
Ill 
(6) With a public good, the consumption by one person does not signifi­
cantly diminish the amount that is available for consumption by 
others We could raise the issue here of "impure public goods' 
where the consumption by one person does not reduce the consumption 
by others but where access is not equal for everybody because some 
live further away than others (see Harvey, 1973, ρ 59) We assume 
here, however, that measures are applied in such a way that the 
effects are felt in the location of those with the problems, and 
we treat inter-local effects later 
(7) Examples of some financial measures used in a regulatory way 
illustrate this In both England and the Netherlands, industrial 
location policy has been pursued with, on the whole, financial 
instruments used in a framework-setting way In both countries, 
however, it has been found that that can be expensive and in­
efficient it has proved very difficult to set general rules which 
specify precisely enough the types of case which, if they could be 
influenced, would be most effective in bringing about the aims of 
the policy That is, the instruments have not always been flexible 
enough So new financial instruments have been created of a 
regulatory type in England sections 7 & 8 of the Industry Act 
1972 (see the criticism of the arbitrariness implicit in this 
made by Minns and Thornley, 1976) and in the Netherlands the use 
of the support to individual firms (steun aan individuele bedrij­
ven) and the marginal policy (margebeleid) - see "Nota Regionaal 
Sociaal-Economisch Beleid, 1977-80" and "Ditto 1981-1985" 
(8) Of course, the allocation can be handled so as to exploit the 
possibility of locational effects, as when housing is built in a 
new town and allocated to people moving out from a city some 
distance away 
(9) We restrict ourselves to theories of the locations of the direct 
responses to the measure, as we did in the section on inter-local 
effects 
(10) There is a connection between the issue of political attitudes and 
the issue of flexibility Framework-setting results in inflexible 
instruments, we concluded earlier A political preference for 
framework-setting over regulation (and that was the preference 
of Popper, 1960 - see chapter 2 - although he used different terms 
- institutional/indirect intervention rather than personal/direct 
intervention) implies therefore the use of inflexible instruments 
(11) Nevertheless, such measures can distribute advantages as a result 
of the price changes that can follow for example, owners of 
property or of long leases are benefitted over renters This point 
is made by - e g - Harrison, 1977, chao 7 It was not considered 
by the local governments we studied 
(12) It will be remembered that this was not the wish of the English 
local authorities which wanted to give as much advantage as possible 
to their own areas 
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8 Local financial instruments 
The purpose and structure of this chapter run parallel with those of 
the previous one: we try to deduce the inherent technical possibilities 
of and the context aopropriate to local financial instruments, within 
the framework of the ten "considerations" which ought to influence the 
choice of a type of instrument First, however, we restate the 
definition of financial instruments as being those by which measures 
can be taken which act directly upon the financial circumstances within 
which people make decisions. In order to clarify the nature of those 
instruments, we explain their relationshio to economic policy 
Henmpman (1977, pp.53-4) says: "the essential characteristic of 
economic policy is to be found not in the striving for a specific 
highest (economic) aim or for certain concrete intermediate aims: 
rather, it lies in the advancement by public authorities of all possible 
welfare objectives by having at their disposal economic goods and by 
exercising influence over the apolication of other economic goods. From 
this standpoint it follows that, just as with the behaviour of private 
economic subjects a category of economic actions cannot be circumscribed, 
so is economic policy no separate sector within the whole of public 
policy: rather is it .. 'the economic aspect of policy'. All policy 
measures have, besides non-economic, also an economic aspect This 
latter concerns the scarcity relationships between the whole of the 
means and the ends: it arises in connection with education no less than 
with national defence " 
That is consistent with our approach of expressing in personal terms 
the ends for which a measure is applied,for, although the ends of the 
economic policy may be expressed in terms of a 'policy maker's welfare 
function" (Henmpman, 1977, ρ 70), nevertheless that function is derived 
from individual welfare functions: ". . the aims of economic policy are 
ultimately connected with the aims of individual economic activity" 
(Tinbergen, 1967, о.18) With such an approach to economic policy we can, 
then, lay the connection between the ends of individuals and the means 
applied by the policy makers in order to realise these ends" (van den 
Doel and Heertje in the introduction - ρ 10 - to Henmoman, 1977) 
That approach to economic policy is very broad, "There are no economic 
ends" (Lionel Robbins, quoted approvingly by Henmpman), all means are 
economic insofar as they require for their execution the expenditure of 
scarce resources, and "the general material characteristic of economic 
appropriateness (of economic policy) is that the decisions are taken 
on the grounds of a correct insight into the economic phenomena and 
their mutual connectedness" (Henmpman, 1977, p.65). So the category 
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"economie instruments" includes our category of "financial instruments" 
but far more besides. In particular, the apolication of physical 
instruments also falls within Henmpman's definition of economic policy: 
it is no accident that we analysed the way that physical instruments 
work in a manner which emphasised their economic aspect. 
THE TYPES OF PROBLEM SITUATION THAT CAN BE CHANGED 
We need a general theoretical framework within which to analyse the 
working of financial instruments on problematic personal circumstances, 
and for this we adapt slightly the framework used by Musgrave and 
Musgrave (1976, pp.6-7) for analysing the fiscal functions of govern-
ment. (1) According to this, the policy objectives which can be achieved 
by revenue and expenditure measures of the public budget can be divided 
into three: 
- "The provision for social goods, or the process by which total 
resource use is divided between private and social goods and by which 
the mix of social goods is chosen. This provision may be termed 
the allocation function of budgetary policy. (2) 
- "Adjustment of the distribution of income and wealth to assure con-
formance with what society considers a "fair" or "just" state of 
distribution, here referred to as the distribution function. 
- "The use of budget policy as a means of maintaining high employment, 
a reasonable degree of price level stability, and an appropriate rate 
of economic growth. There is also the objective of stability in the 
balance of payments. We refer to all these objectives as the 
stabilization function". 
Musgrave and Musgrave are concerned with a particular type of measure 
("revenue and expenditure measures of the public budget", p.4) which is 
similar to but not the same as that with which we are concerned ("those 
which alter the financial circumstances . . . " ) . We modify their analysis 
into the following four ways by which financial measures can be used 
to change problematic personal circumstances. 
Allocation I - altering the types of consumer good produced. 
Personal problems may be caused by consumer goods being of the wrong 
type, or inadequate in supply, or too expensive. Financial measures, 
by altering the financial circumstances within which private persons 
or firms make consumption or production decisions about consumer goods, 
can alter their nature, quality, quantity, and price. Examples of such 
measures are general housing subsidies, and urban renewal subsidies. 
Allocation II - altering production methods. 
The concern here is not with the end-product of the production process 
(consumer goods and their connection with personal problems) but with 
its by-products - working conditions, environmental effects, the 
location of production,etc.: these by-products also can cause personal 
problems. Financial measures, by altering the financial circumstances 
within which firms choose their production methods, can be used to 
tackle such problems. Examples are taxes on pollution, subsidies on 
certain types of capital investment, levies or subsidies on locating 
in particular places. 
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Altering the distribution of income and/or wealth. 
Personal problems might be caused by the way in which income, wealth, 
or the access to consumer goods are distributed between the members 
of the society. Financial measures, by altering the circumstances 
of some consumers only, or the circumstances within which producers 
make decisions about the production of certain goods and services 
especially important for those consumers, can alter the distribution 
of income, consumption possibilities, or wealth. Examples are income 
transfers and subsidies to the production of certain goods (such as 
social housing). 
Altering the scale of the general decisions made by consumers and 
producers. 
Personal problems might be caused by such things as unemployment, low 
or unstable wages, fluctuating price levels, aíl of which might be the 
result of the general level or stability of the economy. Measures which 
alter the general financial circumstances within which individuals 
make consumption decisions or decisions about the division of their 
time between work and leisure, or which alter the financial circumstances 
within which firms decide the scale of their production, can thus affect 
those personal problems. Examples are general demand reflation, general 
price or wage controls, exchange rate manipulations, monetary policy. 
THE POSSIBILITY OF DIRECTING THE HELP TOWARDS SPECIFIED PERSONS 
Can it be ensured that the changes brought about by the financial 
measures are enjoyed by those who were suffering the oroblem? Where 
the problem lies in the types of consumer good being produced and those 
are pubi ic goods, then no allocation difficulties arise: the changes 
are equally accessible to everyone. Where the consumer goods are private 
then supplementary measures might have to be taken to ensure that the 
problem group enjoys the benefits. An example is the subsidies given 
to lower the rents of "social housing": that housing is usually then 
allocated to poorer people. 
Where the problem lies in the production methods the same consider-
ations apply: improvements which are public goods (such as a cleaner 
environment) do not need to be allocated, those which are private 
goods (such as more workplaces in a particular location) might have 
to be allocated by separate measures. 
Where the problem lies in the distribution of income or wealth and 
the financial measure applied is a direct redistribution, the allocation 
is incorporated in the measure. Sometimes, however, another approach 
is tried whereby the financial measure is applied in order to stimulate 
the production or lower the price of certain goods and services 
especially important to poorer people: or, even more indirectly, the 
measure is taken in order to affect goods and services used by richer 
people in the expectation that benefits will "filter down" to poorer 
people. An example of the first type is subsidies on the prices of 
basic foodstuffs which absorb a large part of a poor person's income 
(e.g. bread and milk), an example of the second type is subsidies 
to people who move into expensive housing in the hope that the movers 
will vacate cheaper housing and leave it available for poorer people(that 
is done in the Netherlands as part of the "doorstroming" pol icy). Indirect 
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redistribution of the first type does benefit poorer people but the 
extent of the redistribution might be small, whereas the benefits from 
the second might never filter down (or, at the best, only "trickle down") 
to poorer people unless strong and supplementary allocative measures 
are appi led 
Where the problem lies in the scale of the general decisions made by 
consumers and producers, the effects brought about by financial measures 
can have the nature of public goods (e g. more stability in prices or 
in employment) or of private goods (e.g. more workplaces) In the latter 
case, the improvements might have to be allocated separately unless a 
"filtermg-down" process does that automatically. Suppose, for example, 
it is desired to reduce the unemployment of those with the lowest 
chances in the labour market, some theories stress the stimulus that a 
reflation of the general demand for labour will give to the demand for 
unskilled labour, other theories stress the segmentation of the labour 
market and the need to stimulate specifically the demand for that type 
of labour which is suffering the worst unemployment (see further 
appendix III) 
SPEED 
The speed with which a financial measure can bring about the desired 
effect depends on the type of measure and on the circumstances in which 
it is applied If the measure can act without requiring changes in 
capital goods - if, for example, it can call forth a change in employ-
ment or production without necessitating new investment, if it can 
change consumption by changing relative prices, if it can change 
disposable incomes by changing taxes - then the measures can act quickly. 
If a change in capital goods is required, but no more than acquiring 
equipment, machine tools, buildings, vehicles etc. out of stock and 
bringing them into use, then the extra delay need be no more than a 
few months On the other hand, financial measures which cause large-scale 
investment or new construction can take many years to bring about the 
desired effects (e.g. financial incentives to increase house building). 
THE FLEXIBILITY WITH WHICH THE EFFECTS OF APPLYING THE INSTRUMENT CAN 
BE NEGATED OR REVERSED 
The distinctions just made can be applied here also If financial 
measures which act without requiring changes in capital goods are 
reversed, then their effects also are reversed quickly, examoles would 
be changing the relative prices of goods and services, direct re-
distribution of income, road pricing to tackle traffic congestion. 
If financial measures are taken which require changes in capital goods 
acquired out of stock and if those measures are then reversed, revers-
ing the effects will take longer if the caoital goods are sold, then 
a few months; but if the response is disinvestment by not trying to 
cover capital charges then it could be several years before the effects 
are reversed. And if the financial measures require large-scale invest-
ment or new construction, then the time taken to reverse the effects 
could be as long as the economic life of the capital goods 
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THE FLEXIBILITY WITH WHICH THE APPLICATION OF AN INSTRUMENT CAN BE 
ADAPTED TO A RANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES 
The flexibility of financial instruments in this sense was perforce 
discussed at length in the previous chapter in order to investigate the 
charges of inflexibility levied against physical instruments Here 
there is no need to do more than summarise the conclusions Financial 
instruments can be applied 'continuously' and are in that way flexible 
moreover if the aim of the measure is defined in such a way as to lend 
itself to economic analysis, then the instrument can be so designed that 
the size of the measure adjusts automatically and flexibly to the size 
of the problem If financial instruments are used for 'framework-setting', 
however, they will lose some of their flexibility, unless the framework 
set is one designed to achieve a general economic equilibrium in which 
case flexibility is realised by the automatic adjustment of the size 
of the measure to the size of the problem (3) 
THE INTER-LOCAL EFFECTS OF APPLYING A LOCAL INSTRUMENT 
Some examples of the inter-local effects of the direct response to local 
financial measures (applied in location A) will make this issue clearer 
- allocation I Subsidies are given towards the cost of buying or 
renting housing in A and they can be enjoyed by people moving into A 
from outside, public transport in A is subsidised and the benefits 
are enjoyed by all visitors to A, an extra sales tax is levied on 
certain goods brought from shops in A and people buy from shops outside 
A instead 
- allocation II The price of industrial land in A is subsidised and 
firms move into A for that reason, dangerous or unhealthy working 
conditions in firms in A are taxed and firms move out of A in order 
to excape the tax, a contribution is paid to firms in A towards the 
cost of employing certain types of labour and more people of that 
tyoe, but living outside A, are employed 
- redistribution Extra welfare payments are made to poorer people 
living in A and people with a qualifying income are attracted to live 
in A, an extra tax is charged on richer people in A who then move 
across the boundary in order to escape the tax 
- stabilisation All goods and services produced in A are subject to 
price controls as a result of which firms move out of A and the demand 
from outside for goods and services produced in A increases, all 
goods and services sold in A are subject to once controls as a result 
of which shops move out of A and people switch their buying to shoos 
in A, public expenditure on facilities within A is increased and sone 
of the increase goes to buying supplies made outside A and to employing 
people commuting into A, public expenditure on facilities within A 
is decreased so suppliers of goods, services and labour try to find 
buyers outside A, the interest charged on loans by banks in A is 
raised so people borrow from banks outside A instead 
The inter-local effects of the direct response to a measure depend 
on a comparison (see the previous chapter), in this case of the 
financial circumstances in A after the measure with the financial 
circumstances elsewhere Then the important questions are how great 
a difference between areas can be created by financial measures" and, 
how mobile is the response to such differences7 
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The restrictions that we described to the size of the inter-local 
differences that could be created by local physical measures does not 
operate on local financial measures (It is true that stimulating 
measures taken by a local government are subject to the restrictions 
on its income, but stimulation taken locally by national government 
will not be thus appreciably restricted ) Inhibiting financial measures 
(just as negative physical measures) are subject to no automatic 
restrictions The conclusion is that significant differences can be 
created between the financial circumstances in different areas 
How mobile are people in response to such differences7 If subsidies 
are given towards the provision of a consumer good or service in A 
(allocation I) in order to benefit the residents of A, then additional 
rules can be sometimes devised in order to prevent the leakage that 
would occur by people moving into A in order to enjoy the subsidy 
That is commonly done with housing, but it would be almost impossible 
with public transport or (e g ) subsidised concerts If, on the other 
hand, a tax or some other inhibiting measure is levied on consumer goods 
or services in A practically nothing can be done to stop oeople 
acquiring those things elsewhere, either by extending their shopping 
trips (the higher the tax the further peoole will travel) or by mail­
order buying (4) 
Similar conclusions apply to allocation II measures Measures to 
stimulate in A can sometimes be restricted by additional rules to 
certain groups in order to prevent a leakage (e g the rule that new 
jobs created by a subsidy to firms in A must be given to residents of 
A) On the other hand, the spillover effects of inhibiting measures 
cannot be restricted by allocation rules if firms want to escape the 
inhibition by moving, they will do so Of course, local financial 
measures of the allocation II variety are sometimes taken specifically 
for their spillover effects local governments, for example, subsidise 
industrial land in order to attract firms from outside and the levy 
on industrial investment in certain parts of the Netherlands (Selectie­
ve Investeringsregeling) is designed to make investors consider moving 
to other regions 
The inter-local effects of local financial measures taken for 
redistribution also depend on the nature of the measures Stimulation 
(e g welfare payments) has to be carefully allocated if it is desired 
not to attract immigrants but the wish to emigrate in order to avoid 
inhibition (e g taxes) cannot so easily be thwarted Experience has 
shown, however, that even the first is not easy local governments in 
the United States may set the level of some welfare payments, and 
although "eligibility rules" are usually employed by the more generous 
local governments in order to try to reduce immigration, nevertheless 
quite high levels of migration result (for a review of the evidence 
see Cebula, 1979) It is the nature of the migration, not only the 
extent, which is important 'since the rich will leave and the poor will 
move to the more egalitarian-minded (local) jurisdictions" (Musgrave 
and Musgrave, 1976, ρ 623) 
The inter-local effects of local financial measures taken for 
stabilisation purposes are likely to be so great that they are not 
worth taking, say Musgrave and Musqrave (1976) ' Spending and 
taxing measures by lower levels of government would be largely 
nullified by trade leakages' (p 624), local debt is largely held by 
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creditors outside the jurisdiction (and) decentralised monetary 
policy would be seriously blunted in its effectiveness by the openness 
of the regional economy' (p 625) That the inter-local effects of local 
stabilisation measures are likely to be greater than of local measures 
for allocation or redistribution can be seen from the following the 
inter-local effects of the latter two types of measure are largely 
caused by the movement of people or firms, whereas stabilisation 
measures can cause goods and money also to move Not only are those 
more mobile than people or firms but also it is not easy to devise 
effective rules to prevent incoming goods or money from taking the 
benefits meant for local advantage (5) 
In summary, the inter-local differences which can be caused by local 
financial measures are not subject to natural limitations and the 
response to those differences can be by movements of peoole, firms, 
goods, or money Where the movement is of people or firms and it is in 
the direction of a financial stimulus, the size of that movement can 
sometimes be controlled by allocation rules That is not the case for 
movements of people or firms away from an inhibition, nor for any 
movements of goods or money 
Some of the differences in the scale and nature of the inter-local 
effects of physical compared with financial measures can be summarised 
by pointing out that both local physical and local financial measures 
can cause people and firms to relocate but only local financial 
measures (we are restricting ourselves to direct resoonses) can cause 
the movement of goods and money Moreover, the soillover effect of a 
local measure does not imply a leakage if that measure provides a 
public good, but as local financial measures, in contrast with local 
physical measures, rarely have the properties of a public good, a 
spillover in response to financial measures usually implies a leakage 
also 
THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT 
If a public agency is to consider using a local financial measure to 
tackle a particular problem it must first have a technology image" 
which links the problem and the measure Considering that financial 
measures are very commonly used at the national level, there is likely 
to be a widespread awareness of the technical possibilities that could 
be achieved by using them at the local level also 
Suppose further that the agency wants to be able to predict with some 
certainty the effects of applying local financial instruments is the 
knowledge linking problem and measure sufficiently firm to enable that7 
Part of the relevant knowledge is of the causal relationships between 
financial measures and problematic oersonal circumstances, and as was 
pointed out at the beginning of this chaoter these can be studied using 
theories of public finance by reference to a standard textbook such 
as Musgrave and Musgrave (1976) we can see that such theories are well 
developed A further aspect of the relevant knowledge is that relating 
to the inter-local effects (and again we restrict ourselves to the 
direct responses) of financial measures Where those inter-local 
effects are caused by the movements of people or firms they can be 
investigated by using theories of migration, mobility and industrial 
location as propounded in textbooks on economic geography (see, for 
119 
example, Lloyd and Dicken, 1977, for a general survey of the field: 
for the movement of firms in response to differences in local taxes see 
Fox, 1981). Where the inter-local effects are caused by movements of 
goods and money the very great openness of the urban economy makes 
predictions difficult. (6) The implication is clear: when local 
financial measures are taken for allocation I, allocation II and re­
distribution, the inter-local effects can be better predicted than when 
they are taken for stabilisation. 
THE CAPABILITY OF THE AGENCY 
We would not expect to find a sub-national agency in possession of a 
local instrument if the boundaries of the agency were not big enough 
to encompass the spatial range of that instrument. What is, then, the 
spatial range of local financial measures? From the earlier discussen 
about the inter-local effects of such measures, the only firm 
conclusions to be drawn about the extent of their spatial range is 
that it is likely to be smaller when the spillovers are caused by 
the movement of people and firms (i.e. measures for allocation or 
redistribution) than when they are caused by the movement of goods and 
money (i.e. measures for stabilisation). The implication is that 
allocation and redistribution could be handled by a more local level 
of government than would be allowed to take stabilisation measures 
Many economists, however, take a different view, local governments 
should be restricted to resource allocation and should have nothing to 
do with distributional or stabilisation functions, say Musgrave and 
Musgrave (1976, chap.29), Netzer (1974, chap 8 ) , Richardson (1969, 
chap.8), Henderson and Ledebur (1972, ρ 40), Hirsch (1973, chap.10), 
and Mills (1972, chap.12). The reasons for that widely held view are 
that there are advantages in decisions about the allocation of 
resources between consumer goods and services being taken locally 
because there is likely to be more concensus about consumer tastes at 
the local than at the national level: those decisions can be implemented 
by either physical or financial measures: and in neither case are the 
spillover effects likely to be so significant that the decisions should 
be taken at a higher level With measures for stabilisation or re­
distribution, however, the spillover effects are likely to be so great 
and over such a wide range that those measures should be taken at a 
higher level of government. Those authors, taking account of inter-local 
effects, group redistribution and stabilisation, whereas we, for the 
same reason, have grouped allocation and redistribution The reason 
for that difference probably lies in the fact that the authors argue 
from the American experience of the migration effects of local welfare 
payments. We argued a priori that those effects could be reduced by 
eligibility rules, but if the practical experience is that the migration 
effects are still too great, then that experience must be accepted, 
the conclusion also that the spatial range of financial redistribution 
measures is too great for them to be taken locally. 
Those authors have not divided the allocation function in two as 
we have done - measures to alter the types of consumer good produced 
and measures to alter production measures Our analysis suggests that 
the inter-local effects of allocation II measures would be similar to 
those of allocation I measures,so the deduction would be that financial 
measures for allocation II also should be decided and implemented 
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locally. The case studies show clearly that the central governments 
in both England and the Netherlands do not agree: both find the spatial 
range of financial measures taken by local governments in order to 
influence production methods too great. The reasoning is, perhaps, that 
with allocation II measures (unlike with allocation I) there are no 
reasons for oreferring local decision-making which could offset the 
disadvantages of inter-local effects over a wide range. 
The general conclusion is that the spatial ranges of financial 
measures taken for allocation I and allocation II purposes are the same 
and wider than the boundaries of most local governments (but there 
are special reasons why allocation I measures could well be taken by 
local governments) and that the spatial ranges of financial measures 
taken for redistribution and stabilisation are far wider than local 
government boundaries. 
The most significant difference between the spatial range of local 
physical and local financial measures is that the (direct) response 
to local physical measures includes movements of people and firms 
while the (direct) response to local financial measures can include 
also the much easier movements of goods and money: that would be 
expected to give local financial measures a wider spatial range than 
local physical measures. It is presumably not accidental that in both 
England and the Netherlands local governments are allowed to use much 
wider physical instruments than financial instruments. 
OTHER MEASURES ALREADY BEING TAKEN 
Although this aspect of the organisational context varies from agency 
to agency and from decision to decision, nevertheless two general 
points can be made which arise from the nature of financial instruments, 
viz: that they work by stimulating or by inhibiting, by persuasion or 
dissuasion. The first point is that such instruments can often be 
applied to supplement or strengthen the effects of other measures being 
taken: for example, if positive physical measures provide accommodation 
then a subsidy will help to persuade activities to use it, if negative 
physical measures forbid certain building activities then taxes will 
decrease the demand to carry out those activities Second, if the 
financial persuasion or dissuasion is not applied then very often the 
desired effects will still be achieved, albeit more slowly or to a 
lesser extent, financial measures are not a necessary condition for 
pursuing a particular goal (and in this they contrast with physical 
measures without which the physical changes associated with pursuing 
a policy goal often cannot take place). 
THE REIGNING POLITICAL ATTITUDES 
Much of what can be said here is a summary of what was said when 
discussing physical measures. First, financial measures can be 
regulatory just as much as they can be framework-setting: a political 
preference for the one or the other does not imply a preference for 
or aversion to financial instruments. Second, the use of local 
financial instruments can be inconsistent with the wish not to create 
big differences between areas, and the use of local financial instrumerts 
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of a regulatory type with the wish not to create big differences 
between people or firms within one area. Third, because there is little 
experience with local financial instruments in England and the Nether-
lands they will not be used by local governments which do not like 
taking risks. 
There is a further point. Financial measures work by persuading 
people to act differently (people make decisions in response to the 
financial circumstances, those circumstances are changed, so people 
decide differently): positive physical measures work by providing the 
physical conditions necessary for things to happen or by removing 
perceived inadequacies in the physical environment: negative physical 
measures work by prohibiting certain physical changes. One could expect 
that different attitudes would judge differently those different ways 
in which the types of measure act on people, in particular that the 
more laisser-faire politicians would prefer financial measures to 
negative physical measures. Yet that connection is found neither in 
the case studies, nor in the common discourse of newspapers etc., nor 
in the academic literature. (7) We are not saying that the taking of 
physical measures is without its political critics from the right. 
Such criticisms, however, usually focus on the loss of oroperty rights 
(or on possible compensation for that loss) and that occurs with both 
positive and negative physical measures. The fact that negative physical 
measures try to forbid the activities that would have taken place within 
the proposed physical development and that such interference is an 
infringement of individual freedom receives, on the contrary, no 
attention. 
The reason, probably, is that the amount of prohibition actually 
achieved by negative physical measures is small. Obviously, many desired 
physical changes are effectively prevented, and where the aim of such 
measures is to achieve a certain form of the physical environment for 
itself (e.g. more beautiful surroundings) or to avoid certain external 
effects (e.g. housing subjected to factory noise) then the aim can be 
effectively realised. (It will be seen that those are cases when the 
physical environment as a consumer good is unsatisfactory.) But the 
activities that would have taken place in the proposed development are 
not hindered greatly: they probably still take place, either in existing 
accommodation used more intensively or, after migrating, elsewhere. 
That is a repetition of the earlier conclusion about the limitations 
to the problem situations that can be effectively tackled by physical 
measures. (8) And it explains why the negativeness of negative physical 
measures receives so little attention: it is regarded as a minor 
irritant which is worth suffering for the immediately visible or 
tangible benefits to the physical environment which it can bring. More 
to the point here, it provides no political grounds for preferring the 
soft persuasion of financial measures. 
NOTES 
(1) One of the main reasons for using this framework is that it is 
helpful for considering how local financial measures work - see 
later. It is used by Netzer (1974, chap.8) in that context, which 
suggested it to us. 
(2) The quotation continues, "Regulatory policies, which may also be 
considered a part of the allocation function, are not included here 
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because they are not primarily a problem of budget policy". We, 
however, concerned with a slightly different type of measure shall 
not exclude regulatory policies - see below. (Note that "regulatory" 
in this sense means regulating the actions of others: it does not 
have the meaning with which it was used in the previous chapter). 
(3) In order to develop this point further we would have to introduce 
just those parts of the theory of welfare economics which we des-
cribed in chapter 1 as being too abstract for practical use. 
(4) That phenomenon has been researched in the United States where local 
sales taxes are an important source of local income and where 
adjacent local governments may levy the taxes at different rates 
- see, e.g., Netzer, 1974, chapter 8. 
(5) The effects of and limitations on a decentralised monetary policy 
are discussed for Britain by Ingram (1959) and Hughes (1974), for 
France by Prud'homme (1975), and for the Netherlands by Goedhart 
(1966). 
(6) The openness of the urban economy was examined further in Needham, 
1977a, chapter 12. There a method of analysis was proposed but the 
conclusion remains that in most cases predictions contain much 
uncertainty. 
(7) It is not that the distinction is not made in the literature. 
Friedman (1967) for example distinguishes between inducement and 
coercion and Oulès (1966) between indicative planning and imperati ve 
planning. The point is that that distinction is not appi led to 
physical and financial instruments. 
(8) There is more than one way of coming to that conclusion. A way 
different from that used in chapter 7 of this work can be found in 
Needham, 1982. 
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9 Results and practical implications 
RESULTS 
This work has been based upon the idea that there is a significant 
difference between physical and financial instruments, a difference 
which can be studied theoretically and which is imoortant practically. 
Ideas about the precise nature of this difference and about its detailed 
implications for practice have altered during the course of the research 
but not in such a way as to discredit or even to weaken the basic idea: 
on the contrary, those ideas which have had to be discarded have been 
about peripheral aspects of the two types of instrument, while the ideas 
which the research has confirmed or strengthened have been about the 
basic difference between them. That basic difference lies in the way in 
which those instruments work - physical by changing directly land and 
buildings and the general uses to which they can be put, and financial 
by changing directly the financial circumstances within which people 
make their decisions - and our conclusion is that most of the ways in 
which the two types on instrument are significantly different can be 
directly attributed to that basic definitive difference. 
That will be spelt out in this chapter, but first the development of 
the argument will be retraced. The basic idea - that types of instrument 
could be distinguished by the way in which they work to bring about the 
desired result and that (at least) two types could be thus distinguished 
and identified in oractice - was set out in chapter 1 but not worked out 
in detail until chapters 7 and 8. That structure was chosen because, in 
order to develop the idea, a framework was needed about how public 
agencies choose a type of instrument, such a framework was not to be 
found in the literature, so we were obliged to work out and present our 
own in chapter 2. We could not then go on immediately to explore the 
natures of physical and financial instruments because the theories 
available for deducing the technical possibilities of and the context 
appropriate to physical and financial instruments were so scanty that 
we decided to supplement them with an investigation of how the choice 
of instruments was made in practice. That was done by studying seven 
local governments choosing and taking physical and financial measures 
in order to tackle local problems of unemployment: the case studies are 
in chapters 4 and 5, and some reflections on them in chapter 7. So it 
is not until chapters 7 and 8 that the natures of local physical and 
local financial instruments are investigated, by a method which is 
basically theoretical deduction but strongly influenced by information 
from the case studies about the choosing and taking of physical and 
financial measures in practice. And in that way, this work acquired its 
structure: the core of the research lies not at the centre of the report 
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but at its edges, the meat is round the bone not between two slices of 
bread. This research method has important consequences for the status 
of our conclusions and the practical implications drawn out of them, as 
presented in this final chapter: they must be regarded as theoretical 
deductions, which have not (yet) been subjected to empirical testing, 
and they have all the provisional status of untested deductions. 
Instruments are used for taking measures which, directly or indirectly, 
change personal circumstances politically regarded as problematic: that 
is the means - ends chain used here. Physical measures work by changing 
directly the physical environment and in that way acting upon problems, 
financial measures by changing directly financial circumstances and in 
that way alleviating problems. That is the basic difference between the 
two types of instrument and it is our contention that all the other 
important differences can be traced to that root. In particular, we 
suggest that the difference in the ways in which those instruments work 
leads to financial instruments being more powerful, and thus better able 
to alleviate problematic personal circumstances, than physical instru-
ments: as a corollary, financial instruments can cause more side 
effects, good or bad, than physical instruments. 
The argument can be summarised by referring to the capabilities of 
physical instruments. When positive physical measures are used to create 
the physical environment used as a consumer good then that good has to 
be used before the policy goal can be realised. In a few cases the demand 
for the good is assured, such as when a monument is restored or a nature 
reserve created or the appearance of a city centre improved. In most 
cases, however, it is only when the good (land and/or buildings) is in 
use that the measure can begin to work through to the problem it is 
supposed to be tackling (e.g. inadequate housing, traffic congestion, 
unemployment). If there is no demand to use the good, the measure is 
ineffective: physical measures can sometimes divert demand but they 
cannot create it. 
When positive physical measures are used to create the physical 
environment used as a producer good, then the link between the measure 
and problematic personal circumstances is more indirect, but realising 
that link is still dependent on the demand to use the buildings and/or 
land thus created. If the demand is absent, then the measure is in-
effective. 
Where positive physical measures are used to create or alter the 
physical environment certain aspects of which were causing problems with 
personal relationships, then if people want better personal relation-
ships the physical measures can allow those to develop, but if that 
desire is absent, then the physical measures cannot create or stimulate 
it. 
That is, even positive physical measures are, in that sense, passive 
in their effect on oroblematic personal circumstances. Negative physical 
measures also are passive, and in their effect more indirect. Such a 
measure works by prohibiting a change in land or buildings which would 
have led to a problem. If there was no demand to make that change, then 
the measure has no effect. If that change was demanded and, if granted, 
would have caused a problem situation directly (such as an application 
to build a noisy factory next to housing) then the negative physical 
measure prevents the problem from arising. In many cases, however, the 
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link between the change demanded and the possible problems thus caused 
is less immediate factory development is prohibited because the demand 
for labour there is already too high, or housing is prohibited because 
it is desired to concentrate urban development in other places where 
the landscape is less vulnerable and infrastructure costs are less In 
those cases, the effectiveness of the measure depends not solely upon 
the physical change being prevented but also upon the activity either 
being prevented totally everywhere, or prevented totally in that olace 
(and whether it diverts to somewhere else is irrelevant), or nrevented 
totally there and diverted to another, specified, location And the 
ability of negative physical measures to act on activities is limited 
prohibiting a physical change can still leave the activity taking olace 
locally but within the existing physical environment used more in­
tensively or, if the prohibition leads to the activity migrating, then 
the ability of physical measures to steer that migration is small The 
ability to steer can be increased by using positive and negative 
physical measures in combination negative measures to try to divert 
the demand from A and positive Pleasures to accommodate the diverted 
demand in В The effectiveness of such a combination is weakened by the 
possibility of the activity in A not wishing to migrate or, if it does, 
choosing to migrate to locations other than В 
Financial instruments are, on the whole, more powerful The strength 
of physical instruments lies in their ability to influence the shaping 
and changing of the physical environment, the weakness in their inability 
to influence other activities directly Financial instruments can do 
both things - both influence the activity of shaping and changing the 
physical environment and influence most other activities also - for 
financial instruments act directly on activities by changing the 
financial circumstances within which people decide what activities they 
want to carry out, where, how, and to what extent The only activities 
on which financial instruments cannot act are those in which financial 
considerations play no or a negligible part and, without wishing to 
suggest that man is solely a pecuniary animal, we would maintain that 
the number of such activities important for social policy is few (1) 
That, then, is the main result of our investigation financial instru­
ments are more powerful for implementing public policy than physical 
instruments We shall now investigate how it is reflected in each of 
the considerations which a public agency, when deciding what type of 
instrument to apply, should take into account For reasons that will 
become apparent those will be discussed in a sequence different from 
that used so far 
The types of problem situation that can be changed 
Physical measures can change those problem situations where the in­
adequacy of the physical environment as a consumer good is causing a 
problem directly and where the demand for that good exists, and those 
problem situations where the physical environment as a producer good or 
as the setting for personal relationships is preventing something 
demanded or desired from happening Financial measures can change those 
problem situations caused directly or indirectly by decisions in which 
financial considerations play a part such situations we have divided 
into decisions about consumer goods, decisions about production methods, 
decisions influencing the distribution of income or wealth, and decisions 
about the general scale of production and consumption, and we have argued 
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that they touch more problem situations directly than can be influenced 
by physical measures. 
The inter-local effects of applying a local instrument 
Our investigation led us to conclude that local financial measures can 
have greater inter-local effects than local physical measures, mainly 
because the former can create greater differences between locations than 
the latter can and inter-local effects are caused by movements in 
response to such differences, and because financial measures (unlike 
physical) can cause directly goods and money to move. 
The capability of the agency 
The important conclusion is that the greater inter-local effects of 
local financial measures lead to a wider spatial range. As a result, 
agencies with a small geographical jurisdiction are more likely to be 
entrusted by central government with physical instruments than with 
financial instruments. 
The reigning political attitudes 
The case studies showed that cautious and conservative local governments 
had no hesitation about applying physical instruments but were very 
wary of financial instruments. The theoretical investigations suggested 
that the main reason was the greater potency of the latter: if you do 
not want to interfere too much in the life of the society (especially 
its economic life) then you do not take financial measures, but physical 
measures are not much of a threat to the private order 
In all of those four "considerations" the theoretical investigations 
led us to deduce important differences between physical and financial 
measures, differences which can largely be explained by the greater 
power of financial measures If that deduction is related to the case 
studies we see that three of those four considerations had been important 
in practice also: the types of problem situation, capability and 
political attitudes had all influenced the choice by local governments 
between physical and financial measures. (2) The fact that the issue 
of inter-local effects had clearly been considered (it had been im-
portant when choosing physical measures) but had not influenced the 
choice between physical and financial measures is probably because it 
had already been incorporated in another, the issue of capability: a 
local government will apply the instruments it has been given or can 
get hold of without feeling obliged to consider possibly harmful inter-
local effects (that is a concern for a regional or national government) 
and the larger inter-local effects of financial instruments are one 
reason for their not having been granted widely to local governments 
Other measures already being taken 
One consideration which clearly had been significant in the case studies 
is that an instrument can be chosen to complement or supplement other 
measures already being taken. The theoretical investigations led us to 
expect an important difference between physical and financial instru-
ments in this respect also, but this time a difference not directly 
reducible to the greater potency of financial instruments. The point 
here is that most activities find their physical expression in land and/ 
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or buildings, so measures which change activities often require changes 
in the physical environment it will often be the case then that a 
public agency with powers to take negative physical measures needs to 
use those powers so as to allow another measure to work itself out, or 
that an agency can use positive physical measures to provide directly 
the physical changes that its other measures require Physical measures 
are often, therefore, a necessary complement to other measures Financial 
measures, on the other hand, can often be used to supplement other 
measures by stimulating or inhibiting the relevant activities but the 
taking of those financial measures is not usually a necessary condition 
for the success of other measures 
Five of the ten considerations have not yet been mentioned. These are. 
- the possibility of directing the help towards specified persons 
- the speed with which the desired effect can be achieved 
- the flexibility with which the effects of applying the instrument 
can be negated or reversed 
- the flexibility with which the application of the instrument can be 
adapted to a range of situations 
- the knowledge of the external environment 
Not only was none of those an important consideration to the local 
governments studied, but also the theoretical investigation suggested 
that there would be few significant differences between ohysical and 
financial instruments in any of those respects Nevertheless, we 
consider that it was correct to raise those five points because, as the 
theoretical discussions showed, they could be important for the choice 
of instruments (if not for the choice between physical and financial) 
in some circumstances 
The possibility of directing the help 
This is extremely important since a measure cannot be regarded as 
successful unless it alleviates the problems of those people identified 
as needing help However, neither physical nor financial measures can 
so direct the help (the important exceptions are when physical measures 
provide public goods which are accessible to everyone and which there-
fore do not need allocating, and when financial measures are used for 
direct redistribution), with both types of measure, supplementary 
"organisational ' actions are needed to allocate the benefits as required 
The speed with which the desired effect can be achieved 
The theoretical conclusion was that certain types of financial and 
physical measures can be expected to act quickly (within a few months), 
other types more slowly (a few years would be required) In none of the 
local governments studied, however, had speed been an important point 
Moreover, it would have been illogical of them to have raised it to 
importance, considering the administrative and political delays some of 
them experienced in introducing any new measure of whatever type 
differences of a few months in the speed of action between two measures 
would have been rendered insignificant by the "lead times" (3) of 
several years that occurred 
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The flexibility with which the effects of applying an instrument can 
be negated or reversed 
Although a case can be made that this should be an important consider-
ation because of the many uncertainties about the future, it is probable 
that few politicians or public officials would care to admit to so much 
doubt about the longer term need for their measures (a few large scale 
projects excepted, such as building an international airport or im-
poldering the Zuyder Zee). In any case, none of the local governments 
had considered it and the theoretical discussions suggest that physical 
and financial measures would not differ significantly in this respect. 
The flexibility with which the application of the instrument can be 
adapted to a range of situations 
This proved to be a most illuminating diversion, since the theoretical 
investigation clarified some of the reasons why economists have preferred 
financial to physical instruments and we were able to show that most of 
those reasons are mistaken. The investigation showed also the importance 
of the distinction framework-setting/regulatory instruments but made 
clear that both physical and financial instruments could be used in both 
ways. Further, however, the theoretical investigation found few 
significant differences between the two types of instrument in this 
respect, and the practical investigation found no instance where much 
attention had been given to this consideration. Nevertheless, there 
could be practical situations where this type of flexibility could be 
important: then, the regulatory/ad hoc types of instrument achieve it 
better than the framework-setting/institutional types. 
The knowledge of the external environment 
The theoretical investigation of this issue was inconclusive, but the 
issue might be of little practical significance. In none of the seven 
case studies had it been an important consideration, for in all new 
instruments were being applied marginally and experimentally and the 
effects of applying older instruments could be guessed from a mixture 
of experience and rules of thumb. That finding could probably be extra-
polated to most practical situations: it is probably rarely that a 
measure is taken about which there is little experience with which to 
predict the effects and where that measure is of such a scale that 
predicting the effects accurately is important. Exceptions are, once 
again, such projects as building an international airport or impoldering 
the Zuyder Zee. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE 
The results just stated contain many practical implications, most of 
which are so obvious that it would be unnecessarily tedious to spell 
them out. There are, however, still a few practical deductions which 
have not yet emerged explicitly. 
What physical instruments can always achieve is the construction of 
a new facility (land and/or buildings) and the prohibition of proposed 
physical development. If those changes are sufficient to ensure the 
alleviation of a problem, then physical instruments are effective. In 
all other cases, physical instruments on their own are weak and, if the 
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solution of a problem is accorded political importance, then financial 
instruments should be used 
Physical instruments are weaker in a period of economic stagnation 
or decline than when the demand for land and/or buildings is strong. 
In the latter circumstances, the demand to use the new facilities 
created by positive physical measures can be assumed and the prohibitions 
of negative physical measures will be more successful in steering 
activities elsewhere without killing them off. However, in a time of 
economic stagnation or decline (such as the present) financial instru-
ments should be made more important (although physical instruments will 
still be needed to create the conditions necessary for the financial 
instruments to have their effect) 
Financial instruments applied locally can have a wider spatial range 
and greater inter-local effects than physical instruments applied 
locally If the former are to be applied more widely (and assuming that 
it is desired to avoid effects in other locations which would be harm-
ful there or which could weaken the effects in the location of applic-
ation) then the necessary organisational arrangements would have to be 
made. These could include: 
- regulations or legislation to restrict the size of the financial 
measures which could be applied by local governments 
- all local financial measures (or all such measures above a certain 
size) should be taken only by regional/provincial or by central 
government 
- local governments wishing to apply financial instruments locally 
would first have to obtain the permission of regional/orovincial or 
of central government 
The form of those organisational arrangements and the way in which 
they would be used should be dependent on the size and nature of the 
inter-local effects. It is important, therefore, that the knowledge 
necessary for predicting the effects be improved That improvement can 
be gained not only by more theoretical research (e.g. into the mobility 
of firms and people in response to differences in local circumstances) 
but also - and perhaps more fruitfully at this stage - by careful mon-
itoring of any local measures applied. In that way, the knowledge could 
be built up that was necessary for a pragmatic handling of local 
instruments and for choosing between physical and financial instru-
ments. 
The political implications of a greater use of financial instruments 
need to be made quite clear. Such instruments can cause big differences 
between members of the same group and between firms in the same industry, 
local financial instruments can cause big differences between people 
or firms in one area and people or firms in another area. That is the 
strength of such instruments; but it inplies a strong intervention 
in economic decisions (distorting competition, if you will) If that 
would be a bitter pill for politicians to swallow, then the appropriate 
organisational arrangements could sweeten it, e.g 
- all decisions about the use of such instruments should be made by 
politicians and not delegated to their officials 
- limits should be placed on the size of the measures which may be 
taken with financial instruments 
- local government decisions about taking financial measures should be 
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checked by regional/provincial or by central government. 
Once again, better knowledge of the effects of taking financial 
measures would help the benefits to be obtained by taking such measures 
to be weighed against possible political objections to intervention in 
principle. 
In situations where physical measures would be weak or ineffective 
because the demand to carry out the activities which need accommodation 
is small, then financial measures can strengthen the working of the 
physical measures. If the latter consist of providing land or buildings, 
then the demand to use those new facilities can be stimulated by per­
suasive financial measures applied to that location It might in 
addition be possible to stimulate the demand in location A by inhibiting 
financial measures applied elsewhere, in the hope that demand will be 
displaced to location A the possibility of steering accurately by such 
negative means is, however, slight If the physical measures applied 
are negative - prohibitions on proposed physical developments - then 
the demand to use those developments can be inhibited by financial 
measures applied in the same location. If the aim of the physical 
measures is not only prohibition in area A but in that way to steer 
development to area B, then financial inhibitions in A and financial 
stimuli in В will strengthen the working of the physical measures In 
such ways, the persuasiveness of financial measures, especially when 
applied locally, can supplement the permissiveness of physical measures 
and in that way increase their effectiveness. (4) 
The reverse can also be done, whereby physical measures are taken in 
conjunction with financial measures. If a local financial measure is 
taken to stimulate activities in a particular location then those 
activities will try to find accommodation either in existing facilities 
or in a new development Positive physical measures to provide that new 
development will probably do no more than the market would have done 
(unless all new development and all changes of use require planning 
permission, when the activities stimulated by the financial measures 
will be - at least partially - frustrated by the lack of accommodation 
unless corresponding negative physical measures are taken to allow that 
accommodation to be provided). Another way of using physical measures 
to strengthen the working of financial measures would be to apply 
negative physical measures in areas В, С etc in order to strengthen the 
effect of a financial stimulus applied in area A. If a local financial 
measure is used to inhibit activities in a particular location, then 
corresponding physical measures are not necessary unless the aim of the 
inhibition is to stimulate activities elsewhere, which activities would 
then need to be able to find accommodation there. 
The advantages of using two types of instrument in conjunction are 
still wider If it is desired to direct the improvement brought about 
by a physical or a financial instrument so that particular persons or 
a particular type of person are benefited, then neither of those types 
of instrument on its own, nor the two in combination, can direct the 
help. In many cases, however, organisational instruments (allocation 
rules, etc) taken in conjunction with a physical or a financial instru­
ment can achieve the desired distribution. Where that distribution is 
specified by location (e.g. a local government takes a measure for the 
benefit of its own citizens) then such organisational instruments can 
sometimes reduce undesired spillover effects and leakages. 
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Those last three points introduce a more general implication for 
practice. This study has been about the strength and weakness of types 
of instrument applied on their own: what can be achieved by physical 
instruments and what are the possible objections to them7 whatare the 
inherent technical possibilities and what is the appropriate context 
for financial instruments7 However, most public agencies make their 
decisions about taking a measure in the context of hundreds or thousands 
of other measures already being taken by themselves (especially if they 
are multi-purpose agencies like local governments) or by other public 
agencies. A better way of putting the question is, therefore: 
- given the fact that a number of measures is already being taken, 
should we apply physical instruments or financial instruments or 
both, and are there any other types of instrument (e g. organisational) 
which need to be applied at the same time7 
Then the technical strengths of one type of instrument can be used to 
offset the technical weakness of another, or contextual objections to 
one type of instrument can be reduced by decreasing the scale of its 
application and by supplementing it with another type for which the 
context is more appropriate. In such ways, the discussions about 
physical and financial instruments can be both refined and made more 
practical. Some such improvements are long overdue: what Eversley 
(1973, p.21) calls "a reappraisal of the long-accepted weapons in the 
armoury of legislation" cannot come too soon. 
EPILOGUE I 
At the end of a work which has been rather objective and abstract we 
return to one of the personal motivations which started us out along 
the path - a strong dissatisfaction with the theoretical basis of town 
planning. If the work began thus negatively, as a critique, it has 
ended more positively, with suggestions as to how policy instruments 
should be chosen. Nevertheless, in the years between beginning and 
ending there have been few developments which would make us soften our 
original criticism, town planning is still being practised in the 
absence of a realistic theory which would enable the practitioners to 
make a connection between what they are doing and what they hope to 
achieve. There is still no adequate theory of town planning as a 
technology. 
In the heady days of British town planning in the IQSO's, that 
absence was masked by two things. The origins of town planning in 
architecture led many town planners to adopt a barely thought-out 
architectual determinism, while the indefimteness of their theories 
led other town planners to a kind of policy imperialism, whereby town 
planning became town planning with a social purpose became social 
planning became planning. That castle without foundations fell to 
pieces in the 1970's when it became painfully obvious that town planning 
was not delivering what it had so grandiosely promised. "The planners', 
as they had become known to the public, were blamed for everything - bad 
housing, urban crime, race riots, the inner city problem, vandalism: 
and who can blame the public for such indiscriminate and careless 
criticism, when town planners themselves had been so indiscriminate and 
careless in their pretensions7 
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In the Netherlands, the situation is somewhat different for, unlike in 
Britain, they have there the benefit of the concept of "planologie" 
which, at least for the last 15 years, has been used to refer to the 
scientific basis of town planning. That idea has distanced one branch 
of town planning thought from its architectual antecedents and it shows 
a recognition of the need for a theoretical basis, to be constructed out 
of the "object of planning", the physical environment and activities 
in that space. So far, however, very little has been built, "planologie" 
is still a meagre science (5) 
Socially, we find it disgraceful that the practice of town planning, 
which costs the society so much in administration and which interferes 
in so many private actions, has not yet developed the theories to be 
able to justify itself technically. Physical determinism has been 
rejected (probably dismissed rather too sweepingly), but nothing has 
been put in its place by which the sort of goals achievable by town 
planning could be identified, the measures necessary for achieving them 
recommended, and the probable links between the measures and the goals 
predicted More is expected of civil engineers, doctors and economic 
advisors, why not of town planners7 " . unless the purpose and value 
of government intervention in land in a mixed economy .. can be 
demonstrated, and unless planners can offer some particular expertise 
with which to assist the operation of such intervention ... then 
planners' claims to the several thousand well-paid jobs in local 
planning authorities are on shaky ground" (Healey and Underwood, 1978, 
P.124). 
Here, we have tried to make a contribution to the theory of town 
planning as a technology by focussing attention on the types of measure 
which it can take, those are principally physical measures and we have 
started to develop a theory of what can be achieved by the use of 
physical measures. Taking the powers and the measures that they allow 
as a starting point can be extremely fruitful, as was learned very early 
by economic planners "In these war years we had learned by the hard 
way of experience some of the essentials of planning that if you want 
to plan something you must create all the esssential instruments for 
planning it, and that it was no use creating a list of objectives and 
just hoping that somehow they would come about". (Robinson, 1967, p.12). 
But, as Simmie (1971) points out, that has rarely been recognised by 
town planners "Few (physical) plans have matched or seriously considered 
the diversity and complexity of the issues with which they are dealing.. 
A common defence of (physical) plans is that they must be confined 
within the range of current powers But .. if such powers are inadequate, 
it is an essential function of planning to say so; to set out the 
alternatives, and thus to demonstrate the consequences if new powers 
are not made available". 
The analogy we like to make is with the man trying to open a can of 
beans with a screwdriver. That can be an extremely messy and frustrating 
business, but if the man is not allowed to use a can-opener he must do 
his best with the screwdriver. But what if the man has never thought 
carefully about the potentialities of screwdrivers and has no ideas 
that can-openers exist7 Then we would question his professional 
competence. Very often, town planners remind us of that man. 
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EPILOGUE II 
The analogy of the man not being allowed to use a can-opener is the 
correct one for local governments trying to tackle unemployment. 
It is no accident that the desire of local governments to be able to 
take financial measures to stimulate employment is fairly recent. 
Physical measures create the necessary conditions, they have in most 
places been taken and the conditions are now present - and often lying 
unused (a few big cities with special physical problems excepted). The 
futility of trying to reduce unemployment by further physical measures 
- providing land, buildings, and better infrastructure, all at market 
prices - when there is no demand by employers for those facilities is 
recognised by most local governments. Many of them now want to take 
financial measures (unless they are beset by political qualms about 
intervening in market processes) because they recognise the greater 
effectiveness of financial measures to tackle unemployment at a time 
of economic stagnation. Moreover, the greater effectiveness to be 
achieved by combining physical and financial measures (e g. providing 
land or buildings at reduced prices or offering loans for acquiring 
land or buildings) has been appreciated by many local governments Why 
then are local financial measures not more widely taken in order to 
tackle local unemployment' Mainly because central government recognises, 
correctly, the dangers from the considerable inter-local effects which 
local financial measures can bring about. 
Meanwhile, unemployment gets worse, and new instruments to tackle it 
must be created. About those instruments we would argue, first, that 
they must be financial. The reason should by now be obvious: only 
financial measures will be effective in the present circumstances. 
Second, there should be new instruments capable of being applied 
locally. Again, the reasoning has already been supplied: the macro-
economic policy being pursued nationally needs to be supplemented by 
local measures designed to take account of the specific local 
circumstances. And thirdly, the new instruments should be in the hands 
of local governments. There are three reasons· that local governments 
(or at least the larger authorities) have the intimate local knowledge 
that higher authorities do not have, that they can act more quickly, 
and that they usually feel a much stronger involvement and committment 
to act than do the more remote level s of government. 
In the Netherlands, that implies a decentralisation of powers from the 
Ministries of Economic and of Social Affairs to the gemeenten. In 
Britain, it would require new legislation, perhaps an extension to 
more local authorities of the powers already given to a few by the Inner 
Urban Areas Act 1978. 
We understand well why the central governments in both countries are 
so frightened of that: apart from the less creditable reasons of trying 
to build up centralised empires, there is in both countries a well-
justified wish to avoid the damaging inter-local effects of the local 
use of financial instruments. But that is a matter of political judge-
ment. The reason for recommending financial instruments is precisely 
that we expect them to be powerful, and the reason for recommending 
that they be in the hands of local governments is that we expect the 
latter to use them actively: considerable inter-local effects are an 
inevitable consequence: so the one - effectiveness in reducing unemoloy-
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ment - must be judged against the other - possible inequity and 
damaging competition between local areas In the author's opinion, the 
English are nearer to striking a good balance than the Dutch: the former 
do not allow themselves to be so scared by the thought of allowing 
differences to be created between local areas (rechtsongelijkheid!) that 
they instinctively retreat into a defensive centralism. Competition 
between local governments can also be healthy! 
The balance which is struck will have to be maintained by administrat-
ive procedures - setting a limit to the size of the financial measures 
which may be taken, for example, or a limit to the annual budget for 
that sort of measure, or the need for prior approval if the proposed 
measure exceeds a certain size. Whatever the content of the chosen 
procedures, they will have to be enforceable and once again the English 
way of doing that has certain advantages over the Dutch way. The English 
way of passing enabling legislation makes it quite clear what the limits 
are, and within those limits a local government can act quickly and 
without further hindrance. The Dutch way of insisting that there is an 
"uoper limit" - set by what the higher authorities do - which the local 
government may not transgress, but not making it crystal clear what 
would count as a transgression, leads to confusion and delays, neither 
of which helps in tackling unemployment. In order to avoid that, the 
decentralisation of powers over industry and employment recommended 
above should be accompanied by precise guidelines. The "1961 Guidelines" 
were written in order to create such clarity; they are now being revised 
but in order to make clearer how gemeenten should be restricted , they 
should be revised in order to set precise boundaries to the wider 
freedom of action that gemeenten should be allowed 
No one is claiming that local governments could solve the oresent 
unemployment problem, nor even that their contribution to solving it 
could be more than marginal. Only central government can create the 
conditions necessary for a substantial growth in the demand for labour 
Nevertheless, local governments able to use the appropriate financial 
instruments could help firms, especially the smaller ones, to overcome 
local and temporary obstacles which might be preventing them from 
taking advantage of the national conditions Local governments want to 
be involved, they can make a contribution, and every contribution helps. 
NOTES 
(1) Remember that we are restricting ourselves to personal circumstances 
regarded as problematic by politicians. And although the scope of 
social policy continues to widen it does not yet (fortunately) 
include a person's spiritual well-being, where financial consider-
ations might be expected to play no part 
(2) In the case of capability, the influence was passive The greater 
power and spatial range of physical instruments had led to their 
not being made available, or only subject to narrow restrictions, 
to local governments. Those agencies had had to take physical 
measures when they might have preferred to take financial measures. 
(3) The term is from the Birmingham I C.P. and describes the time 
between deciding to take a measure and completing the implement-
ation. 
(4) A good example of this is provided by section 3 of the Local 
Authorities (Land) Act 1963, for an example of the application of 
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which Dudley will serve. That Act allows financial assistance to be 
given to firms, but only towards the costs of building on land 
provided by the local authority. The financial measure stimulates 
the demand to use the physical measure. 
(5) The collection of papers edited by Needham and Wissink, 1982, shows 
a movement in the right direction. 
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Appendices 
Appendix I A method for estimating the 
employment effects of local 
employment measures 
The method presented here is general and, therefore, equally applicable 
to England and the Netherlands. However, the first set of assumptions 
which we add are more applicable to the circumstances in the West 
Midlands, where the English investigation was made, than to the Nether-
lands. The application to the Netherlands follows thereafter. 
The crucial question is: what would have happened to employment had 
the public agency not taken those measures? We first consider employ-
ment within the local government boundary. Then, applying this 
question to the provision of industrial land we assume that there are 
very difficult site conditions in the area which would prevent a private 
developer from supplying the land. Moreover, we assume that the agency 
avoids taking any measures which would damage the interests of private 
developers within its area, so we can deduce that no land on private 
industrial estates within the administrative boundary is left unused 
because of the local government's measures. (1) Then, employment in 
the firms which have moved from outside on to the local government 
land, employment in completely new firms set up on that land, and any 
increase in employment in firms which have moved within the 
administrative area on to the local-government-provided land from 
premises in which they could not expand, these are employment gains 
to the area attributable to the measures. Moreover, if the sites that 
have been vacated by the local firms moving on to the new land are then 
occupied by other firms, either local firms which increased in employ-
ment after the move, or firms new to the area, that increase also can 
be attributed to the measure. 
A similar argument can be applied to the measure of providing small 
unit factories, but only if it is indeed valid to assume that, at the 
time when they were built, no other agency would have supplied them. 
The application of the argument to giving financial assistance is, 
however, more risky, for it is implausible to assume that the local 
government was the only possible source of the finance. It is more 
likely that the firm could have borrowed elsewhere, but a smaller amount 
or at a higher interest rate (see JURUE 1979, chap.4), in which case 
only a part (and perhaps a very small part) of the employment in the 
aided firm can be attributed to the measure. There is a further diffi-
culty when considering the employment effects of financial assistance -
because capital is made cheaper, the possibility that the firm 
substitutes capital for labour (see Willis and Whisker, 1981). However, 
the more such financial assistance is given selectively and conditional 
upon the creation of new workplaces (which is how the assistance was 
given in most of the cases studied) the smaller will be the substitution 
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effect. 
In that way, the effects on total employment within the local govern­
ment area can be estimated. The effects on who gains the employment 
are, however, more difficult to assess, for the actual people employed 
might not be those who were previously unemployed. If the total employ­
ment has increased, then the people obtaining the new work might have 
vacated places which others then take, and ultimately some of the 
previously unemployed will obtain work. Suppose, however, that total 
employment is falling and that the new workplaces replace (some of) the 
places lost elsewhere: the measure has still reduced total unemployment 
(which is less than it would have been otherwise) but if those filling 
the new workplaces are people who would otherwise have been made 
redundant by their previous firms, then the measure has not helped the 
existing unemployed. For that kind of reason, the extent to which the 
extra employment has helped local residents or particular social 
groupings (e.g. young people) would have to be established by special, 
and very difficult, surveys. 
In ways like that, and if the assumptions are valid, the effects of 
the measures on employment within the local government boundary can be 
estimated. But to what extent is any employment gain locally at the 
expense of employment elsewhere? That is, what is the difference between 
the gross employment effect locally and the net employment effect 
nationally7 (2) Suppose that the agency had not provided the land or 
the buildings: what woulcf then have happend to the f ι rms involved? It 
is unlikely that the locational advantages of the local government area 
are so special that the firms moving into the area or the new firms 
founded by outsiders setting up in the area (exogenous new) would, if 
deprived of that opportunity, have ceased trading: for that reason, some 
of the exogenous new and all of theimmigrating firms probably provide an 
employment gain to the local area at the expense of another area, so the 
net employment gain is nil. (3) It is, however, probable that some of 
the firms relocating within the area and many of the new firms founded 
by local people (endogenous new) have such strong local ties that they 
would not have considered emigrating or establishing elsewhere: without 
the opportunity given them locally, they would not have expanded or 
been established. 
In order to follow up the consequences of that we have to switch our 
attention from firms to output. If those local firms were not able to 
expand or to be established because of restrictive land or premises 
and an inability to move out of the area, what would happen to the lost 
output? Some of the business would be taken by other national firms 
(no net employment change) and some by foreign firms (a net employment 
change nationally) in the form of import substitutes or capturing export 
markets. However, only in a perfectly functioning market economy would 
the lost output of firms prevented from expanding be completely made 
up by other firms. To the extent that that does not happen, the 
measures taken by local governments to allow immobile local firms to 
expand and immobile local entrepreneurs to start businesses permits a 
national, as well as a local, employment gain. It is too simple to 
dismiss all such measures as "zero-sum games". It is far from simple, 
however, to estimate the size of the national employment effects of 
such measures. 
The following comments and qualifications must now be made on that 
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proposed method for estimating employment effects. First, only the 
first-round effects are included, it could be that extra employment is 
created also in local building firms, in local firms supplying the 
assisted firms, and in local service and consumer goods firms responding 
to increased local wages However, the estimation of local multiplier 
effects is so difficult (see, e.g. Needham, 1977a, chap.12) that it 
seems advisable not to try to include them in routine measures of 
effectiveness Second, the method counts extra workers directly rather 
than using statistical techniques which compare actual with "expected' 
employment, the reason is that the latter techniques break down when 
applied to small areas (see Willis and Whisker, 1981) Third, this 
method measures effectiveness and has nothing to do with efficiency. 
If it were so that the provision of land and buildings was a profitable 
business which would be undertaken by the market were it not for 
complications of land ownership, access rights, etc. - which com-
plications local governments have many more powers to cut through than 
private suppliers - then there is a clear case of market failure. That 
provides an economic justification for the government measure and it 
can be assumed that the measure is economically efficient. (4) Those 
assumptions are not always valid, however, so we cannot say anything 
in general about the economic efficiency of measures. (5) 
Finally, can this general method of estimating effectiveness be applied 
to the employment measures taken by Dutch local governments'7 In England, 
local authorities provide industrial land as an exception, in the 
Netherlands gemeenten do that as the rule, so the assumptions about 
"filling gaps" in the land market are not valid in the Netherlands. 
There it is much more the case that a gemeente, by providing land, allows 
employment to grow and by not providing land restricts employment growth. 
To that extent, the employment growth on gemeente-provided land can 
be "attributed to" that measure, but only in a rather trivial sense. 
Moreover, the assumptions of local industrial interdependencies and 
immobility are probably more correctly applied to the West Midlands 
conurbation than to the Netherlands, so it is less likely that local 
employment gains attributable to providing industrial land would be a 
national gain also: more probably, they would be at the expense of 
another area The situation with regard to providing industrial buildings 
and financial assistance is rather different gemeenten do not provide 
those as a matter of course. If the rationale is to fill market gaps 
or to supplement the market, then the arguments made for English local 
authorities are applicable to Dutch gemeenten also. 
NOTES 
(1) That set of assumptions amounts to the assumption that the agency 
has restricted itself to filling "gaps in the market" - i.e. that 
there was a demand for industrial land in its area which the private 
sector would not supply. The more strictly a public agency applies 
the policy of "no competition with the private market" the more 
likely it is that extra employment on the land and buildings which 
it has supolied would not have been realised without that provision. 
(2) The local government taking the measures might be inclined to ignore 
the effects outside its boundaries, as being of no concern However, 
insofar as the measures are being taken within a system which 
contains powerful bodies which are concerned with the national 
effects (such as central government), then the local government 
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might find itself checked if it cannot show that the national 
effects are acceptable. 
(3) Nevertheless, someone must provide the land and buildings necessary 
for the new and expanding firms, and if the private market does not 
then public agencies must. And if all local governments reasoned -
we shall not do that because another local government elsewhere can 
do that equally well - then the necessary facilities would never 
be provided and the employment would not be able to grow nationally. 
(4) "The rationale for government in economics is found in market fail-
ures ... To the extent that markets do not work effectively ... 
there is reason for public intervention or control (Winger, 1977, 
p.296). 
(5) In one case only (the West Midlands County Council) had this been 
calculated: the provision of small unit factories had a financial 
rate of return of between 6% and 9%, which was below current 
interest rates. On a narrow calculation, therefore, that measure 
was economically inefficient. 
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Appendix II The background to the 
employment measures 
being taken by local 
governments in England 
and the Netherlands 
The situations in the two countries, England and the Netherlands, are 
here described separately but, as far as possible, under similar 
headings. However, it was not possible to use precisely the same 
structure in both cases, mainly because the constitutional position of 
local governments in the two countries is so totally different. The 
background information about England is provided under the following 
headings: 
- the general powers and constraints within which local authorities may 
take employment measures 
- local authority employment measures and the central government response 
- the concern of local authorities for enployment in their areas 
Changes in England since 1980 have not been incorporated, since the 
situations described in the English case studies refer to events which 
had taken place up to and including 1980 but not thereafter. 
For the Netherlands the following headings are used: 
- legal constraints on a gemeente 
- financial constraints on a gemeente 
- gemeenten and local employment problems - the upper limit 
- the focus of concern about unemployment in the Netherlands 
- a decentralisation of employment policy7 
The situation in the Netherlands has been described up to the end of 
1981, for that is the period which the Dutch case studies cover. 
ENGLAND 
The general powers and constraints within which local authorities may 
take employment measures 
In England, the constitutional position of local government relative 
to central government is clear and simple. Central government is the 
sovereign body, and it has conferred certain powers and functions on 
local governments. (1) The result is that local government depends on 
central government for its powers to take any actions and is subject 
to central supervision and, ultimately, control. (2) Although that 
is the constitutional position, there is nevertheless a tradition of 
strong local government independence which is manifested in (inter alia) 
a commonly expressed plea that local authorities should have wider-
ranging powers. For example, the Royal Commission on Local Government 
in England (1969, vol.1, para 51) defined the role of local government 
as taking "an all-round responsibility for the safety, health and well-
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being of people in different localities" and recommended (para 323) that 
local authorities should have a general power to spend money (3) More-
over, local authorities obtain a considerable proportion of their 
current income (about 29% of current income in 1977/78 (4)) from a 
source independent of central government, viz - the rates. (5) 
In such a situation, where local government is dependent for its legal 
powers on central government but wants to act independently, the outcome 
is inevitably some tension between the two tiers, and the central 
government has a battery of controls in order to constrain the local 
governments. In the policy field considered here - unemployment - the 
tensions are particularly acute, for the local concern (and hence desire 
to act) about unemployment is often very strong, while there are very 
important national interests which the centre wants to safeguard. Those 
tensions will be described shortly, first it is necessary to describe 
the powers which local governments have, and the constraints to which 
they are subjected, when they try to take employment measures. (6) 
Statutory powers for employment measures The range and scope of 
measures is first of all constrained by the ultra vires rule to those 
activities for which local authorities have powers so we begin with 
the statutory powers. There are four types which may be utilised for 
employment measures: 
- statutory duties for employment services 
- statutory duties for other services which are not primarily con-
cerned with employment but which might have an incidental effect upon 
it; when the effects are intended, the aspect of the service involved 
can be seen as an employment measure 
- permissive powers given to all local authorities which may be used, 
in certain circumstances, to take employment measures 
- local powers arising either from Local Acts or from Special Acts which 
apply only to some local authorities or within specified areas. (7) 
The local employment measures open to a local authority are summarised 
and classified in that fourfold way in figure II.1 
Local authorities have a limited number of statutory duties for 
employment They have obligations to provide careers services for 
school and college leavers, to provide facilities for industrial and 
vocational training, to provide sheltered employment and workshops for 
disabled persons, and to allocate land for emoloyment and related 
purposes. In discharging these statutory obligations, local authorities 
have some discretion in terms of the quality and scale of the services 
provided and land allocated. 
The main responsibilities of local authorities are their statutory 
obligations for housing, education, transport, town planning, social 
and environmental services. Local authorities have not always been 
concerned about (or even necessarily been aware of) the effects of these 
services on employment In recent years, however, there have been 
substantial changes of attitude in many authorities, and part of the 
rationale for the recent trend towards rehabilitation rather than renewal 
has been the reduced disruption to local firms from that type of physical 
planning 
Several employment measures are available to local authorities in 
connection with each of the statutory services which they must provide, 
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Figure II 1 The general powers and constraints within which local 
authorities may take employment measures 
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and the measures involved are sufficiently wide ranging to allow local 
authorities to influence the supply of many of the inputs to local firms: 
- the aggregate supply of labour (through the provision of public housing 
and the supply of land for private housing, key workers' housing, 
transport schemes to increase labour availability, day nurseries to 
increase female participation) 
- the quality of labour supply (through the education curriculum and 
provision of training) 
- access of firms to markets and suppliers (through the provision and 
management of a transport system) 
- supply of land and serviced sites (through town planning powers). 
Moreover, those statutory duties entail a level of employment and 
expenditure by the local authority itself which often make it the 
largest employer in its administrative area and one of the largest 
purchasers of goods and services from local firms. In 1978-79 local 
authorities in England and Wales employed over 13% of the total working 
population (Department of Employment Gazette, 1979) and accounted for 
nearly 11% of all domestic expenditure (Cmnd. 7439, HMSO). However, 
the possibility of increasing the demand for labour locally, either 
directly by expanding local authority employment or indirectly by a 
local purchasing policy, is constrained by the requirement that the 
accounts of local authorities be submitted for annual external audit. 
Nevertheless, this does not rule out all measures to retain or increase 
employment in local firms: a purchasing policy which prefers local 
suppliers when all other things are equal is permissible. Nor are all 
measures to retain or increase the local authority's own employment 
ruled out: no-redundancy policies are common and there is considerable 
opportunity for local authorities to utilise the Manpower Services 
Commission's employment programmes in order to provide temporary jobs. 
Local authorities are also vested with permissive powers, which allow 
them to take employment measures in the form of loans to firms, 
promotion campaigns, the development of factory premises, the establish-
ment of Industrial Development Officer posts, and the provision of 
information and advice services. Again, the focus of these measures is 
on improving the supply of inputs to firms either by increasing the 
availability, or lowering the cost, of inputs. However, increasing the 
demand for local goods and services - by the promotion of tourism -
is also possible by the use of permissive powers. 
Lastly, some authorities possess powers under Local Acts (such as the 
Coventry Corporation Act, 1972) and Special Acts (such as the Inner 
Urban Areas Act, 1978), which allow them to make loans and grants to 
firms (for land and premises) and to declare Industrial Improvement 
Areas. These measures too are aimed at the supply of inputs to local 
fi rms. 
Other constraints on local employment measures. The constraint of ultra 
vires has been central in the above description: it limits local 
authorities to acting within the powers that they have been expressly 
given. The constraint of the external audit has also been mentioned, and 
this is wider than checking whether a local authority has strayed "outside 
the powers". The auditor has responsibilities, over and above those of 
auditors of commercial accounts, to ensure that accounts do not disclose 
"any significant loss arising from waste, extravagance, inefficient 
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financial administration, poor value for money, mistake or other case" 
(Code of Practice for local government auditors). Three further 
constraints must be mentioned: the availibility of finance, the 
existence of central government guidance on expenditure, and the 
monitoring of staff numbers by the Joint Manpower Watch. (8) 
Many of the measures described require financing from current income, 
and changes in the proportion of revenue expenditure funded by central 
government grants (principally the Rate Support Grant) can be, and have 
been, operated to limit local authority revenue expenditure. This makes 
especially costly any decision by local authorities to raise their rate 
income in order to employ more labour. The second type of financial 
constraint on local authorities is the system of loan sanctions on 
borrowing. 
Local authorities are given guidance by central government on the 
types of employment measure they should undertake, mainly through 
circulars. Circular 71/77, for example, advised local authorities on 
how to adapt their education, planning, housing, and transport policies 
to the government's industrial strategy. Such guidance is not mandatory 
but is taken seriously by both sides. 
Finally, staffing levels in local government have been monitored 
continuously since 1976 by the Joint Manpower Watch. This was set up 
just after a large increase in local authority employment: since then 
public expenditure cuts have ensured that further expansions of employ-
ment are not likely in the near future. However, the Manpower Watch 
would probably exert an independent constraint upon any future expansion 
of local government staffing, whether for employment or any other 
purposes. 
At the end of this appendix part of figure II.1 is expanded to give 
a list of the instruments and their statutory basis available to 
local authorities for taking employment measures. The list is derived 
from JURUE 1979, app. 2. 
Local authority employment measures and the central government response 
The central/local tensions which are built into the English local govern-
ment system are particularly acute in the policy area we are considering 
- local authorities taking employment measures. The reasons are clear 
- employment measures taken in one area might have important effects 
in other areas, might increase inequalities between different oarts of 
the country (both of those are examples of what were called in chapter 
2 "inter-local effects"), and might jeopardise government policies for 
macro-economic management, industrial restructuring, or a nationwide 
distribution of industry. Central government cannot be happy to see 
those effects and it has, moreover, the powers to stop local govern-
ments bringing them about. Yet many local governments want desperately 
to improve employment locally. 
Those tensions are clearly manifested in the recent history of the 
legislation which gives powers for local employment measures. We have 
seen that local governments have been given very few powers explicitly 
for taking employment measures, that central government has been 
careful to ensure that most of the instruments derived from powers given 
for other purposes are not such as could cause serious inter-authority 
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effects, and that most of the measures are subject to central govern-
ment constraints. In that situation of severely limited oowers, several 
local authorities have in the last few years attempted to obtain more 
employment instruments by promoting Local Bills, but with very limited 
success. (9) After studying those attempts, Minns and Thornley (1976) 
say "What is emerging from this is a significant conflict between 
central and local government", and Rogers and Smith (1977) conclude 
"Unfortunately, the main opponent of a strong and flourishing local 
authority role in the field of economic development is central govern-
ment". 
In that conflict, central government took the initiative in 1978 by 
passing the Inner Urban Areas Act, a new general Act which gave extra 
employment powers to local authorities. Significantly, however, those 
new powers may be used only by certain local authorities (designated 
by central government) and only after approval in detail by "Partnership 
Committees" containing representatives not only of the local authorities 
but also of central government. The latter has been careful not to give 
away any powers in this sensitive area. The end-result is that local 
governments have only limited and piecemeal instruments for taking 
employment measures, and that the application of most of those instru-
ments is subject to direct or indirect checks and controls from the 
centre. 
The concern by local authorities for employment in their areas 
In 1947, Fogarty published a book with the attractive title "Plan your 
own industries" in which he describes what he calls the "development 
movement", the actions of "local and regional development organisations" 
made up of local authorities acting individually or in voluntary 
regional groupings. "The basic idea underlying the work of all of them 
is the importance of planning for the welfare of communities, as apart 
from industries ... full employment combined with a full and satisfactory 
life can be obtained only by taking account of people's home and other 
strong social group ties apart from those organised and controlled by 
the industrial life of the district" (Fogarty, 1947, p.11). Such actions 
by local authorities - aiming "to obtain full employment combined with 
a full and satisfactory life" - are broader than what we are studying 
(actions taken to reduce unemployment). Nevertheless, Fogarty's book 
reminds us that this sort of activity is not new. 
Other indications of the age of this activity can be found in the 
"public works" schemes undertaken by some local authorities to find work 
for the huge numbers of unemployed in the Depression. (10) Further, 
a study of local Acts of Parliament passed to give specified local 
authorities extra powers to attract and assist industry reveals that 
such oowers were being sought and granted throughout the 1960's (see 
Needham, 1977(b), appendix 4D). Nevertheless, we can usefully take 1974 
as the year in which the present concern by local authorities for 
unemployment first became significant. (11) 
Reasons for that growing concern by local authorities are not hard to 
find. In the first few years of the 1970ls a number of publicly-funded 
studies of conditions in parts of big cities - most importantly the 
Community Development Projects and the Inner Area Studies - showed that 
unemployment, low incomes, unstable employment, and similar problems 
were not spread evenly but were concentrated in some (small) parts of 
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some areas. Those findings were reinforced when local planning 
authorities started to prepare, for the first time. Structure Plans, 
for which employment studies are an obligatory part. There was a dis-
covery of local employment problems. 
That was accompanied by the argument that to tackle local employment 
problems might require measures especially designed to be appropriate 
to the local conditions and applied to the local areas (see further 
appendix III). Three quotations made at that time illustrate the point. 
"Employment-generating policies may have to start with demand acceler-
ation probably at national level, but, on their own, demand policies may 
not solve the local employment problem because of the (local) influences 
(of jobs and jobtakers), any one of which may be an absolute constraint 
preventing demand benefitting employment locally" (Smith, 1975, p.3). 
" ... to the extent that the problems of any area ... which reflect a 
maldistribution of opportunities and incomes do flow from factors which 
have a genuinely local and spatial content, rather than from the national 
employment structure and income distribution, the role of social 
security payments and such types of expenditure is more palliative than 
curative: to this extent local authorities may have more real leverage" 
(Kirwan, 1973, p.123, DBN's emphasis), "(local) economic olans will make 
it possible to take more account of local considerations in developing 
planning agreements or in providing government assistance to industry" 
(Falk and Martines, 1975, p.28). 
If anything was needed to attract political attention to the discover-
ies of the area-based studies and to the practical implications of the 
accompanying theories it was the steep rise in national unemployment 
which began in 1974 and which manifested itself in high average un-
employment rates for whole local authority areas (not just parts of 
those areas) even in many areas previously prosperous (see figures 4.2 
and II.2). 
Among the many responses of central government to the recession were 
new or expanded measures to create new employment or to improve training, 
initiated through departments of central government (the Department of 
Employment and the Manpower Services Commission) but requiring for their 
implementation co-operation and contributions from the local authorities 
(those measures are described in Needham, 1979a, chapter 3). Then in 
1977 the Department of the Environment published a circular (71/77) 
"Local government and the industrial strategy" asking local authorities 
to take measures to improve various aspects of their local economies. 
At the same time, many local authorities wanted to complement and 
supplement, from their own resources and with their own statutory powers, 
the local measures of central government. On the other hand, other local 
authorities (particularly in the non-Assisted Areas (12)) considered 
that their employment problems were being made worse by certain central 
government actions (e.g. policy for Industrial Development Certificates 
(13)) or were concerned that central government measures to stimulate 
economic regeneration had no spatial component (Lawless, 1981): those 
local governments started to take independent and counter-active employ-
ment measures (even if it was only putting pressure on central govern-
ment to act differently). The result of all those influences was that, 
starting around 1974, local authorities began greatly to intensify their 
own independent actions against unemployment in their areas. 
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THE NETHERLANDS 
Legal constraints on a gemeente 
The Dutch State is, by its Constitution, decentralised, which means 
that the central authority (het Rijk) does not carry out all tasks 
of the State but shares them with other independent authorities. The 
gemeenten are one sort of independent authority, and the other sorts 
are the provinces, the waterboards (waterschapoen), the city regions 
(gewesten), organisations for regulating professional, commercial and 
industrial activities (lichamen van de publiekrechtelijke bedrijsorga-
nisatie), and other public bodies (andere openbare lichamen). Each of 
those has powers which are derived not from the central authority but, 
directly or indirectly, from the Constitution. Here we shall confine 
our discussion to the constitutional position of the Dutch gemeenten 
(14) 
A gemeente has two sorts of power, called autonomy and joint-rule 
(medebewind). By autonomy is meant that the regulation and government 
of affairs within its own boundaries (specifically named are public 
order, morals, health, "and other matters concerning the local economy') 
are left to a gemeente, which in turn implies that the central authority 
is not allocating or awarding such tasks to the gemeente, the latter has 
them by right. By joint-rule is meant that some aspects of regulation 
within the gemeente boundaries are not left entirely to the gemeente. 
rather, the central authority passes certain laws, and the gemeente is 
included in the execution of those laws within its boundaries 
Those powers of a gemeente are subjected to restrictions, both on 
the way in which it may interoret the scope of its autonomy and on the 
freedom with which it may implement central laws within its "joint-rule" 
task. The most important restriction is that a gemeente may not take any 
measures which trespass on the special interests of private citizens 
and organisations (the so-called "lewer limit" to its powers), nor any 
measures which are contrary to an existing law or which concern matters 
which are already regulated by a higher authority (the "upoer limit"), 
nor any measures concerning matters which are already being regulated 
by another public authority on the same level (the "side limit"). The 
limit set by other public authorities already regulating a matter is 
qualified as follows: whenever the other authority did not intend to 
regulate a topic exhaustively, then the gemeenten nay make further rules 
concerning that topic (aanvullende bevoegdheid) in the interest of its 
own affairs (eigen huishouding). For example,the fact that the central 
authority tries to regulate unemployment does not of itself preclude a 
local authority from doing the same What is not allowed is that a local 
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authority should try to undo or thwart the regulations passed by another 
authority 
The legal restrictions on a gemeente's powers are operated by the 
supervision (toezicht) which a higher authority can exercise over the 
actions of a lower This supervision is sometimes preventative - ι e 
the decision has to be submitted for checking before it is implemented 
- and sometimes retrospective (repressief) - ι e the decision can be 
annulled (vernietigd) after it has been implemented This supervision 
is exercised over Dutch gemeenten mostly by the provinces (15) 
For example, a gemeente must obtain prior approval (preventative 
supervision) for, among other things, its annual budget, taking out 
and giving loans, buying and selling land and buildings (16), and hiring 
gemeente property to private bodies, and that approval must be obtained 
from the College van Gedeputeerde Staten (a sort of executive committee) 
of the relevant province This Colige G S when checking the budget of 
a gemeente - and in general when exercising its preventative super­
vision - tests against three general criteria does the gemeente 
decision contravene any laws, is it in conformity with 'the general 
interest , and does it endanger the financial soundness of the gemeente7 
The necessity of obtaining prior aoproval is very time-consuming, so 
it is reserved for just a few (mainly financial) of the gemeente's 
decisions Less demanding is the duty to inform (mededelingsplicht) the 
province of the intention to introduce those new regulations which 
carry with them a penalty for non-observance Approval is not required, 
but the province has the opportunity to register disapproval by calling 
for the regulation to be annulled 
Annullment takes place according to the principle of retrospective 
supervision, which can be applied to all decisions of the gemeente 
(excepting those of the burgemeester) The workings of this principle 
can be illustrated by supposing that a gemeente makes a traffic regul­
ation That can then be tested, retrospectively, against two criteria -
"the general interest" and conformity with the law The former implies -
according to Bel infante (1973, ρ 143) - that conflicts between social 
interests must not be exacerbated The latter implies conformity not 
only with the formal legislation but also with the regulations of higher 
authorities (such as the province) Suppose now that the gemeente 
implements its parking regulations in an arbitrary manner Such actions 
also can be supervised retrospectively and found contrary to the general 
interest', where here it is an unwritten principle of responsible 
administration (behoorlijk bestuur) that is being infringed (17) 
Those restrictions can be laid uoon a gemeente as a public body by 
virtue of the separate legislation governing such bodies (het publiek­
recht) A gemeente is also, however, a legal person in terms of the law 
governing private bodies (het privaatrecht), and acting in this capacity 
a gemeente can sometimes obtain a few extra powers (18) Advantage of 
this is sometimes taken as, for example, when a gemeente gives out 
leases on land in its ownership by virtue of its position as a land­
owner (not as a public authority) it can include extra clauses in the 
lease, and these clauses can have extra force because of the strong 
position held by gemeenten in their local land markets Gemeenten can 
exploit this advantage even further by setting uo - but only after 
obtaining the aporoval of the province - limited liability companies 
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(vennootschappen) or foundations (stichtingen) to carry out prescribed 
tasks. Such bodies (privaatrechtelijke overheidsinstellingen) are then 
subject to a different set of legislation (het privaatrecht instead of 
het publiekrecht) and the restrictions laid upon gemeenten as public 
bodies no longer apply. (19) 
Financial constraints on a gemeente 
It would appear from the above that gemeenten have considerable legal 
freedom in deciding what measures to take. We shall describe how that 
freedom is restricted by financial constraints, and we look first at 
constraints on the income of a gemeente (for that affects the extent 
of its actions) and then at controls on its expenditure (which affect 
the nature of its actions). (20) 
The most striking asoect of the income of a gemeente is how much of it 
comes directly from the centre: in 1977, 94% of current income (Gouds­
waard, 1978, p.48) and in 1975, 72% of current and caoital income. (21) 
Particularly important is how little freedom gemeenten have for in­
creasing their current income and, in that way, choosing the extent of 
their actions. They have control over certain local levies (local taxes, 
of which the most imoortant is a property tax, charges, and 
contributions) and profits from such things as local public utilities: 
but together those contributed only 6% of current income in 1977 More­
over, the central authority tries (by circulars etc.) to regulate some 
of the tariffs, by raising which a gemeente could increase its local 
income. A further limit on local income is that gemeenten nay not raise 
more than a prescribed amount from property taxes: but - rather sur­
prisingly - most gemeenten choose to set their property taxes much 
lower than the maximum (the "onbenutte belastingcapaciteit"). (22) 
The expenditure of a gemeente is limited in a number of ways. First 
there is the fact that it is very inflexible, and that for five reasons. 
The first is that a very large part of the income received from the 
centre is in the form of specific grants (specifieke uitkeringen) - in 
1977, 55% of all current income and in 1975, 47% of current and capital 
income. (23) Second, the central authority often exerts pressure on 
the gemeenten to undertake - and thus commt their money to - certain 
activities. This is the so-called "verkokerd dirigisme", a sort of 
"government by circulars", even by circulars not yet aporoved by 
Parliament: Schroot et al (1977, part II, о.383) mention the use of 
conditional financial supoort. Third, such centralism is also encouraged 
by the giving of "contributions" (bijdragen), the centre can give not 
only specific grants to which gemeenten have a right but can also grant 
a contribution towards a particular scheme: in that way, according to 
van Bork and Schrijver (1980), the centre can "govern via the ourse 
strings" (bestuur per gouden koorden). Fourth, gemeenten are often 
committed to paying contributions (to city regions, foundations, etc.) 
and subsidies (to associations etc.) the size of which is not under the 
control of the gemeenten (Goudswaard, 1978, p.70, calls this horizontal 
or complementary dependence). And fifth must be mentioned the "meer­
jarenplannen", financial estimates for the coming few years, a sort of 
financial rolling programme. Gemeenten are not obliged to produce these 
(24), but many do and such plans have tended to have a conservative 
effect: they indicate the future financial commitments if a gemeente 
continues to pursue its present policies and they present thus a picture 
of very narrow financial margins for manoeuvring (de budgetruimte, see 
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Mol, 1980). The result of those five types of limitations is that the 
expenditure of gemeenten (especially their current expenditure) is very 
inflexible and that the "free margin" available for new or revised 
policies is only a few percent a year. 
A different method by which the expenditure of a gemeente can be 
restricted is by the supervision to which it, as a lower authority of 
the State, is subjected by a higher authority. The principle of this 
supervision was explained earlier, so here we just give a few examples 
of the types of financial decisions to which it is aoplied: 
- the budget must be approved in advance, also modifications to the 
budget 
- all financial decisions can be supervised retrospectively. The Act 
mentions the following points, setting up and participating in 
foundations, limited companies, associations, etc; taking out loans; 
giving loans; buying and selling property 
- the end-of-year accounts must be approved retrospectively and the 
gemeente has to be able to give a satisfactory explanation to the 
province of any deviations from the budget 
- gemeenten must obtain prior aporoval for the local taxes that they 
want to levy. 
Apart from that supervision, there is a separate law which regulates 
the ways in which gemeenten may finance their capital expenditure and 
the extent of their short-term loans And finally it should be mentioned 
that in 1980 7% (56 in number) of all gemeenten were so-called 'artikel 
12 gemeenten' this means that they had nad to receive extra financial 
assistance from the centre in order to balance their budgets, as a 
result of which they have to submit to extra financial restrictions for 
a few years 
In spite of all those restrictions on exoenditure there is still, 
according to Goudswaard (1978, ρ 122), considerable freedom left open to 
gemeenten to undertake activities and the consequent financial outlays. 
the main reason is the constitutional position of gemeenten and the 
corresponding principle that their activities may only be tested at the 
margins. Moreover, the central authority has no wish to become involved 
in all the decisions of the lower authorities (and here Goudswaard 
- pp.141-2 - emohasises one,exception important for our study, namely 
decisions by gemeenten about industrial activities in their areas). 
Where the central authority j_s concerned is about the effect of alj^ local 
expenditure on national macro-economic policy. And for that reason the 
centre controls not the nature of the expenditures of gemeenten but the 
extent (the so-called "blunt axe method") by a tight control of the 
income to the gemeenten. (25) 
The picture we are left with, after noting those legal and financial 
constraints, is not that with which we started - gemeente enjoying a 
constitutionally guaranteed autonomy. "Surely", says Cornelissen (quoted 
by van den Brink, (1980)), "autonomy of which the duration and the 
conditions are determined by higher powers is no autonomy". 
Gemeenten and local employment problems, the "upper limit" 
The "upper limit" to a geneente's activities is set by what the higher 
authorities are doing, for a lower authority may not take measures which 
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have the effect of undoing or thwarting the regulations passed by a 
higher authority. And although in general the higher authorities might 
enforce this upper limit leniently, when it comes to gemeenten trying 
to influence industrial activities in their areas the upper limit is 
much more strictly imposed. 
That is what Goudswaard (1978, pp. 141-2) claims, and the reasons are 
fairly clear. "It is obvious", say Schroot et al (1977, part III, p.90), 
"that central government must play a dominant role in looking after 
social-economic welfare ... Only in that way can a policy be followed 
which guarantees, both separately and together, a balance between the 
various sectors of society, assistance proportional to needs, equality, 
legal certainty and justice" (evenwichtigheid, evenredigheid, gelijk-
heid, zekerheid en rechtvaardigheid). Schroot et al show how strongly 
centralised is regional economic policy in the Netherlands: this is the 
policy for influencing the location of industrial activity throughout 
the country, it is in many ways similar to that in Britain, both in its 
history and in the instruments it uses (see, for example, de Smidt, 1972 
and the two Notes Regionaal Sociaal-Economisch Beleid 1977-1980 and 
1981-1985) and it is no less centralised than its British counterpart-
(26) Then they continue, "The above may lead one to the opinion that, 
within this (policy field) no significant activities have been set 
aside for gemeenten ... This however is not correct. In looking after 
social-economic welfare there is a job of significant proportions for 
gemeenten, although this task has become more and more embedded in the 
corresponding policy of the provincial and central authorities" (op cit, 
p.92, DBN's emphasis). 
What are the ways in which a gemeente can influence "social-economic 
welfare" within its boundaries? Hartog (1965) distinguishes eight 
"economic functions" of a public authority and Schroot et al (1977, 
vol. II, p.273) consider that gemeenten can participate in six of them: 
(i) creating a climate in which economic processes can take place 
(ii) financing public services and spending public money effectively 
and efficiently 
(iii) financing collective goods and services 
(iv) regulation and control over its own finances 
(v) running public companies 
(vi) intervening in the economic life of the area by subsidies and by 
levying taxes. 
Some of those will be expanded upon (using Schroot et al, 1977, vol. 
Ill, pp.92-8), especially where gemeenten may take measures not open to 
English local authorities. 
Under function (i) a gemeente may: 
- try to ensure a good arrangement of land uses 
- provide and maintain streets, paths, open space, waterways 
- provide public transport 
- plan and regulate the transport in its area 
- provide land and accommodation for industry. Here it is important to 
point out that in the Netherlands most land for new building is 
provided by the gemeente: for example, of all the industrial land sold 
for new development between 1965 and 1978, 76% was sold by gemeenten 
(Maandstatistiek van de Bouwnijverheid). By contrast, it is only as 
an exception that an English local authority provides industrial land 
(see chapter 4) 
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- provide and regulate markets and harbours 
- promote local industry and try to attract new firms. 
Under functions ( m ) and (v) gemeenten, unlike their English counter­
parts, provide the gas, water and electricity services, separately or 
in co-operation with adjacent gemeenten 
Under function (vi) gemeenten may and do run banks for both saving and 
lending; may give subsidies toward the cost of buildings for industry, 
trade, and commercial services, and Schroot et al (op.cit.) even include 
here the welfare payments given by social service departments of gemeen­
ten Under this function fit also the taxes which a gemeente may levy, 
even though the extent of these and freedom of a gemeente over its 
taxes are both severely limited. 
Those are extensive powers and, claims Goudswaard (1978, ρ 141), they 
enable gemeenten to exercise "a large influence on the economic struct­
ure in their area". And Smit (1975), although he classifies differently 
the relevant instruments available to a gemeente, comes to the same 
conclusion - "a direct and influential role in the economic development 
(of its area)". That influence is exercised by removing "bottlenecks in 
the production environment" says Smit (1981), by 'creating the conditions 
that will makean entrepeneur more willing to invest in the area" say 
Olden and Verhoef (1978), by creating the "necessary conditions to 
ensure a production structure which will take up the local supply of 
labour" says the Association of Dutch Gemeenten (Vereniging van Neder­
landse Gemeenten, 1977). The powers can also, of course, be used 
negatively, by not removing bottlenecks or not providing the conditions, 
industrial developments can be hindered. (27) 
That is what Schroot et al (1977, vol.Ill, p.92) call "a job of 
significant proportions for gemeenten" but gemeenten can be severely 
restricted in carrying out that job by the "upper limits" of the 
economic policy of higher authorities. The gemeente powers are passive 
- providing the necessary conditions for things to happen - so by acting 
negatively a gemeente can hinder the attempts by a higher authority 
to implement an active policy of industrial development for the gemeen-
te's territory. Zandsteeg (1980) gives the examole of the Eemshaven 
area where the central government wants to stimulate industry but the 
province of Groningen and the gemeente Delfzijl want to restrict it for 
environmental reasons Such cases, however, are rare in this period of 
high unemployment, and much more common is where a higher authority wants 
to restrict the industrial develooment of an area (either actively or 
by steering development elsewhere) against the wishes of the gemeente 
there Can the gemeente then use its powers to thwart national policy7 
"Central government allows no room for such measures" says the Associ­
ation of Dutch Gemeenten, they clearly trangress the "upper limit". 
So gemeenten may use their powers to further the success of centrally 
implemented economic policies (28), they may plead to be allowed to 
play a greater role in the application of those centrally provided 
instruments (such as the Selectieve Investeringsregeling and the Wet 
Investeringsrekening) with which regional econome policy is being 
pursued, but they may not counter regional policy Is there any room for 
a gemeente to pursue an independent "economic policy"7 The room is very 
restricted, says the Association of Dutch Gemeenten (VNG, 1977) Such 
a statement cannot be deduced from a study of statutory powers (as was 
possible for English local authorities) because the room allowed is 
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determined by how higher authorities impose the "upper limt' in 
practice.An indication of how central government wishes to do that with 
respect to employment policy is provided by a set of "guidelines" drawn 
up by the Ministry of Home Affairs (Binnenlandse Zaken) in 1961 in order 
to instruct the provinces how to exercise their supervision over gemeen­
ten in matters concerning the giving of assistance to industry ("Richt­
lijnen voor de beoordeling van besluiten tot het verlenen van medewer­
king aan industrievestiging"). The main considerations (Kamerstuk 
1980/81, 16492) were to prevent gemeenten distorting the pattern of 
competition (concurrentievervalsende maatregelen) and to protect gemeen­
ten financially. The first consideration expresses clearly the wish of 
the central authority that local authorities should have only very 
limited oowers here: "The guidelines have as a starting point that 
giving assistance (steunverlening) to firms does not in principle belong 
to the responsibilities of a gemeente .. (and) this starting point will 
be maintained". (Nota Regionaal Sociaal-Economisch Beleid, 1981-1985, 
p.152) 
For further insights into how the higher authorities impose the "upper 
limit" we have to study the practice of gemeenten trying to take in­
dependent actions in this area, and we can learn most from those cases 
where higher authorities have disallowed the proposals of a gemeente, 
for it is by such precedents that the "upper limits" are established 
So we read, for example (Provincie Gelderland, voorstel Η-31Δ, 18 Nov 
1980) that central government is taking action against the gemeente 
Enschede for actions which supposedly transgress the above guidelines, 
and we see in the case study of Eindhoven (chapter 5) how the province 
blocked a particular measure which the gemeente Eindhoven wished to 
take. We note further the story of how Rotterdam introduced a oolicy 
of issuing industrial land only to firms which agreed to adopt certain 
labour relations (sociaal vestigingsbeleid - see, e.g., De Gemeentestem 
по. 6270 and no. 6276 both of 1973 and Terpstra, 1974). This was a 
new policy for gemeenten and after its proposal in 1969 it took until 
1973 before it was formulated. Then the central ministry responsible for 
labour affairs (Sociale Zaken) asked Rotterdam to withdraw the prooosal 
on the grounds, among others, that labour affairs are a matter for 
central government. Rotterdam refused, and a motion was passed in the 
"House of Commons" (Tweede Kamer) instructing the relevant Minister to 
forbid the policy. The Minister ignored the motion, and eventually 
agreement was reached over a reformulation which weakened the policy 
somewhat. That opened the way, and several other gemeenten now have 
similar policies (see Geraets, 1980 and Olden and Verhoef, 1978). 
Such cases are not common however, so we have also to look at the 
economic measures being taken by gemeenten without hindrance from higher 
authorities We have to remember, however, that such a study might give 
the impression of an "upper limit" imposed more tightly than it really 
is, the false impression being given either by cautious gemeenten not 
daring to explore the limits of their freedom of action, or by gemeenten 
with a severely restricted financial freedom, or by both. The study by 
Geraets (1980) of the measures to counteract local unemployment being 
taken in 1979 by 11 of the largest gemeenten in the Netherlands does not 
give a picture of gemeenten adventurously pursuing a wide-ranging and 
active local employment policy The general impression was of the ge­
meenten providing industrial land (but that is traditionally one of the 
functions of Dutch local authorities) and infrastructure, spending money 
(sometimes quite large sums) on promotion and acquisition, helping 
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firms in difficulties to extract financial help from the central 
authority, and taking advantage of schemes financed by the centre but 
implemented by gemeenten (extra money for construction to reduce un-
employment in the building industry, for example) The fact that those 
gemeenten complained not only of the lack of oowers but also of the lack 
of money means that we cannot attribute this generally low level of 
activity simply to the "upper limit" imposed by higher authorities. An 
idea of the interaction between that rather cautious approach and the 
operation of the "upper limit" is given by the developments observed 
in the course of this study, in chapter 5 we see how some gemeenten 
explored the possibilities within the upper limit and ended up with 
slightly wider powers than Geraets (1980) had discovered two years 
earl 1er. 
There is one further, and very important, comment to be made about the 
"upper limit" to a gemeente's activities. Employment measures are 
usually divided into those which affect the demand for labour and those 
which affect its supply (see further in appendix III). If that 
distinction is applied to the powers described by Schroot et al (1977) 
and listed above, we see that they are all powers to influence the 
demand for labour. The survey of 11 gemeenten described above (Geraets, 
1980) asked about measures taken to influence the supply of labour and 
found very few, found even that some gemeenten saw it as not their task 
to be able to exercise that influence. (29) Another attempt to draw 
uo a list of instruments for a regional policy found only two which a 
gemeente might use for influencing labour supply - operating nursery 
schools and operating primary schools (Onderzoek A.R.E Nijmegen, 1979). 
That state of affairs is very different from in England - where local 
authorities can orovide housing, training, careers advice and a place-
ment service, see earlier in this appendix - and the explanation must 
be sought to a large extent in the operation of the "upper limit". Most 
labour suoply measures are in the hands of a central government ministry 
(Sociale Zaken), and the provision of housing and of education after 
12 years of age are in the hands not of the gemeente but of semi-in-
dependent organisations subject to the supervision of the central 
authority. There is therefore very little scope left to gemeenten for 
influencing labour supply. 
The focus of concern about unemployment in the Netherlands 
Unemployment in the Netherlands began to grow steadily some years 
before 1974 (see figures 5.2 and II 3), but the significance of this 
for the politics of unemployment seems to have been slight. Our 
suggestion is that in the Netherlands, compared with England, concern 
is focussed less on the amount of total unemployment and more on certain 
aspects of it. 
Van Hoof (1977) reviews the course of labour market research in the 
Netherlands and divides it into three stages. In the first (the later 
1950's) research was "principally directed to changes in the working 
population ... which were then related to the problems experienced by 
firms". In the second (at the end of the 1960's) "the coming together 
of supply and demand and their mutual adaptation took a central place 
in research". And at present "more attention is being paid to the 
distributive function of the labour market and to the sorts of social 
inequality which are thereby manifested". 
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In the first two of the stages distinguished above, the accent was 
laid on the behaviour of the labour supply side, says van Hoof (1977). 
"Labour market policy in the Netherlands since the Second World War 
has been principally a policy for labour supply (arbeidsvoorzieningen-
beleid). Initially the attempt was to achieve and maintain a situation 
of full employment, but this gradually acquired a qualitative aspect 
also, expressed in the term - an optimal allocation of labour. That 
meant ... an adaptation of the supply to the demand in such a way that 
everybody's capabilities might be used optimally: the correct man in 
the correct place". This is the goal, now very widely accepted, of 
"full and worthwhile employment" (volledige en volwaardige werkgelegen-
heid) and helping people to find "suitable work" (passend werk) - see, 
for example. Lewin 1977, and "Jaarverslag Arbeidsmarkt 1979" (1980). 
(30) 
The third (present day) of van Hoof's stages of labour market research 
Days attention to labour demand as well as supply and has as its 
concern social inequality arising from labour market processes: we see 
research into labour market segmentation, the theory of the dual labour 
market, the position of women, discrepancies and bottlenecks in the 
labour market, etc. This is confirmed by recent reviews of current 
labour market research (31), and the 1979 Annual Report of the 
Ministry responsible for employment ("Jaarverslag Arbeidsmarkt 1979", 
1980) says "The labour market policy is directed at, on the one hand, 
greater fluidity in the labour market and, on the other hand, a 
different distribution of the available employment. In this way it will 
be ensured that unemployment does not weigh disproportionately heavily 
on certain population groups". 
From the above it is evident that the focus of concern in the last 
few years has been on the employment and unemployment of certain 
vulnerable social groupings in the labour market (the importance of 
this for theory is treated in appendix III). Moreover, most of the 
measures available for tackling those problems operate on the supply 
side of the labour market (arbeidsvoorziemngenbeleid). (32) 
The relevance of the above for gemeenten trying to tackle local un-
employment now becomes clear. 
- The few powers which gemeenten have for influencing employment 
locally are powers which operate on the demand side. 
- Moreover those powers are fairly general and if they work at all 
cannot be used to influence the demand for particular types of labour. 
(33) 
- Supply side instruments have more potential for improving the employ-
ment conditions of selected social groupings, but gemeenten are 
prevented from using such instruments by the fact that the central 
authority is pursuing labour supply policies even at the local level. 
- The above is taking place within a political climate in which the 
dominant concern is for the employment difficulties of certain social 
groupings. Yet the gemeenten are hardly able, because of legal and 
financial constraints, to respond to that dominant concern. 
In that situation, gemeenten react in one of two ways. Either they 
say: the employment problems of our residents cannot be any concern of 
ours, or they say: we are frustrated in our wish to help our residents 
with their employment problems. (34) The survey by Geraets (1980) 
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found both reactions It is the latter reaction (among with the 
frustrations felt by gemeenten about the restrictions on some of their 
other powers) which is fuelling the demands for a decentralisation of 
powers 
A decentralisation of employnent policy7 
Decentralisation is defined as "decreasing the interference of higher 
authorities in the affairs of lower authorities, and leaving areas of 
government open to lower public bodies (even by the centre withdrawing 
from certain policy areas) so that the lower public bodies have the 
opportunity of pursuing their own policies' (Nota Regional Sociaal-
Economsch Beleid 1981-1985, p. 153). Central government has committed 
itself to a policy of decentralisation is that going to give gemeenten 
the freedom they want for tackling unemployment7 
That seems to be highly unlikely. In general, central government is 
paying little more than lip service to the policy (according to 
Hoogerwerf, 1980), and with respect to an economic or an emoloyment 
policy the central government has shown quite clearly that it has no 
intention at all of giving any extra powers to gemeenten, on the 
contrary That is apparent from the central policy paper "Nota Regio-
naal Sociaal-Economisch Beleid 1981-1985". If there is to be any de-
centralisation it will be of powers to carry out certain infrastructural 
works, and the decentralisation extends no further than to the provinces. 
they will then be expected to keep a closer eye on the geneenten And 
about policies and measures for the labour supply the Note says 'For 
the time being the judgement of the Government is that a redistribution 
between the centre and the lower authorities of powers to influence and 
steer the labour supply (arbeidsvoorzieningen) would not be appropriate" 
(pp 158-9) The execution of some of central government's measure will 
be left to gemeenten, and there will always be some freedom left over 
for the latter to take measures which supplement (DBN's emohasis) the 
centre's measures. (35) But there will be no possibility of the gemeen-
ten getting the type of powers that many of them consider would be 
necessary for taking active or independent measures against unemployment 
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Statutory instruments available to English local authorities for taking 
employment measures. 
STATUTORY OBLIGATIONS FOR EMPLOYMENT SERVICES 
ACT INSTRUMENT POSSIBLE MEASURE 
Employment & 
Training Act 
1973 S 8 
Education Act 
1944 S.7 
Industrial 
Training Act 
1964 S 16 
Town & Country 
Planning Act 
1971 SS.6,7,11 
Disabled Per-
sons (Employ-
ment) Act 1958 
Provision of Careers Advice 
Service 
Vocational and Industrial 
Training 
Vocational and Industrial 
Training 
Land Allocation 
Provision of Sheltered 
Employment and Workshops 
Uptake of schemes under 
the MSC's Youth Opportun-
ities Programme 
Training Courses in 
Col leges of Further 
Education, "Off the Job" 
Courses (in association 
with ITB's and employers) 
Ensure no planning con-
straints on supply of land 
for emoloyment purposes 
Improve the employment 
chances of disabled persons 
STATUTORY OBLIGATIONS FOR SERVICES AND THE INSTRUMENTS 
THAT MIGHT BE USED FOR EMPLOYMENT MEASURES 
ACT INSTRUMENT POSSIBLE MEASURE 
Education Act 
1944 S.7 
Education Act 
1944 S.8 
Education Act 
1944 S.42,84 
Housing Act 
1957 S.91 
Local Govern-
ment Act 1972 
S.203 
Duty to provide efficient Work sampler courses 
education to meet the needs 
of the population 
Provision of primary schools Nursery school provision 
(including nursery schools 
and classes) 
Preparation of Further 
Education Schemes 
Duty of local authorities 
to consider the housing 
needs of their areas with 
respect to the provision of 
further housing accommod-
ation 
Provision of co-ordinated 
and efficient systems of 
public transport to meet 
the needs of the County 
(non-metropolitan) 
Training Courses 
Allocation oolicies to 
imorove intra-housing-
authority labour mobility 
Housing for incoming work-
ers. Provision of rented 
housing Provision of 
housing for sale 
New roads 
Road improvement 
Traffic management schemes 
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Local Govern­
ment Act 1972 
S.203 
Transport Act 
1968 S.20 
Grants towards costs 
incurred by private 
passenger transport under­
takings. Power to subsidise 
public transport 
Assistance for rural bus 
and ferry services 
Specific route subsidies 
General fare subsidies 
Grants for upkeep of ser­
vices. Provide support for 
train services 
Local Govern­
ment Act 1972 
5.3,л 
Assistance for rural Dus 
and ferry services 
Town and County To acquire and dispose of 
Planning Act land for development, re-
1971 S.112,119, development, or improve-
123 ment 
Provide land for employment 
purposes 
Local Govern- To acquire and dispose of 
ment Act 1971 land for development, re-
S.124 development, or improvement 
Town & Country To develop land for planning Provision of a variety of 
Planning Act purposes serviced sites for 
1971 S.124 industrial development 
Town & Country Determination of applic-
Planmng Act ations for planning 
1971 S.29,30,45 permission 
Development control policies 
Decrease time taken to 
process appiications 
Town & Country Order for discontinuance of Review of policies to re-
Planning Act use, alteration, or removal locate non-conforming uses 
1971 S.51 of buildings 
Town & Country Agreements regulating dev-
Planmng Act elopment and use of land 
1971 S.52 
Review of policies to re­
locate non-conforming uses 
Control of 
Pollution Act 
1974 
DoE Circulars 
10/73, 2/76 
Control of noise from 
factories etc. 
Control of Noise from 
factories etc. 
Clean Air Act Control of emission into 
1956 the atmosphere 
Method and stringency of 
application can affect 
amount of industrial 
activity and hence employ­
ment 
Method and stringency of 
application can affect 
amount of industrial 
activity and hence employ­
ment 
162 
Building Regul- Enforce methods of 
ations Statutory factory etc. building 
instrument 
1972/317 and 
1976/1676 
Method and stringency of 
application can affect 
amount of industrial 
activity and hence employ-
ment 
PERMISSIVE POWERS 
ACT INSTRUMENT POSSIBLE MEASURE 
Local Author-
ities (Land) 
Act 1963 S.3 
Local Author-
ities (land) 
Act 1963 S.4 
Loans to firms Loans for erection of buil-
ings on land sold or let 
by Local Authorities (up to 
75% valuation) 
Loans in pursuance of build- Loans to firms 
ing agreements (up to 75% 
valuation) 
Local Author-
i t i e s (Land) 
Act 1963 S.2 
Local Govern-
ment Act 1971 
S.120 
Local Author i ty Development Provision of advance 
of land-erect ion of b u i l d - f a c t o r i e s , warehouses, small 
ings or construct ions, or uni ts 
works upon land (subject 
to Min is te r 's consent) 
Local Author-
i t i e s (Land) 
Act 1963 S.6 
Treatment of de re l i c t land Provision of indus t r ia l land 
Local Govern- Dispose of land at reduced Supply land at subsidised 
ment Act rents fo r l im i ted periods prices for employment 
1972 S 123 purposes 
Local Govern- Power to do anything con- Create economic/industr ial 
ment Act ducive to the discharge of development units 
1972 S . I l l t he i r functions 
Local Govern-
ment Act 
1972 S.142, 
144 
Provision of information Promotion-land and property 
reg is ters etc 
Local Govern-
ment Act 1972 
S 112,113 
Local Govern-
ment (Mise 
Provisions) 
Act 1976 S.28 
Appointment of s t a f f 
Set up a fund to meet any 
expenditure in connection 
with t he i r functions 
Indust r ia l Development 
Off icers 
A fund to support economic 
development 
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Local Govern- Power to incur expenditure Set up a fund to support 
ment Act in the in teres ts of the area economic development 
1972 S.137 or i t s inhabitants up to a 
maximum of 2p product of the 
rates 
Local Author- Power to invest up to 10% Invest funds in local firms 
ity Superann- of superannuation funds in 
uation Reg- unquoted securities 
ulations 1974 
List of measures against unemployment that were being taken by, or had 
been suggested for, Dutch gemeenten 
to influence the demand for labour 
1. Placing orders with or making purchases from local employers 
2. Using the central government scheme for supplementary public works 
3. Supplying industrial land 
4. Disposing of i ndus t r i a l land in such a way as to st imulate employ-
ment 
5. Using land prices to st imulate employment 
6. Supplying new indus t r i a l premises 
7. Rehabi l i ta t ing i ndus t r i a l premises 
8. Providing the i n f ras t ruc tu ra l f a c i l i t i e s which f irms use 
9. Carrying out acqu is i t ion and promotion 
10 Helping f irms in d i f f i c u l t i e s 
11. Speeding up the procedures (planning permissions e t c . ) which new 
or expanding f irms must go through 
12. Maintaining good contacts with firms 
13. Taking an equity share in terest in f irms 
to improve the brokerage between labour supply and labour demand 
14. Organising or helping to organise a "jobs-market" 
15 Sett ing up or helping to set up a public employment agency for 
supplying temporary labour 
16. Sett ing up or helping to set up "labour pools" 
17. Maintaining contacts wi th the local employment o f f i ce 
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to influence the labour supply 
18. Setting up or helping to organise training and retraining courses 
19. Maintaining contact with or subsidising careers-advice offices 
20. Promoting new educational opportunities within the area 
21. Making accommodation available to employees who come with firms 
moving into the area 
job creation schemes etc. 
22. Promoting the possibilities for training places, temporary employ­
ment or part-time work within the gemeente staff establishment 
23. Promoting the possibilities for training places, temporary employ­
ment or part-time work within other (quasi-) oublie bodies 
other 
24. Exercising pressure on central government 
NOTES 
(1) Local governments are of two types, counties and districts However, 
although geographically the counties "contain" the districts, those 
two levels of local government are politically, and almost entirely 
administratively, independent of each other (although a certain 
amount of co-operation between them is required over such matters 
as the making of Development Plans, in operating development control, 
and in planning, building and maintaining highways) Further, both 
have the same constitutional position vis-a-vis central government 
(which is why we speak of two tiers - central and local - rather 
than three - central, county and district), and everything in this 
chapter about central/local government relationships applies 
equally to both counties and districts 
(2) A local authority is a corporate body and as such can pursue only 
those objectives, using only those powers, as are stated in the 
Act or Charter of Incorporation (Cross С A , 1974, chap.l). Central 
government determines the content of the Act or Charter of 
Incorporation for local authorities and ensures that the resulting 
restrictions are not transgressed 
(3) This recommendation was not accepted by central government Nor, 
and more pertinently for this study, was the recommendation by that 
same Commission (op cit , oara.Sl) that local government should 
have much more responsibility for 'economic planning" within its 
area. 
(4) Precise definitions are important here, but 29% is the figure both 
for all UK local authorities' current account income (Financial 
Statistics, HMSO) and for all England and Wales local authorities' 
rate fund services revenue income (Local Government Financial 
Statistics, HMSO). 
(5) But it must be added that central government has recently started 
to use its current grant to a local authority deliberately in order 
to neutralise any attempts by a local authority to increase its 
independent income from the rates 
(6) Much of this section is taken, some of it verbatim, from JURUE 1979, 
chap.2, to which the present author contributed. Our concern in the 
case studies is with measures taken to reduce unemployment. Here we 
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have listed the full range of powers to influence employment more 
generally, because that gives the wider context within which 
measures against unemployment can be taken. 
(7) A local authority can promote a "Local Bill" asking for extra legal 
powers. If Parliament grants that request the Bill becomes a "Local 
Act": the extra powers become available only to the local govern­
ment which asked for them A "Special Act" is sponsored by the 
central government itself, and gives extra legal powers only to 
certain specified local authorities. 
(8) There is another kind of constraint, very imoortant for local 
government/central government relationships although it is not 
applied to local governments taking measures explicitly to 
influence employment locally. It is that central government may 
require that local authorities submit to it for approval certain 
policy statements before being allowed to implement those policies: 
examples are Structure Plans, Transport Policies and Programmes, 
Housing Improvement Policies 
(9) The progress of the County of Tyne and Wear Bill 1975 is described 
by Rogers and Smth (1977) and we have traced the progress of the 
County of South Glamorgan Bill 1976 (correspondence with the County 
Solicitor, South Glamorgan). In both cases central government 
allowed the bills to be passed but only after greatly diluting 
the powers they would have given: for the details see Needham 1977 
(b), appendix 4D. Other local authorities which promoted similar 
Bills failed totally and the requested Acts were not passed. 
(10) See, e.g. MacMorran 1973 who describes the building with that aim 
of new roads in Birmingham between 1924 and 1927. 
(11) There are several reasons for choosing this date First, the Local 
Government Act 1972 by which the whole organisation of local 
government in Britain was radically altered included the clause 
(section 262) that all existing Local Acts would be repealed in 
1979 (metropolitan counties) or 1984 (elsewhere): and significantly 
many of the new local authorities created in 1974 reacted by 
promoting Local Bills to acquire or re-acquire extra powers for 
taking employment measures (inter alia, Tyne and Wear C.C., South 
Glamorgan С С , Greater London Council, West Yorkshire C.C., 
Merseyside C.C., Cheshire C.C.). Second, a survey of Industrial 
Development Officers (URBED, 1978) showed that for those author­
ities with IDO's 41% had established the posts in the period 
1975-78. Third, there are the impressions, created by surveying 
22 local authorities in the West Midlands (see chapter 4) and 
by reading the burgeoning literature in this field, that 1974-75 
saw an upsurge of this activity. A oartial list of local employ­
ment measures taken and proposed in 1974, 1975 and 1976 is included 
as appendices В and С to chapter 2, Needham 1977(b) 
(12) The Assisted Areas are those regions in Britain where private 
firms receive special incentives given by central government in 
order to stimulate industrial and employment growth. 
(13) I.D.C.'s are licenses to build industrial floorspace and they must 
be obtained from central government before building factories over 
a certain size in the non-Assisted Areas. 
(14) In this section, use has been made of Belinfante (1973), Oud (1970), 
van de Pot/Donner (1977), Schroot et al (1977). 
(15) This illustrates one of the important differences between Dutch 
and English local government In the Netherlands, the provinces 
are a higher authority than the gemeenten, in England the Districts 
and Councils have a similar legal status with respect to the 
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central authority. 
(16) Prior permission for buying and selling land and buildings is not 
required by gemeenten with more than 100,000 residents. 
(17) There is a further legal possibility for restricting a gemeente 
that should be mentioned here. The burgemeester is the chief 
executor of the decisions of the gemeente council (de raad) and of 
the "College van Burgemeester en Wethouders" (a sort of executive 
committee). He or she is also, however, indeoendent of those 
bodies, being appointed by the Crown. A burgemeester who considers 
that he or she is being asked to execute a decision which is in 
his or her opinion contrary to the law or the general interests 
must inform the province and refuse to obey the wishes of the 
council or "college". 
(18) By acting as a private legal person a gebeente does not escape the 
attention of "het publiekrecht": but that latter legislation 
restricts a gemeente acting as a private legal person in only a 
limited number of specified cases - see Bonnema et al, 1979, part 
I, pp.66 et seq. 
(19) De Haan et al (1978, pp.144 etc.) call this kind of activity "bui-
tenwettelijke regelingsbevoegdheid", acquiring powers outside the 
legislation, because the gemeenten are withdrawing themselves from 
the sphere of influence of the law governing oublie administration. 
Nevertheless,it must be said that in most cases a gemeente sets 
up such bodies mainly in order to obtain a different advantage: it 
can act more quickly than if it were subject to the usual checks 
of the gemeente council. 
(20) In writing this section the following have been used: Goudswaard 
(1978), Bonnema et al (1979). 
(21) Financial information about gemeenten is difficult to find. The 
information about current and capital income together is derived, 
with reservations, from Koopmans 1975 and the C.B.S. Yearbook 1977. 
(22) Perhaps the reason is that the effect on its income of raising 
property taxes would be so low that a gemeente considers it would 
not be worthwhile in view of the ensuing oolitical unpopularity 
- see later, the divorce between expenditure responsibility and 
income responsibility. 
(23) Sources as above. Note that the specific grant components of the 
gemeentefonds - for social services and for orimary education -
are included here in the general grant. If that were not so, then 
the proportion of income in the form of specific grants would be 
even higher. 
(24) Provinces are required to produce such financial estimates and a 
proposed change in the law would require gemeenten to do the same. 
(25) One of the results, according to Goudswaard (1978, p.143) is that 
gemeenten have responsibility for their expenditures but not for 
their income, and that they therefore are not forced to weigh the 
benefits to be obtained from any proposed expenditure against its 
costs. This is a good example of what the Layfield Report on 
local government finance in England and Wales (Local Government 
Finance, 1976, chap.3) called "the divorce of administrative and 
financial responsibility". And the divorce is more extreme in the 
Netherlands (where gemeenten control only about 6e,- of their own 
income) than in England and Wales (where the corresponding figure 
is around 30%). 
(26) For example, Hoffman (1977) says about the first of the above 
mentioned Notes that it is, from the point of view of its analysis, 
more about a national policy than a regional policy. 
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(27) A useful discussion of the scope and limitations of the instruments 
available to gemeenten for influencing conditions in the local 
labour market is found in Geerling et al, 1978, chap 7 
(28) There are some who argue that gemeenten should be allowed to use 
their powers inthisway only, and that this should be achieved by 
the gemeenten having to share those powers with the provinces: see, 
for example, Zandsteeg (1980), Kurstjens (1974), Olden and Verhoef 
(1980). 
(29) That survey asked gemeenten whether they had applied any of 26 
"possible measures" in order to tackle unemployment. That list was 
compiled from reports by gemeenten about measures being taken and 
being considered, and only 4 were found which could be described 
as "supply side' measures plus a further 4 which attempted to 
improve the contact between suppliers and demanders A modified 
version of that list is included at the end of this appendix. 
(30) De Galan (1981, chap 5) summarises the development of labour market 
policy in the Netherlands and he also traces the rise of a concern 
for "the conditions or work, in a broad sense". Van Woorden (1980) 
talks about "the sociologising of the labour market"! 
(31) See, e g. van der Woude, 1979, and the Newsletters from SISWO, 
Amsterdam about current labour market research in the Netherlands 
(32) The measures being taken centrally to stimulate the national 
economy (macro-economic policy) and certain local economies 
(regional economic policy) must not be forgotten. But it is 
recognised that the effect of those measures on those suffering 
the worst unemployment might be slight. "However, this (macro-
economic) policy is inadequate for making a satisfactory impact 
on a number of specific problems in employment and the labour 
market" (Commissie Arbeidsmarktverkenmng, 1980). This point is 
argued more fully in appendix III 
(33) Geerling et al say (1978, p.132) after establishing that providing 
the physical conditions for industry is the most important thing 
that a gemeente can do, "Moreover it is far from certain that the 
firms which announce themselves will be those firms which are 
inroortant for a guaiitative balance on the labour market" (DBN's 
emphasis). It must be noted that some gemeenten now have a policy 
of issuing industrial land selectively, precisely in order to try 
to achieve a labour demand which matches the local labour supply. 
However, the survey by Geraets (1980) found that most of the land 
in these gemeenten was being issued without regard for that 
selective policy. 
(34) "It is obvious that the very limited freedom which gemeenten have 
for pursuing a local economic policy is experienced by gemeente 
officials as frustrating" (V N G , 1977). 
(35) The ways in which central government's employment policies are 
implemented locally and the extent to which account is taken of 
the wishes or the actions of the gemeenten are described in detail 
by Geraets, 1982 
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Appendix III A theoretical framework for 
local employment 
measures 
It is our aim in this appendix to set out a theoretical framework 
within which to place and discuss the technical aspects of local employ-
ment measures. In more detail the theoretical framework must: 
- explain the amount and composition of unemployment in a local area 
in such a way as to provide a basis for policies for reducing that 
unemployment. (1) The explanation, moreover, should be quantitative 
so as to allow the size of the effects of measures to be predicted in 
case it should be necessary to choose between different measures on 
the basis of their likely efficiency or effectiveness. 
- analyse for local areas which are administratively defined, for the 
studies are of local governments taking emoloyment measures. That 
means that, even if it were possible to define local labour markets 
across the boundaries of which net labour flows were small or zero 
(2) (and within which, presumably, analysis of unemployment would be 
easier), we have not the choice of working with such areas but must 
be prepared to analyse the often economically arbitrary areas of 
English districts and counties and Dutch gemeenten 
- incorporate the employment measures being taken by local governments 
in England and the Netherlands That is, there must be sufficient 
points of contact between our theoretical framework and the framework 
(the "technology image") used by the public agencies. 
- explain unemployment not just in general but also the distribution 
of unemployment between social groupings This requirement is set 
by the importance we have given to the question - can the measure be 
directed to help those people who are suffering the problem7 - and by 
the necessity to incorporate the local governments' measures (which 
are often directed to helping specific social groupings - e.g. women, 
school leavers). 
It must be emphasised that we are not trying to develop a new theory: 
rather we shall be searching among existing theories to find ideas 
which can provide the framework we need and which have not (yet) been 
refuted or discredited. (3) 
STARTING POINTS 
" .. The city is where externalities abound: and these externalities 
in turn are in many respects the raison d'etre of the city" says Hirsch 
(1979) He goes on "Consequently it is not enough to look at urban 
economics as modifying mainly neo-classical economic theory by 
introducing location and other spatial considerations into production 
and assumption decisions of firms, households, and governments. Instead.. 
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urban markets are the focal point around which to organise urban 
economics as a discipline .. ι e. the interdependencies of actors 
within them and the interdependencies between different urban markets 
rather than ... the behaviour of individual firms and households" For 
that reason we take as one of our starting points local labour markets. 
We do not claim that there exist local labour markets in the sense of 
geographical areas across the boundaries of which no labour flows Rather 
we use the definition of Heijke et al (1975, p.11) that a labour market 
is the "functional place where labour enters the production process, or 
leaves it, or changes functions within it". Then we study the labour 
supply offered by the people living in an area, the labour demand by 
the firms operating in the area, the interactions between those two, and 
also the demand by firms outside the area for the labour supplied within 
it and the supply by people living outside the area to the firms located 
within it. Note that in taking labour markets as our staring point we 
are making the now familiar distinction between the market in which 
labour is exchanged and an only marginally related market in which wages 
are set (see, e.g., de Galan, 1981, chap 4) and we are talking of the 
first type of market only, that in which labour is exchanged. 
An alternative would be to attempt to modify neo-classical economic 
theory by introducing spatial considerations into production and 
consumption decisions (see for example "Planning by local authorities 
for employment within their areas", 1979): we reject this for the 
reasons that Hirsch gives above. Another alternative would be to put the 
emphasis on the demand for labour by local firms (e.g. Carmichael, 1978) 
sometimes on the labour demanded by a few specific firms of local 
significance (e.g. the method used by the Community Development Projects 
- see, e.g.. Moor, 1974 and Canning Town CDP, 1975), sometimes the sub­
suming of labour supply questions under the heading "the reproduction 
of the labour force" (e.g. Leyten and Fahrenkrog, 1932, chap.III.3). 
That approach we reject because it pays insufficient attention (or even 
grants no autonomy) to people's decisions about supplying their labour 
(the amount of labour they supply, the training they choose, etc.) 
whereas especially in the last few years, changes in the labour supply 
important for unemployment have come about as a result of changes in 
such supply decisions (see e g. de Galan, 1981, chapters 2 and 4). 
As our second starting point we distinguish three causes of unemploy­
ment in a local area. (4) 
- frictions in the labour market, whereby there are vacancies available 
which can be adequately filled by people living in the area and 
seeking work, but the process of matching supply and demand works 
slowly so that there are always people temporarily unemployed. 
- a mismatch between the occupations demanded and the occupations 
supplied. In this case, the vacancies available cannot be adequately 
filled by the local residents seeking work because the demand is for 
certain occupations and the supply is of other occuoations. Because 
this situation is often the result of structural changes in the 
economy, whereby there are changes in the mixture of goods and 
services produced or the technology used, which changes cause the 
occupational composition of demand to alter faster than the occup­
ational composition of supply can react, then this is called 
"structural unemployment". 
- a general deficiency in the demand for labour, whereby at the ruling 
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wage rates there are fewer vacancies available to the local residents 
than there are local residents seeking work, so that even if there 
were no frictions and no occupational mismatches still there would be 
people unemployed. 
(The question whether the local residents who are unemployed try to 
escape by looking for work in other locations is discussed later). 
There are other ways of classifying the causes of unemployment. De 
Galan (1981, chap.4), for example, classifies into seasonal/trade-cycle/ 
frictional/qualitative structural/quantitative structural/personal 
deficiency: Brown (1976) classifies into demand deficiency and market 
imperfection which latter is then divided into frictional/locational/ 
structural/personal deficiency. Thirlwall (1969) distinguishes what he 
calls an "American approach" whereby a twofold classification is used 
- demand deficiency and structural. Those classifications are not, 
however, inconsistent with ours. De Galan's seasonal, trade cycle, and 
quantitative structural categories are all varieties of demand 
deficiency, albeit varying in the duration for which the demand is 
expected to be inadequate: we do not make the distinction because 
seasonal unemployment is usually a minor evil and because the distinction 
trade cycle/quantitative structural rests upon too many assumptions to 
be useful for our purposes The non-demand-deficiency unemployment we 
divide into one clearly definable category (occupational mismatch) which 
can be tackled by a distinct measure (training), and the rest 
(frictional): Brown's categories "locational" and "personal deficiency" 
we introduce as modifications later (under "geographical mobility" and 
"segmentation" respectively). 
The particular classification of causes of unemployment is the explicit 
aspect of our second starting point. There is an implicit aspect too 
- the choice of a macro- rather than a micro-economic approach. The 
latter starts with the individual actors, the most important of whom 
in the issue of unemployment are the suppliers and demanders of labour, 
whose individual decision-making leads to employment or unemployment. 
It is clear that our classification of unemployment gives no insight 
into that individual decision-making (5): we have chosen a macro-economic 
approach which starts with groups of people (e.g the unemployed) or 
aggregate economic variables (e.g the level of demand in the economy). 
(6) The reasons for that choice and for not taking a micro-economic 
approach are given at the end of this appendix: there is explained also 
how some of the insights from the micro-approach have led to important 
modifications to the macro-approach. 
With those two starting points we can classify measures taken to 
reduce unemployment as follows: 
A - to increase the general demand for labour 
В - to decrease the general supply of labour 
С - to change the occupations supplied so as to fit the demand better 
D - to change the occupations demanded so as to fit the supply better 
E - suoply-side measures to reduce frictional unemployment 
F - demand-side measures to reduce frictional unemoloyment 
G - better brokerage between supply and demand 
Two qualifications must be made to this list: 
- measure A will probably also achieve some of the effects desired by 
measures D and F but might work against the effects desired by 
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measures С and E (see the discussion later) 
- the success of supply-side measures С and E will be conditional upon 
the existence of unsatisfied demand to take up the new, now more 
suitable, supply. That condition is made explicit in the wording of 
measures С and E. 
By using the method set out later for analysing unemployment in a 
local area and by combining it with this classification, the measures 
which would probably be most effective in a given situation can be 
chosen - A and В with demand-deficiency unemployment, С and D with 
structural unemployment, E, F and G with frictional unemployment. 
SEGMENTATION IN THE LABOUR MARKET 
The review later of micro-theories of labour markets concentrates on 
those recent developments which have emphasised the amount of mobility 
in labour markets. In the last few years, however, other theoretical 
developments have emphasised precisely the opposite - the extent of 
immobility and segmentation in labour markets. Those latter develop­
ments are important for the following reasons. 
The oroblem-oriented approach emphasised the necessity to make the 
connection - direct and indirect - between the people suffering the 
problem and the people helped by the measure. In the case studies, the 
problem is unemployment and in both Britain and the Netherlands some 
types of people suffer much higher unemployment than the average. In 
general such "vulnerable" or "unemployment prone" social grouoings are 
school leavers, unskilled workers, older workers, wonen, some ethnic 
minorities: the details can vary between areas. Our chosen approach 
requires that we ask the question, therefore: what type of measure 
taken locally will help those people who are suffering the worst un­
employment locally? 
The answer depends on the amount of mobility in the local labour 
market. For example, when Hirsch (1973, ο.16Δ) says: 
"Until recently, it has been assumed that the mix of people 
unemployed tends to be about the same regardless of the level 
of unemployment ... If such an assumption were correct then 
an aggregate labour policy might be fairly effective in 
containing unemployment. However, if such an assumption is 
invalid, then labour policies must become much more specific 
and be directed towards the specific groups in society who 
need and can benefit from labour programs". 
he is implicitly assuming little mobility in the labour market. On 
the other hand, Cheshire (1979) emphasises explicitly the extent of 
mobility (including geographical mobility in local labour markets) and 
therefore recommends increasing the general demand for labour in order 
to relieve the unemployment of particular social groupings (because 
the extra general demand will quickly filter through the labour market 
into an extra demand for unskilled workers, school leavers, etc.). The 
question of mobility requires further attention therefore, and we give 
it in two stages - first the mobility of supply and demand across social 
classifications of skills, race, sex, age, (7) etc. (the question of 
segmentation in the labour market), second the mobility of supply and 
demand across distance (the question of the locational effects of local 
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measures). 
There is little ooint here in trying to summarise the current state 
of theories of labour market segmentation - the division into internal/ 
external labour markets, or into craft/fi m-specifi c/residual sub-
markets, or into primary upper/primary lower/secondary sectors, or into 
primary internal/primary external/secondary internal/secondary external 
segments, or into non-conpeting grouos. It is more useful to refer to 
existing critical reviews (e.g in English to Lovendge and Mok, 1979(b), 
in Dutch to Vissers, 1979). What is most important here is the 
significance of those theories "The essence of segmentalist theories 
is the all-pervasive nature of barriers to mobility" say Jain and Sloane 
(1977, quoted in Lovendge and "lok, 1979(a), p.35) which means, for 
our purposes, barriers which might prevent those peonie who are suffering 
the worst unemployment from taking advantage of opoortumties created 
by the employment measures. The higher the barriers, the more important 
it is to direct the unemployment measures at those oeople whom it is 
wished to helo. (S) 
That barriers exist is indisputable. Lovendge and Mok (1979(b), ρ 81) 
suggest three empirically testable hypotheses derived from theories of 
segmentation of which the first is: 
"stigmatized groups are identifiable because peoole with their 
characteristics are "crowded" into low-paying jobs, or jobs 
with no upward career prospects, or jobs with low security of 
employment, or jobs with bad working conditions". 
And they summarise the evidence in their paper (1979(a)): 
"The "crowding" of minority groups into bad occupations, bad 
industries and bad regions can be shown to occur in advanced 
capitalist economies, but the cultural/institutional structuring 
of this "crowding" appears to be different across countries. 
Age, aptitude, physical handicap, migrant origin, sex and 
education can all be shown to affect market chances in Europe's 
labour markets. 
... From the empirical evidence there is little doubt that 
obvious differences exist between the characteristics regarded 
as debilitating in labour by employers That is to say that 
separate demand schedules exist for male and female labour 
for white and black labour, etc. .. " (9) 
That is far from being conclusive evidence that one or the other of 
the various theories of labour market segmentation is correct Moreover, 
in their present form the theories cannot be empirically tested for 
"tests of the dual hypothesis require some criteria for determining 
in advance ... what degree of bimodality or immobility would be 
sufficient to j'ustify the dual label" (Cain, 1975a, quoted in Lovendge 
and Mok, 1979(b), p.74) and no criteria are given. 
Fortunately, for us the significant question is not. is there a dual 
labour market7 but: what are the important segments of the labour market, 
especially those which affect the chances of unemployment7 and. how 
great are the barriers to mobility, especially the mobility of people 
in unemployment-prone groupings moving into (better) employment7 The 
first of those questions is answered by identifying the unemployment-
prone social groupings in the labour market under analysis. To answer 
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the second of those questions requires extremely difficult investigations 
which to our knowledge have not yet been made (10) (and, moreover, the 
size of the barriers might be different in different local labour 
markets). 
In that situation it would seem advisable to croceed as follows. Before 
considering segmentation we listed seven types of measure - A to G -
which could be taken against unemployment. They were general measures 
in that they were not to be directed at any particular social grouping. 
The smaller the barriers to mobility the more would those general 
measures benefit those people in the vulnerable social groupings, and 
vice versa. If it was not known how big the barriers were it would be 
advisable, in order to ensure that the people with the greatest problems 
were helped, to supplement the general measures A to G with specific 
measures Ag to Gg, each measure qualified by the social grouping to 
which it was directed (the suffix g indicates that qualification). Then 
we have the following supplementary list of measures against unemploy-
ment: 
Ag - to increase the demand for a particular social grouping e.g. 
by job creation projects for school leavers 
B.l.g - to decrease the supply of a particular social grouping (e.g. 
by early retirement payments) 
B.2.g - to redistribute existing enployment in favour of a particular 
social grouping e.g. by decreasing the suoply of labour in 
such a way as to make available existing jobs and by re-
allocating those freed jobs to the people in that grouping 
(for example, splitting full-time into part-time jobs for married 
women) 
Cg - to change the occupations supplied by a particular social 
grouping so as to fit the demand better, e.g. by retraining 
schemes for older men 
Dg - to change the occupations demanded of a particular social 
grouping so as to fit the supply better, e.g. reducing the skill 
requirements for vacancies to be filled by certain groupings 
(a positive discrimination), possibly with internal training 
afterwards 
Eg - supply-side measures to reduce frictional unemployment, aimed 
at a particular social grouping, e.g. helping school leavers 
to become more "employable" 
Fg - demand-side measures to reduce frictional unemployment, aimed 
at a particular social grouping, e.g. firms should stop 
discriminating in the hiring of coloured, female, older workers 
Gg - better brokerage between supoly and demand for a oarticular 
social grouping, e.g. in England, where that function for young 
people is performed by specially trained local authority 
"Careers Officers", not by the general Employment Offices. 
Three comments must be made about that list: 
- the smaller the barriers to mobility the more will the effects of 
measures directed at a particular grouping filter through to other 
groupings and the less will be the benefit gained by the target 
grouping. 
- measures Cg and Eg aim to improve the supply offered by a particular 
social grouping. However, the extent to which that improved supply 
is taken up by the general demand for labour will depend on the 
nature and extent of the discrimination against the social grouping. 
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-all of the measures favour one or a few social groupings and they 
all (except for Ag which creates the extra jobs for those favoured 
groupings) favour those groupings at the expense of the rest. Further-
more, whereas measures Cg to Gg increase the chances for some social 
groupings of finding a job relative to the chances of the rest of the 
unenployed, measure B2g increases the chances of some social groupings 
by creating extra unemployment for others. That is, all the measures 
Ag to Gg redistribute the chances of being unemployed, measure Ag 
reduces total unemployment, measures Cg to Gg might reduce total un-
employment (by reducing the structural and frictional components) but 
might not, and measure B2g does nothing to reduce total unemployment. 
That must be recognised: the aim of social-grouping specific un-
employment measures is as much to redistribute the chances of being 
unemployed as to reduce total unemployment (Needham, 1981), and the 
justification for such measures is not so much economic (to increase 
output) as social (to counteract the extra difficulties which some 
people face in finding a job). 
GEOGRAPHICAL MOBILITY 
In neo-classical labour market theory, distance is recognised as one 
of the factors which segment the labour market into sub-markets, and 
the analysis into and of local labour markets is a well established 
branch of economic theory (Lovendge and Mok, 1979(b), chap.3, summarise 
the state of the art). However, we cannot take over those theories, 
for they are based on the idea of closed local labour markets, while 
we have to work with open markets and economically arbitrary areas. 
So for our purposes, the important questions are about geographical 
mobility (or "inter-local effects", see chapter 2) - e.g. if the measure 
is applied in a given area, how much will it benefit people living in 
that area/working in that area, and how much will it benefit people 
living or working in other areas7 if it is desired to help people living 
in a given area, in what area or areas should the measure be applied7 
- questions which cannot be avoided by choosing an area for analysis 
which is a closed (net or gross) labour market. 
The importance of geographical mobility is illustrated by the issue 
which Cheshire (1979) discusses-unemployment in inner areas. According 
to him, an inner area (but it need not be geographically an inner area: 
it could be an outlying council housing estate) accommodates by reason 
of the housing it offers relative to the housing offered elsewhere, a 
type of worker who, in comparison with other workers, is likely to 
suffer high unemployment. The housing in that area is the local "cause" 
of the high local unemployment, but only in that it draws together a 
concentration of people with poor employment chances. Measures to change 
that local condition (the housing) will only displace or disperse the 
unemployed and will do nothing to reduce the total number unemployed 
unless the previously unemployed move or are moved to areas where the 
general demand for labour is higher. (11) Moreover, if local demand 
reflation (i.e. applied to the inner area itself) is used to try to 
tackle that local unemployment, that measure will probably fail (unless 
it happened that the concentration of poor housing was geographically 
very remote), because distances are so small that better qualified 
workers/would-be workers living nearby will take most of those extra 
jobs 
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Suppose that a different measure is taken in order to help those inner 
area unemployed, namely training schemes to improve their productivity 
or their "employability". If the inner area (or any other geographical 
concentration of poor housing) is surrounded by areas of unsatisfied 
demand for that type of retrained labour, then by travelling a little 
further to work the retrained person will be able to acquire work. 
If not (e.g. if the appropriate labour demand in the suburbs is no 
higher) then measures to change the labour supply will have little 
success in reducing the inner area unemployment. 
Now, according to Cheshire (1979), "The spatial dimension of labour 
markets is simply one more dimension in terns of which mobility occurs". 
He goes on "It is useful to define two sorts of mobility in the spatial 
dimension: continuous mobility may be defined as job mobility without 
residential relocation, discontinuous mobility involves both job 
mobility (or a move from unemployment or inactivity to employment) and 
residential relocation. Evidence suggests that the volume of both 
continuous spatial mobility and discontinuous spatial mobility is a 
function of the level of excess demand for labour" 
Particularly interesting in that quotation is the idea that 
geographical mobility can be treated in the same way as mobility 
across segments of the labour market - that is, in terms of barriers 
of an unknown (and possibly variable) height. That idea we shall apply 
by first assuming that continuous mobility is costless within and does 
not go outside given boundaries and that there is no discontinuous 
mobility. The (arbitrary) area within which we are studying unemployment 
is, let us say, I (see figure III.l). Suppose that the boundaries 
within which journeys-to-work are free are as shown, which delineates 
three further areas II, III and IV If the concern is for the unemploy­
ment of people 1iving in I then, relevant to that oroblem.are. 
- the supply of labour in I 
- the demand for labour in the area accessible from I (i.e. I and II) 
- the competing supply of labour in the area to which work in (I and II) 
is accessible i.e in (II and III) 
If, on the other hand, the concern is for the unemployment of the people 
working in the area I (and possibly living, therefore, in I and II) 
then relevant to this problem are 
- the supply of labour in (I and II) 
- the demand for labour in the area accessible to (I and II) i.e. in 
(I and II and III) 
- the competing supply of labour in the area to which work in (I and II 
and III) is accessible ι e in (III and IV) 
In the list of seven employment measures A to G each measure is now 
qualified by the location of its application (indicated by the suffix 1 
- e.g. Al to Gl). Suppose first that we are concerned with the unemploy­
ment of people 11 ving in I. Then we can list the following: 
Al - to increase the general demand for labour by firms in I and II 
Bl - to decrease the general supply of labour by peonie living in I, II 
and III 
CI - to change the occupations supplied by people living in I so as to 
fit better the demand by firms in I and II 
Dl - to change the occupations demanded by firms in I and II so as to 
fit better the supply by people living in I 
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Figure III.l The geographical areas relevant to a study of employment 
in area I 
El - supply-side measures applied to people living in I to reduce 
frictional unemployment 
Fl - demand-side measures applied to firms in I and II to reduce 
frictional unemployment 
Gl - better brokerage between supply in I and demand in I and II. 
Second, suppose we are concerned with the unemployment of people 
working in I. The following local employment measures are then relevant: 
Al - to increase the general demand for labour by firms in I, II and 
III 
Bl - to decrease the general supply of labour by people living in I, II, 
III and IV 
CI - to change the occupations supplied by people living in I and II 
so as to fit better the demand by firms in I, II and III 
Dl - to change the occupations demanded by firms in I, II and III so 
as to fit better the supply by people living in I and II 
El - supply-side measures applied to people living in I and II to 
reduce frictional unemployment 
Fl - demand-side measures applied to firms in I, II and III to reduce 
frictional unemployment 
Gl - better brokerage between supply in I and II and demand in I, II 
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and III 
We now drop the assumptions of costless mobility within given 
boundaries and of no discontinuous mobility. Drooping the first means 
that the boundaries of areas II, III and IV cease to be fixed or sharp: 
the boundaries become gradients, the actual journey-to-work flows are 
subject to geographical differences in the level of the excess demand 
for labour, and the distances travelled vary according to the tyoe 
of worker (e g. richer people travel further - see Cheshire, 1980, 
working mothers are tied to the school hours of their children - see 
Bramley, 1979). Dropping the second assumption blurs the boundaries 
of areas II, III and IV even more because people can rehouse into or 
out of the different areas: moreover the ease of rehousing varies 
according to the type of worker, being more difficult for poorer people 
and for many of those with the greatest difficulties in the labour 
market (12) 
The value of such a geographical analysis is that it illustrates 
Cheshire's suggestion (see above) that we can treat "the spatial 
dimension of labour markets" as one more dimension in terms of which 
mobility occurs, such as the skills dimension, the male/female 
dimension, the age dimension. Those latter we have treated as segments 
of the labour market, across which mobility might sometimes be 
difficult but rarely impossible, and we concluded that it might often 
be useful to supplement employment measures aimed at the general labour 
market with employment measures directed at specific segments of the 
labour market. Applying that conclusion to the geographical dimension, 
we see that the boundaries of the areas 11, III and IV are no more 
than hindrances to mobility (and here we can group continuous and dis-
continuous mobility together). And general measures against unemploy-
ment (A to G) can be supplemented with measures applied in a particular 
location (Al to Gl) to which the following qualifications must be added. 
- taking a local measure against unemployment in a oarticular area 
does not imply that a national measure would not help these people, 
only that the locational discontinuities in labour markets might 
hinder the desired working-out of that effect on the people living 
in that location 
- the greater the geographical mobility the more will people living in 
a particular location be able to benefit from general measures, and 
the less will people living in a particular location be able to 
derive exclusive benefit from a measure applied there. On the other 
hand, the smaller the geographical mobility, the more important it is 
that employment measures have their effects in the area where the 
people live whom it is desired to help. As the evidence suggests (see 
above) that unemployment-prone people are less nobile (both contin-
uously and discontinuously) than the average, then this consideration 
is more important for them than for other people. 
- there is no reason why we should not combine our analyses of labour 
market segmentation and geographical mobility and identify measures 
specified both by certain social groupings and by certain locations. 
The seven general employment measures A to G can then be expanded 
into a list of measures Agi to Ggl, which is what we find in practice 
- local governments take local measures to help certain unemployment-
prone social groupings. 
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LOCAL MEASURES OR NATIONAL MEASURES7 
We are now sufficiently prepared to give further consideration to the 
question which was raised in chapter 1: should local oroblems be 
tackled with local measures or with national measures7 and to which we 
referred in appendix II as "the argument that to tackle local employment 
problems might require measures especially designed to be appropriate 
to the local conditions and applied to local areas" A part of the answer 
has already been given in the previous section where we said that, if 
the geographical mobility of labour was low, then measures to help the 
unemployed in a particular location must have their effects in a 
location accessible to the unemployed. But that is not the complete 
answer, for it could well be that an appropriate measure applied 
nationally (e.g. demand reflation, tax concessions) would have the 
desired effect in the desired location (or in every location, including 
the desired location). It remains to be shown that-
- local employment problems might have local causes, and that 
- if so, then measures applied selectively to remove those local causes 
should be taken. 
The first of the above points we shall tackle by talking not of the 
"causes" of a problem but of its "explanatory conditions" Ve assume 
that the unemployment in a particular location has been analysed into 
its explanatory conditions, (13) which are then divided into two sorts: 
- (X) those which are the same locally as nationally.e g. high interest 
rates, unwillingness to invest because of nationally reigning 
business uncertainty, export difficulties because of a too high 
exchange rate or a depressed foreign market, the demand for the 
output of a particular industry is declining nationally. 
- (Y) those which are different locally than nationally, e g. poor local 
transport links which make the area unattractive to industrialists; 
a local shortage of land, of buildings, of a particular sort of 
labour; an inefficient local labour market because of poor 
exchange of information, discrimination by employers, badly 
organised labour training, an overrepresentation of a particular 
sort of industry which is declining nationally 
Notethat, in making this distinction, we are not looking for area-
based explanations of local concentrations of unemployment problems 
(the dangers in which explanations are well expounded by Hammett, 1979). 
All we are saying is that, if unemployment in one area is different in 
nature or extent from unemployment nationally, then there must be 
specifically local conditions (Y-type) which contribute to those 
differences. We go on: if those specifically local conditions were 
removed, then that should help towards reducing unemployment in the 
area. That is an unexceptionable statement unless you argue that the 
nature of social/economic processes is such as to continually create 
or recreate differences between areas in such a way that attempts to 
improve a local situation will always be thwarted or in such a way 
that local disadvantages will symply be switched to other areas (such 
an argument can be read into some Marxist analyses - see, e.g., 
Janssen, 1980). 
We now move to the second point - that measures should be applied 
selectively to remove those specifically local causes We use the 
distinction between X-type conditions (the same locally as nationally) 
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and Y-type conditions (specifically local). One could in principle 
tackle both types of conditions (some but not all of X and all of Y) 
by measures applied locally, for both types of conditions are 
experienced locally. In practice, however, the X-type conditions would 
probably not be tackled by local measures because: 
- if the condition lies outside the locality (e.g. exchange rates) local 
measures cannot affect it 
- if the condition lies inside the locality but also outside it (e.g. 
high interest rates) then firms etc. outside the locality could take 
advantage of the local measure, causing big "leaks', so that the 
local measure was very inefficient in bringing about local effects 
- if the planning and executive agency is central government it will 
prefer for equity reasons to take measures applied uniformly over 
the whole country because the conditions are experienced nationally 
- if the planning and executive agency is local government it will 
either not be able to afford to take local measures which largely 
leak away or it will be orevented by central government from taking 
local actions which run counter to national macro-economic policy 
(e.g. a contracyclical monetary or fiscal policy) 
There is, on the other hand, a good argument for trying to tackle 
some of the Y-type conditions (i e. conditions which are different 
locally than nationally) with local measures, namely that it is in-
efficient to apply measures to the whole country to change conditions 
which are oroblematic only in some parts of the country (e g in-
adequate roads, insufficient skilled labour). (14) 
There is a small but important qualification which must be added 
McGregor (1979) studied a particular area with very high unemployment 
and concluded that "unemployment varies systematically with certain 
individual characteristics but is probably not causally related to 
residence in a deprived area": that is, there is a high unemployment 
rate because there is a concentration of housing which is dis-
proportionately occupied by unemployment-prone individuals. If we say 
that the "specifically-local explanatory condition" is the concentration 
of a certain type of housing and if that concentration is broken up 
or the housing changed, then the unemployment seen as an 'area's' 
problem has been removed but the unemployed persons remain unemployed. 
If, on the other hand, we say that the "specifically-local explanatory 
condition" is a concentration of (say) unskilled workers, and if those 
people could more easily find work after training, then the appropriate 
measure would be a training scheme, moreover, considering the 
geographical mobility of the unemployed, the training should be offered 
within easy travelling distance of the unemployed We conclude that a 
concentration of unskilled unemployed requires a concentration of 
training opportunities - i.e. a local measure. McGregor (1979) argues 
"To the extent that unemployment is less an area problem and more a 
problem for certain types of individual (for example, the unskilled 
irrespective of where they live) it would seem fair to allocate 
resources for tackling the problem on the basis of individual and not 
residential criteria". We agree. But it is also incontrovertible that, 
where there is a concentration of unskilled people,then it is more 
efficient (less travelling in total) to concentrate the training schemes 
in the same area. That is, training schemes (and other employment 
measures) can be located in deprived areas without raising the equity 
problems (as McGregor sees them) of "allowing easier access to 
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training programmes for residents of deonved areas". (15) 
With that qualification about formulating the specifically-local 
explanatory conditions we conclude that where some of the conditions 
contributing to a local unemployment problem are different locally 
than nationally and where it is desired to reduce that unemoloyment by 
applying measures to change those specifically local conditions, then 
it will be more efficient to restrict those measures to an application 
in the locality than to apply the measures nationally. But whether 
local measures are, in fact, required or desirable cannot be answered 
in general or a priori, for the answer depends on several factors (the 
degree of geographical mobility, the relative contribution of 
specifically local conditions to the local unemployment, the in-
efficiency involved in tackling specifically local conditions with 
national measures, etc.) the size of which can vary from case to case. 
However, neither can the opposite be argued: that a local concentration 
of unemployment should never be tackled with local measures, always 
with national measures 
MICRO-THEORIES OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND THEIR EFFECT ON MACRO-THEORIES 
In the last few years, the micro-economic processes in labour markets 
have received the attention they lost under the influence of Keynes, 
leading to new micro-economic theories of unemployment. (The collection 
edited by Phelps, 1970, in particular the two essays it contains by 
Holt, 1970a and 1970b, was especially influential. For a textbook 
exposition see Rees, 1973 For an English working of these ideas into 
micro-theories of unemployment see Fisher, 1976) Such theories lay 
great emphasis on the searches undertaken by workers seeking a better 
job and by firms seeking a better worker One of the most important 
conclusions is that "No theory of involuntary unemployment seems 
essential to explain the emergence of unemployment, and even its 
persistence over reasonable periods of time, at quite high levels of 
intensity' (Fisher, 1976) 
The contrast between the macro- and the micro-approaches is described 
by Mines (1976) as follows. 
In the days before the "new" theory, it was commonly believed 
that real world unemployment could be decomposed into frictional, 
seasonal, structural and demand-deficient comoonents. There 
were problems with this classification. For example, . is not 
structural unemployment simply frictional unemployment which 
for various reasons is drawn out in time7 Again, the Keynesian 
notion of demand-deficient unemployment requires that we can 
define full employment. But to what level of actual unemploy-
ment does this correspond9 
. Such oroblems remain within the old classificatory system 
The new micro theory of employment and inflation simply by-
passes them by the bold assertion that ajj_ unemployment is 
frictional. Moreover, it is voluntary ... 
Let us observe that whether we regard unemployment as decomposing 
into demand-deficient, structural, seasonal and frictional 
components, the last being quantitatively the least important, 
or we regard all unemployment as voluntary and frictional, has 
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serious implications for policy. The policy implications of 
the "new" theory are quite clear. If unemployment is voluntary, 
no social disutility attaches to it. Such observed unemploy-
ment merely reflects the optimum off-the-job search which 
util ity-maximsing workers voluntarily undertake in an economy 
which is implicitly assumed to be always at full employment 
Aggregate demand management which interferes with this natural 
rate of unemployment results in non-optimality, in as much as 
it makes workers engage in more or less than the optimal amount 
of search ... (Therefore) .. the only beneficial policy open 
to the government consists in taking steps to improve the 
efficiency of the labour market by increasing the flow of 
information and perhaps reducing the costs of mobility and 
change '. 
The main reason for choosing the "old" macro-theory rather than the 
"new" micro-theory is that an important aim of the latter is to deduce 
certain macro-conclusions (such as the natural rate of unemployment 
and the relationship between the rate of unemployment and the rate of 
inflation - see, e.g., the discussion by Brittan, 1976) which are just 
not applicable at the local scale. (16) For example suppose that, in 
a town where the unemployment rate is similar to the national average, 
a large firm closes down. Unemployment in that town will then increase 
but with no appreciable effects on the level of wages or prices, for 
those are set at the national level. And it seems reasonable to say 
that demand-deficiency is the cause of (at least some of) that extra 
unemployment. Moreover, if by government help new firms are attracted 
to the town, then unemoloyment there will fall, prices and wages will 
be unaffected, and we can sensibly speak of a reduction in demand-
deficiency unemployment. It is for a similar reason that we do not use 
that approach to unemployment which, as Thirlwall (1969) puts it, 
classifies unemployment on a "cure" (rather than a "causal") basis. 
That approach distinguishes between unemployment that could be eliminated 
by expanding demand without causing intolerable inflation (where the 
rate of inflation that is just tolerable is defined before-hand) and 
unemployment that could not be so eliminated: but because inflation 
is determined nationally, that distinction cannot be applied locally. 
We ought to consider further, however, one of the central ideas in 
the new micro-theories of unemployment - the idea of job search and 
the concomitant concentration on "flows" in the labour market (e.g 
into and out of unemployment) rather than on 'stocks" (e.g. the number 
of people unemployed). This could be important because proponents of 
the "flows" view of the labour market have argued that the volume of 
labour turnover might explain much of the current high levels of 
unemployment: moreover, Clark (1980) has shown that it is possible to 
apply the "flows" view in analysing local labour markets and another 
author (Sugden, 1980) has modified search theory to incorporate journeys 
to work in a regional labour market. There are two reasons why we do 
not adopt this approach. The first is that it requires data which are 
not available at the local level (not in Britain or the Netherlands, 
at any rate), the second is that recent empirical work 'has suggested 
that recurrent turnover may not contribute as largely to the level of 
unemployment as initially thought' (Clark,1980) 
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However, we cannot ignore the developments in labour market theory 
of the last few years and use the macro-theory of frictional/structural/ 
demand-deficiency unemployment without modifications It is not that 
we need to modify the very simple starting point of distinguishing 
three causes of unemployment in a local area, rather that we must be 
very careful how we operationalise it Suppose for example that the 
local demand for labour was increased if the demand-deficiency in the 
local area was not great and if the extra demand was for occupations 
not available among the already unemployed, then the effect of that 
measure would be different than if there was a big deficiency of demand 
And obviously the effect of labour retraining schemes will depend on 
the type and extent of structural unemployment What is needed, we 
conclude, is an idea of the importance of the three causes of unemploy­
ment in a local labour market and an idea of the inter-relationships 
between those causes 
In order to operational!se the division into three causes of un­
employment we have to try to split the total unemployment in a local 
area into that part caused by demand-deficiency, that caused by 
occupational mismatch, and that caused by friction That is the so-called 
'classification of unemployment" and given adequate unemployment and 
vacancy statistics it can be done (see, e g Thirlwall, 1969 and Cheshire, 
1973) (17) However, the classes are not independent of each other 
as Cheshire (1973) says 'A classification into, say, 1% fnctional 
unemployment, 2% structural and 3% demand-deficiency does not mean that 
increasing demand by 3% and retraining 2% of employees would leave only 
1% fnctional unemployment The increase in demand would alter 
structural and fnctional unemployment some of it would pile up 
vacancies for which potential applicants existed but were not yet 
recruited and some of it would increase the number of vacancies 
for which there were insufficient candidates in the required trades, 
though others might be made available by retraining" However, and this 
is important for our purposes, 'what the analysis does indicate is, 
very roughly, whether extra demand, or retraining, or improved inform­
ation and mobility of labour, or some combination of these, is 
likely to be the thing most required to produce some reduction of un­
employed" (Cheshire, 1973, his emphasis (18)) 
There are further inter-relationships between the three causes of 
unemployment which can be important for our purooses The micro-theories 
of unemployment emphasise mobil ιty in the labour market (19) Cheshire 
(1979) in his exposition and development of Holt's model (see Holt, 
1970a and 1970b) says that labour "is best described as a continuum, 
but in many dimensions We may draw boundaries in the labour market 
with respect to a oarticular dimension, between occupations or skills, 
on industrial lines or between classes, or primary and secondary 
segments, but I wish to emphasise the extent or which those lines are 
crossed, and more importantly, the fact that the volume and direction 
of net flow are not exogenous but endogenous and a function of excess 
demand" 
That type of mobility has important implications for the classification 
of unemployment For if the willingness of an employer to hire someone 
who does not possess precisely the skills required depends on the level 
of excess demand for labour, then a particular mismatch that would lead 
to structural unemployment in a labour market with low demand would 
not lead to unemployment in another labour market with high demand 
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And if the willingness of a worker to accept a job depends on the 
number of jobs on offer, then a job offer that would be taken up in a 
low demand labour market might in a high demand labour market be 
rejected, so adding to frictional unemployment. More generally this 
implies, says Cheshire (1980) "that there will be interaction between 
the level of excess demand prevailing in a region and the measure of 
labour market efficiency most commonly used. This would extend ... to 
individual measures (of efficiency) such as structural unemployment, 
"mismatch" or frictional unemployment". 
In the light of the above, is it still valid to take as a starting 
point the three causes of unemployment in a local area and to claim 
that this can be operationalised to give guidance in the choice of 
measures to reduce local unemployment7 We would answer yes, for the 
following reasons: 
- that it is useful in practice to distinguish between measures to 
reduce unemployment by trying to increase the general demand for 
labour, by trying to reduce occupational mismatches, and by trying 
to reduce labour market frictions. 
- that the simple method proposed by Cheshire (1973) for classifying 
unemployment into demand-deficiency, structural and frictional is 
adequate for indicating which type or types of measures should be 
appi led. 
- that the fact that measures which change the level of demand-def-
iciency might change structural and frictional unemployment also, 
and hence might modify the effects of measures taken specifically 
to reduce structural and frictional unemployment, is not likely to 
be sufficiently significant as to invalidate the distinction between 
those three types of measures or to elevate demand-deficiency 
measures to a pre-eminent oosition in all circumstances (20) 
- moreover, the worse (higher) the local unemployment and the more 
marginal the measures taken against it (and local governments have 
only weak powers for influencing unemployment locally) the less 
will be the inter-relationships between the three causes of un-
employment and between demand-deficiency measures and structural 
and frictional unemployment. 
NOTES 
(1) As Cheshire, 1973, says "The most effective remedy .. is bound to 
depend on (the) cause and if Keynesian demand-deficiency should not 
be the sole, or even the most important, reason, Keynesian remedies 
alone cannot be expected to eliminate the problem". 
(2) This is a much disputed problem, see e g. Kottis,1972, Carmichael, 
1978, Lovendge and Mok,1979(b), chap.3. Cheshire, 1979, argues 
that the boundaries of a local labour market shift according to the 
level of demand for labour in that market, in which case the 
necessity of being able to work with arbitrary areas is even greater 
(3) Note that there are many things that we do not require of our 
theoretical framework - e g . to link the level of unemployment and 
the level of inflation, to link suooly and demand in a particular 
labour market with the setting of wages in that market, the feed-
back between final (consumer) demand and aggregate labour demand, 
all of which are determined at a larger scale than local labour 
markets It follows that what is offered here is a very partial 
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approach to unemployment. 
(4) Using the terminology of chapter 1, it would be better to say that 
we distinguish the "explanatory conditions" which have caused the 
problem of unemployment to arise. 
(5) As Thirl wall (1969) says " ..it is obviously impossible to put 
individually unemployed men into these boxes. There is no answer to 
the question, for instance, of whether an unemployed coal miner is 
frictionally unemployed because he is in the process of transition 
from one job to another; structurally unemployed because there are 
no vacancies for coalminers, or unemployed due to deficient demand 
because in the aggregate the demand for labour falls short of the 
supply avallable". 
(6) Hence we are not following strictly the approach of methodological 
individualism (see the discussion of chapter 1) However, because 
it is very easy to make the connection between the unemployment 
problems of individuals and the policy conclusions from a macro-
economic study of unemployment, our principle of analysing problems 
in personal terms has not been abandonned 
(7) Demand can be mobile across classifications of skills, age, race, 
sex; supply only across skill classifications (a worker can change 
the skills offered but not age, race or sex) 
(8) As Vissers (1979, p.75) says "The relevance of the dual labour 
market theory is that oeople in the secondary sector need extra 
help to get into the primary sector" He goes further, however, 
and draws the additional conclusion that extra jobs in the 
secondary sector should not be encouraged. We to not take this 
point up because in general local governments do not possess 
instruments which would allow them to pursue such a selective 
policy 
(9) Van Wezel (1979) is concerned with a rather different theory - that 
there is an enforced division of labour - but there is a strong 
similarity with the internal/external markets theory (see Cain, 
1975b) in that he claims that the division of labour is brought 
about by jobs being allocated not by wage-comoetition but by 
employers choosing between competing employees on the basis of 
their (i e the employees') skills, age, sex, etc And he claims 
that the empirical evidence supports his model of the competition 
for workplaces. 
(10) We suggest that the size of the barriers could be conceptualised 
in one of two ways The simplest would be in terms of a wage 
difference for example, how much lower would the wages of a woman 
have to be than the wages of a man of comoarable skill, experience, 
age and race for an employer to be indifferent between the man and 
the women More complicated would be to investigate the elasticity 
of substitution of, say, woman for men - the proportionate increase 
in demand for women (at constant female wages) for a given propor­
tionate increase in male wage rates 
(11) McGregor (1979) analyses the unemployment in a particular "problem" 
housing estate and concludes "if the population (of the whole town) 
was distributed at random within the town, the same individuals 
and groups would still suffer relatively high unemployment rates 
Problem areas . would disappear but the problems of the individ­
uals affected by unemployment would remain" 
(12) Bramley, 1979, ooints out that many of those people are in public 
sector or social housing, where rehousing is often very difficult 
because of waiting lists, etc Loveridge and Mok, 1979(b), ρ 55, 
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quote the evidence that manual workers are less likely to rehouse 
in order to get a job than non-manual workers are. And women are 
often tied to the location of their husbands' work. 
(13) A good example of such an analysis of unemployment in a local 
labour market is to be found in Bramiey, 1979. 
(14) There is the additional argument that if local demand deficiency 
unemployment is higher in some localities than the national average, 
then a national demand reflation to reduce those local problems 
might cause inflationary pressure in the higher demand regions 
(see, e.g., Wilson, 1964). This argument loses a lot of its force, 
however, if unemployment is high in al 1 regions. 
(15) Valkenburg, 1980, p.80, analyses the available Dutch data and comes 
to the provisional conclusion that residence in a deprived 
neighbourhood does contribute independently to unemployment: as 
possible explanations he gives prejudice by employers against 
people living in certain areas and the development of subcultures 
in those areas which are antipathetic to a work ethos. If that is 
so, then there is a case for positive discrimination in favour of 
the residents oT^certain areas. 
(16) This is not to say that if the micro-theory was applicable at the 
local scale then we would accept it. For an elegant dismissal of 
micro-theories of unemployment see Solow, 1980. 
(17) Both those references give methods which rely on an analysis of 
the UV curve (see Brown, 1976 for a description of this analysis). 
There are, however, theoretical oroblems attached to a UV analy-
sis: for a good criticism see Salverda, 1980. It is important to 
note, therefore, that Cheshire, 1973, offers an alternative, a 
simple method that does not rely on an analysis of the UV curve. 
(18) He is referring here to his simple method of classifying unemploy-
ment - see previous footnote. It applies also to those methods 
which analyse the UV curve. 
(19) For example, Holt (1970a) says "the continual flow of workers, 
particularly young and unskilled ones,through the US labour market 
annually averages between one third and one half of the total 
labour force". In Great Britain during 1978 the number of people 
who registered as unemployed was 20% of the total employees in 
employment and the number of people who left the unemployment 
register was slightly greater (Department of Employment Gazette). 
In the Netherlands during 1979 the corresponding figure was 15% 
(Jaarverslag Arbeidsmarkt, 1979) or 13% (according to the Commissie 
Arbeidsmarktverkenmng, 1980). 
(20) See Needham (1981) for a counter to the neglect of measures against 
structural or frictional unemployment and of measures to help 
unemployment-prone social groupings, a neglect inherent in 
arguments (such as that by Cheshire, 1979) which stress the 
importance of demand deficiency. 
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S T E L L I N G E N 
b e h o r e n d bij het p r o e f s c h r i f t van D В N e e d h a m 
" C h o o s i n g the right policy i n s t r u m e n t s " 
1 Het is m de planologie gebruikelijk theorieèn te verdelen in die 
welke betrekking hebben op het planning-object ("theories in planning") 
en die waarin het planmatige handelen centraal staat ("theories of plan-
ning") Het verdient aanbeveling een derde groep theorieën te onder-
scheiden die als schakel tussen beide fungeert en waarin planning-object 
en planmatig handelen met elkaar in verbinding staan, in belangrijke 
mate via de genomen of te nemen maatregelen 
2 Het is niet alleen zo dat "the bad workman blames his tools" (zoals 
de Engelse uitdrukking luidt) maar ook is de vakman onbekwaam die zich 
van de beperkingen van zijn gereedschappen niet bewust is Het zou de 
ontwikkeling van de ruimtelijke planning en ordening ten goede komen 
indien de ruimtelijke ordenaar, als vakman, meer inzicht in de beper 
kingen van de hem/haar ter beschikking staande instrumenten zou hebben 
3 Ten behoeve van een betere evaluatie van het sociaal economische be-
leidsinstrumentarium dienen de effekten van werkgeIegenheιdsmaatregelen 
niet te worden gemeten in termen van het aantal geschapen arbeidsplaat-
sen (zoveeΙ η ι euwe banen) maar in die van het aantal gecreéerde arbeids-
jaren ( = arbeidsplaatsen χ de in tijd uitgedrukte levenskansen voor 
die piaatsen) 
k De "aanzuigende werking op het arbeidsaanbod" van het creéren van 
meer deeltijdbanen (zie het Jaarverslag 198l van De Neder 1andsche Bank 
η ν , blz ^0) welke als argument wordt gehanteerd tegen het nemen van 
daartoe strekkende maatregelen in het licht van het bestrijden van 
werkloosheid, is juist een belangrijk argument vóór het gebruik ervan 
in het kader van een emancipatiebeleid 
5 Teneinde de doeltreffendheid van het gemeentelijke economisch beleid 
niet verder in te snoeren verdient het aanbeveling dat de rijksoverheid 
meer ruimte verschaft voor de inventiviteit en de inzet van gemeenten 
via een versoepeling van het wettelijk vereiste provinciale toezicht 
op de gemeenten 
6 De gebruikelijke vertaling van de Nederlandse woorden "wethouder" 
en "gemeente" met achtereenvolgens de Engelse termen "alderman" en 
"municipality" is onnauwkeurig en nadelig voor de kwaliteit van ver-
gelijkende studies tussen Nederland en Engeland 
7 De in de grondprijstheorie te signaleren, vaak herhaalde uitspraken 
dat de grondkosten geen deel uitmaken van de produkt1ekosten en dat de 
produktprijs bepaald wordt door de produkt1ekosten op marginale gronden 
zijn op zijn minst een over-simp 1 1 f 1 ca11 e en op zijn ergst onjuist en 
mislet dend 
8. Gezien het zeer lage aandeel van de verwervingskosten van ruwe grond 
in de st¡chtingskosten van woningen moet een verklaring voor de grote 
politieke belangstelling voor grondprijzen en voor het gebruikswaarde/ 
marktwaarde-vraagstuk waarschijnlijk eerder worden gezocht bij de machts-
posities die enkele nauw betrokkenen daarbij innemen dan in een bezorgd-
heid voor woonlasten. 
9. Het hertrouwen van een kennis wiens eerste huwelijk ongelukkig was 
heeft Dr Samuel Johnson beschreven met de woorden "a triumph of hope 
over experience". Deze uitspraak is, niettegenstaande de problemen 
aangaande het "leren van de lessen der geschiedenis", evenzeer van toe-
passing op de bewering dat het toch mogelijk is een samenleving zonder 
strukturele confiikten te stichten. 
10. Het zou de discussie over de epistemologische status van weten-
schappelijke uitspraken ten goede komen als in plaats van het gebruike-
lijke debat over de "waardevrijheid van de wetenschap" het onderscheid 
van Hennipman tussen "de persoonlijke neutraliteit van de onderzoeker 
ten opzichte van de doeleinden" en "de logische neutraliteit van het 
wetenschappelijke onderzoek" als uitgangspunt zou worden gehanteerd. 
(Zie Hennipman P., 1977, Welvaartstheorie en economische politiek, 
Samson, Alphen aan den Rijn, blz.82.) 
11. De zin van het gebruik van het begrip "planologie", in de betekenis 
van wetenschap van de ruimtelijke ordening, dient - gezien de afstand 
tussen opleiding en praktijk die dat begrip kan scheppen en gelet op 
het nauwere en vruchtbaarder verband tussen opleiding en praktijk in 
Engeland, waar dat begrip ontbreekt - nader te worden overwogen. 
12. Ondanks de bezwaren die kleven aan het onderscheid tussen planologie 
en ruimtelijke ordening maakt Sinclair Lewis het bestaan van een derge-
lijk onderscheid alleszins aannemelijk: " Carol retained a will-
ingness to be different from brisk, efficient, book-ignoring people; 
an instinct to observe and wonder at their bustle even when she was 
taking part in it. But* as she discovered her career of town plan-
ning, she was now roused to be brisk and efficient herself" (zie Main 
Street, Albatross, Hamburg, ІЭЗ1*. biz.13). 
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